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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE HOPES AND THE REALITIES OF AVIATION IN FRENCH INDOCHINA,
1919-1940
My dissertation examines how and why the French employed aviation in the five
constituent parts of French Indochina (Annam, Cambodia, Cochinchina, Laos, and
Tonkin) during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. I argue that the French,
believing that the modern technology of powered flight possessed seemingly endless
potential, saw aviation as a vehicle for extending, consolidating, developing, and
protecting their interests both within the colony and around Southeast and East Asia.
Aircraft, whether civil or military, were viewed and used as a multi-purpose tool of
empire. Indeed, planes were employed for a variety of tasks in Indochina: transportation
and communication; delivery of patients and medical supplies; colonial development
projects; scientific studies; imperial propaganda; internal policing and assertion of
authority; and air defense of the colony.
My argument is that the realities of what was accomplished with aviation fell far
short of the sky-high hopes that government and military officials and aeronautics
enthusiasts had for flight technology in the empire. My dissertation also examines the
causes and the effects of this yawning gap between what was hoped and what was
accomplished in matters of aviation. When aviation failed to “get off the ground” to the
extent that the French hoped, the reasons typically related to a recurring combination of
unfavorable weather and geography, insufficient funding and aeronautics materials, the
limits of the era’s flight technology, and foreign competition that originated in Europe as
well as Southeast and East Asia. Challenges to French aerial supremacy were present
within the colony itself, although in a more indirect manner, through the ways that the
colonized responded, or failed to respond, to French aviation. In sum, as much as the
French envisioned aircraft as being able to rather easily vanquish the perceived
challenges of the colonial landscape, aviation, in reality, failed to do so or only did so
after a protracted period of time.
My dissertation is positioned at the intersection of colonial aviation history and
the history of French Indochina. While studies in each of these fields have considered
parts of this dissertation’s subject matter, there has been a lack of sustained critical
analysis on French aviation in Indochina. My project contends that Indochina presents a

rich area of study for colonial aviation history because, more so than anywhere else in the
French empire, the aviation efforts in Indochina encapsulated all that the French hoped to
accomplish with aircraft, the era’s most modern, symbolically saturated transportation
technology. In addition, my topic reveals much about the hopes and the realities of the
French colonial project in Indochina as well. Thus by analyzing how aviation was viewed
and used in the context of the Indochina, my dissertation provides insight into not only
what the colonizers wanted to achieve in Indochina but also why this effort failed.
KEYWORDS: Aviation, Indochina, French Empire, French History, Interwar Period.
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INTRODUCTION: AVIATION HISTORY AND COLONIAL HISTORY IN FRENCH
INDOCHINA
Pierre Cordemoy, who wrote at length on aviation and Indochina in the Bulletin
de l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine in the 1930s, affirmed that “the airplane is a
marvelous colonial tool particularly adapted to Indochina, one of the most immense and
most distant of our colonies.” Aviation, he declared, was “an asset of the highest
importance in the overt struggle between nations for...a prominent position in the Pacific
Hemisphere.” Furthermore, Cordemoy described three ways that aviation could be
utilized for the colonial project in Indochina: “the consolidation of peace and security; the
establishment of rapid, scheduled postal links; [and] the extension of French influence to
the interior and exterior of the colony.”1
My dissertation analyzes statements like Cordemoy’s, examining both the logic
that drove such remarks and the ways that French aviation succeeded—and failed—in the
work with which it was charged in Indochina during the 1920s and 1930s.2 The reasons
for these successes and failures—and the resulting consequences—are also considered.
Overall, the French imagined that aviation would make a modern, distinctive, and
significant contribution to French colonialism in Southeast Asia. The various ways in
which aircraft were put to use in Indochina not only reflected this faith in aviation but
also revealed the challenges that the French faced both within the colony and throughout
the empire during this period.3

1

Pierre Cordemoy, “L’Indochine et l’aéronautique,” Bulletin de l’Agence Economique de
l’Indochine (February 1930): 45, 37.
2
By this period in time, French Indochina consisted of five parts: Cochinchina, Tonkin,
Annam, Cambodia, and Laos.
3
My dissertation uses the term “air force” interchangeably with “military aviation” and,
where appropriate, “air service.” Utilizing the term “air force” in the context of pre-1933 France
is, technically, anachronistic; an independent air force was only established on April 1, 1933, a
1

As a relatively new, multi-purpose “tool of empire,” the airplane represented the
ascendant hopes and superiority of the French in Indochina. John Tully argues that the
image of the “heroic aviator” replaced that of the “intrepid explorer” as a symbol of the
French mission in Indochina. Across the French empire and in the context of European
imperialism in general, aviation carried this type of symbolic weight during the 1920s
and 1930s. Thus Robert Aldrich states that aircraft “seemed a fitting symbol for the
[French] colonialists’ new aspirations and initiatives” during this period, and Daniel R.
Headrick contends that these years saw “the pioneering aura that railways had once
possessed passed on to the automobile and the airplane.”4
Yet as my dissertation emphasizes and as Cordemoy’s remarks indicate, the
appeal of aviation went beyond representation and symbol. In addition, aircraft were
perceived and utilized—by government and military officials, scientists, commercial
airlines, and local businesses—as a vehicle for extending, consolidating, developing, and
protecting French interests both within Indochina and throughout Southeast and East
Asia. While aviation may have appeared to be the preeminent “tool of empire,” my

date prior to which military aircraft were attached to either the army or the navy. My analysis
nonetheless employs this term for the entirety of the interwar years as a means of avoiding
excessive repetition and adding variety. In any case, the creation of the air force in the spring of
1933 did not have much of a direct, immediate impact on Indochina’s squadrons. Christophe
Cony and Michel Ledet explain that “the parliamentary turmoil linked to the creation of the future
[air arm] hardly affected the colony.” They note that there was “little change” for the time being,
as the functioning of the air force units—“the nature itself of the air squadrons”—kept them in the
service of the land-based army. Of course, the creation of the air force did result in certain
alterations to the structure and financing for military aviation, such as how infrastructure work
would be funded. Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet, L’Aviation française en Indochine: Des
origines à 1945 (Outreau: Lela Presse, 2012), 202, 210.
4
John Tully, France on the Mekong: A History of the Protectorate of Cambodia
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002), 261; Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A
History of French Overseas Expansion (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 116; Daniel R.
Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 49-50.
2

analysis reveals otherwise.5 Thus my dissertation argues that the realities of aviation in
Indochina—and, indeed, the realities of aviation throughout the French empire—in the
1920s and 1930 never reached the sky-high hopes that were attached to powered flight.
This gap between what was envisioned and what was achieved was evident—though to
differing extents—across the entire spectrum of aviation usage in the colony. The
realities of flight fell short of the hopes most completely and most noticeably with regard
to utilizing airpower as a defense against external threats. In other ways, aviation was
more successfully employed. Prominent among these successes was the gradual
development of commercial air routes to, within, and through Indochina as well as and
the application of aerial photography and reconnaissance to colonial development
projects and scientific studies. The success of other fields of aircraft usage can be judged
as falling somewhere in the middle. On the whole, even in cases that the French could
cite as aerial achievements, the realities of aviation tended to fall short of the hopes
according to some metric—whether cost, usage, practicality, efficacy, or speed of
development.
There were various reasons that aviation failed to meet French expectations as the
5

The phrase “tool of empire” is taken from Headrick’s book, The Tools of Empire:
Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century. In this study, Headrick
examines how developments in different types of technology—these related to breakthroughs in
medicine, communications, weapons, railroads, and water transport—encouraged European
imperial expansion during the nineteenth century, particularly from mid-century onward.
Contending that the Europe’s imperialist projects required appropriate motives as well as
sufficient means, Headrick asserts that the aforementioned period was characterized not only by
new technology but also by renewed interest in the penetration, conquest, and consolidation of
large swaths of Africa and Asia. He argues this point by considering “the technological changes
that made imperialism happen, both as they enabled motives to produce events, and as they
enhanced the motives themselves.” Headrick concludes that “the flow of new technologies in the
nineteenth century made imperialism so cheap that it reached the threshold of acceptance among
the peoples and governments of Europe, and led nations to become empires.” Daniel R. Headrick,
The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 9-11, 206.

3

arch tool of empire in Indochina. To begin with, the limitations of the era’s planes and the
colony’s unfavorable weather and challenging geography kept aircraft grounded.
Additionally, along with European nations and the United States, neighboring Asian
powers contested, implicitly or explicitly, the supremacy of French aviation in this part of
the globe. As they worked to establish routes to and through Southeast Asia, French
aviation interests often were required to negotiate contracts on supposedly equal terms. In
such cases, the French found themselves in, at best, a position of near-equal footing that
required compromise or, at worst, a position of weakness and vulnerability vis-à-vis their
counterparts. Even within the colony, albeit in a more indirect manner, the supremacy of
French aviation was challenged by the native populations.
Furthermore, the process of installing and maintaining aviation—from developing
an infrastructure to acquiring aeronautics materials and personnel to finding a customer
base—proved difficult, if not impossible at times, and often yielded returns that were
meager compared to the immediate costs involved. The necessary terrestrial
infrastructure—networks of airfields, radio and meteorological posts, and fuel sites—was
itself a hindrance that kept aviation very much tethered to the earth. Aviation in
Indochina remained tethered to—and frequently handicapped by—developments in
France as well. Indeed, aviation was an expensive, specialized technology, and the
funding and resources required to keep it aloft in a colony that was distant from the
metropole were not always forthcoming; this was an especially problematic issue during
the 1930s as the economic crisis of the first half of the decade gave way to the reality of
another war in Europe in the later 1930s. As my dissertation demonstrates, these bonds to
the metropole related more to large-scale economic, military, and diplomatic concerns

4

than to specific policy changes that accompanied the political shifts within the French
government amidst the tumultuous climate of the mid-to-late 1930s.

The Significance of Aviation and Empire in the Interwar Years
While fostering the growth and technological refinement of the aeronautics
industry, the First World War had aptly demonstrated the usefulness of aircraft for
military purposes. The postwar years witnessed further rapid development in aeronautics.
Robin Higham points out that this period experienced “a revolution in various aviation
technologies.” Higham explains that “as the range, speed, ceiling, and carrying capacity
of aircraft became greater, the aircraft and engine industries started to flourish.” Aware of
such technological improvements, governments and entrepreneurs began to grasp that
aviation potentially possessed “global diplomatic and economic significance.” In turn,
this realization heightened desires throughout the West to develop national aeronautics
industries.6
In addition, public interest in flying dramatically increased during the 1920s and
1930s. Historian Bernhard Rieger states that European and American publics had
followed aviators’ exploits since the Wright brothers’ pioneering flights of December
1903. Yet after the First World War, this fascination with pilots transformed into a

6

Robin Higham, “Introduction,” in The Influence of Airpower upon History:
Statesmanship, Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy since 1903, ed. Robin Higham and Marik Parillo
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 8. For analyses of the French aeronautics
industry in the twentieth century, see Emmanuel Chadeau, De Blériot à Dassault: Histoire de
l’Industrie Aéronautique en France, 1900-1950 (Paris: Fayard, 1987) and Herrick Chapman,
State Capitalism and Working-Class Radicalism in the French Aircraft Industry (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991).
5

“subject of popular curiosity verging on the obsessive.”7 Discussing the general appeal of
aircraft in the 1930s, Robert Wohl argues that “no other machine seemed to represent as
fully humankind’s determination to escape from age-old limitations, to defy the power of
gravity, and to obliterate the tyranny of time and space.”8 Yet as aviation was a stilldeveloping technology in the postwar years, Western nations considered the destructive
and bellicose potential of aircraft alongside the globally unifying and humane
possibilities for flight.9

7

The nature of this conflict had itself magnified the symbolism of human flight. The
image of the pilot freely soaring above the trenches to engage in combat with a single aerial
adversary harkened back to romantic notions of knightly conduct in battle, thus offering a sharp
contrast to the faceless slaughter in the mud below. In this manner, the airplane—“the most
significant technological achievement of the modern world”—functioned as a way to affirm
traditional values. “Through the postwar decade flying retained these associations,” Modris
Eksteins asserts. Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern
Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1989), 264-265. Yet Robert Wohl cautions that the reality of how
aircraft were utilized in the First World War did not reflect such notions: the “passion for aces
and their exploits...concealed the fact that airplanes were used primarily during the First World
War to observe movement on the surface of the earth.” Robert Wohl, A Passion for Wings:
Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1908-1918 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1994), 285.
8
Bernhard Rieger, Technology and the Culture of Modernity in Britain and Germany,
1890-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 117; Robert Wohl, The Spectacle of
Flight: Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1920-1950 (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2005), 1-2, 4, 279.
9
Contemporary discussions about aviation within governments and among the public
reflected both hopeful expectations and profound dread about the potential of powered flight. For
example, in referencing the “fearsome dangers” and “unexpected opportunities” of aviation in
this period, Peter Fritzsche remarks that “the air age was both fabulous and horrible.” However,
as Wohl observes, aerial attacks on civilians “moved from a threat to a destructive reality”
between the start of the Spanish Civil War in the summer of 1936 and August 1945. The Western
public’s view of aviation was ultimately changed by news headlines about horrific events
stretching from the German Condor Legion’s bombing of Guernica in late April 1937 to the
Allied incendiary attacks on the city of Dresden in February 1945 to the atomic bombs dropped
on Japan that August. By the end of the Second World War, the use of airpower to level cities and
decimate civilian populations had seemed to confirm people’s worst fears about aviation’s
destructive potential. In his chronologically broad comparative study of aviation, Emmanuel
Chadeau contends that Western nations have struggled since the start of the twentieth century—
and continue to struggle—to reconcile their desires for what has been these opposing yet
intertwined elements of flight: the capacity of aviation to uplift individuals and unify all of
humanity; and the capability of aircraft to be a tool of power and conquest. Peter Fritzsche, A
Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
6

The interwar years were also a significant period for the French empire. While the
empire reached its greatest extent during this time, consolidation and development
replaced conquest as the primary goals in the colonies.10 Moreover, French governments
launched an extensive propaganda campaign to arouse public interest in, and knowledge
of, the constituent parts of the empire.11 “The mark of empire on the contemporary world
was made in the interwar period,” Raymond F. Betts writes. He explains that “local
populations [were] mobilized, regional resources [were] exploited, and the general
environment—both physical and cultural—[was] altered to suit European needs.”12
Though French imperialists touted the progress made in harnessing colonial
resources and developing the empire during this era, these years witnessed the rise of
local nationalist and anti-colonial movements. Threats to the empire originated from
beyond a given territory’s borders as well. “Colonial domination faced unprecedented
challenges from within and without,” Martin Thomas observes. These challenges came
from a variety of sources, “from marginalised and exploited colonial peoples, from critics
University Press, 1992), 5, 218; Wohl, The Spectacle of Flight, 3; Emmanuel Chadeau, Le Rêve et
la Puissance: L’Avion et son Siècle (Paris: Fayard, 1996).
10
Aldrich, 114, 120-121. A key component of these new aims—and, indeed, a term that
encapsulated the era’s economic projects for the empire—was the mise en valeur of the colonies.
Detailed by then-Minster of the Colonies Albert Sarraut in the early 1920s, the mise en valeur
program was a “wholesale plan to develop colonial resources to increase production and stimulate
trade between France and the empire. This demanded substantial French investment to improve
roads and railways, port facilities and transport links, schools and hospitals.” For several reasons,
Sarraut’s proposals were never fully implemented. While certain government officials deemed the
plans too expensive, others either believed that the metropole had pressing needs that should take
precedence or simply disapproved of the government intervention that Sarraut’s program
required. These various objections were being raised even before the Depression and the threat of
war in Europe made the actualization of Sarraut’s plans only more difficult. Nonetheless, Aldrich
notes, Sarraut’s ideas “excercised considerable influence in colonialist milieux and led to the
assumption of a greater economic role by the state in the interwar years. They also fed into the
debate on the merits or hazards of colonial industrialisation.” Aldrich, 115, 172.
11
As part of this effort, France hosted colonial expositions in Marseille in 1922 and in
Paris in 1931.
12
Raymond F. Betts, Uncertain Dimensions: Western Overseas Empires in the Twentieth
Century (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 11.
7

of imperial practice across the French political spectrum, and from hostile nation states
opposed to a French colonial presence in Africa and Asia.” This surge of anti-colonial
sentiment and activity was indicative of a larger trend. As Michael Adas points out,
imperialists across Europe found that their long-held view that “their unprecedented
material achievements entitled them to dominate the globe and chart the course of
development of subjugated peoples” was increasingly being criticized and contested after
the end of the First World War.13
The interwar years also marked a significant period for aviation in French
Indochina. Though the colony’s first flight had occurred in December 1910, aviation
would not truly get off the ground until after the First World War. As Governor General
Albert Sarraut explained, the end of hostilities in Western Europe had created a “new
situation” for aviation in Indochina. Henceforth, Sarraut noted, aviation could be
reoriented toward “economic and political goals” in the colony, all while ensuring that
military obligations were not neglected. Air force commandant François Glaize likewise
reflected in February 1924 that “the armistice arrive[d] without any really serious result
having been obtained in Indochina in matters of aviation. Everything must be restarted.”14
For the colony’s air force in particular, the interwar years were the period in which this

13

Martin Thomas, The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and
Society (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 2; Michael Adas, Machines as the
Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1989), 401. Adas’ study considers how from the early years of
European overseas exploration to the end of the First World War, Europeans’ views of their own
scientific and technological achievements “shaped their attitudes toward and interaction with
peoples they encountered overseas.” Adas, 4.
14
Gen. L.-M. Chassin, “Débuts de l’Aviation en Indochine,” Forces aériennes françaises
110 (December 1955): 1007; ANOM, GGI 66499, “Télégramme Officiel. Gouverneur Général à
Colonies,” November 23, 1918; ANOM, GGI 66499, “Note sur l’Aviation en Indochine.
Demandée par le Gouvernement Général,” [February 3, 1924; a cover sheet preceding this
document has this February date].
8

service expanded in size and actually acquired a structure and purpose.15 Moreover, the
progress of civil aviation followed closely behind that of military aviation; thus it is
reasonable to conclude—and history bears out the case—that the 1920s and 1930s also
witnessed the development of non-military aviation to, within, and through the colony.

The History of Colonial Aviation
As a topic of scholarly research, aviation has received considerable coverage.16
While some of this work touches on flight and empire, colonial aviation has in general
been the subject of fewer studies. Within the field of colonial aviation history itself, there
has been even less focus on French Indochina. A pair of recent French-language books
that are described at the end of this section—these publications proved essential to my
own analysis—are notable exceptions.
Scholars have considered how Western nations used civil aviation as a vehicle for
furthering their imperial agendas. For example, Gordon Pirie—Pirie’s work was very
helpful for my own project—has analyzed British colonial aviation during the interwar
15

Of the nine squadrons established in the colony between 1917 and 1940, five were
created between 1927 and 1939; the first two squadrons were formed in 1917 and 1918, and the
last two were set up in October 1940. Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet, L’Aviation française en
Indochine: Des origines à 1945 (Outreau: Lela Presse, 2012), 628-631.
16
There is no shortage of works on French military aviation and the French aeronautics
industry. In particular, several articles and books have examined the struggles to modernize and
rearm the nation’s air force as war threatened Europe beginning in the mid-1930s. See, for
example, Patrick Facon’s numerous publications on the French air force, including Histoire de
l’armée de l’air (Paris: La Documentation française, 2009) and “Politics and French Aviators: A
Prism on the International European Crises of the 1930s,” in The Influence of Airpower upon
History: Statesmanship, Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy since 1903, ed. Robin Higham and Mark
Parillo (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 61-84; Christopher Anthony Cain,
“L’Armée de l’Air, 1933-1940: Drifting toward Defeat,” in Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of
Defeat, ed. Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky,
2006), 41-70; Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarrague, A History of French Military Aviation,
trans. Frances Kianka (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986); and Robert J. Young,
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years,17 and Mark Dierikx has written about Dutch aviation as well as air travel in
general. For the United States, Jenifer Van Vleck has studied the symbolic and actual
importance of aviation in the country’s rise to the status of an international power in the
twentieth century.18
With regard to colonial military aviation, David E. Omissi has examined how
aircraft were used in the British Empire during the interwar years; notably, his study
contains a comparative discussion of the French air force’s activity in Morocco and the
Levant during this period.19 Likewise, David Killingray has written about the use of
aviation as a tool of colonial authority in British Africa, and Priya Satia has considered
the intertwined issues of British airpower and Orientalist views in Iraq after the First
World War.20 Headrick brings the topic of air control closer to the present day. In his
analysis of the relationship between technology and Western imperialism, Headrick
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Gordon Pirie, Air Empire: British Imperial Civil Aviation, 1919-39 (Manchester:
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1919-1940,” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire 78, no.3 (2000): 889-911 and Clipping the
Clouds: How Air Travel Changed the World (Praeger: Westport, CT, 2008); Jenifer Van Vleck,
Empire of the Air: Aviation and the American Ascendency (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2013).
19
Employing Headrick’s framework for understanding the relationship between
European technology and European imperial expansion, Omissi argues that aviation was involved
in the phases of colonial penetration, conquest, and consolidation. Aircraft, Omissi writes, not
only helped to penetrate and map areas of imperial interest but also “crushed primary resistance
movements” and assisted with putting down rebellions. Moreover, once nominal imperial control
was established, planes were used to “extend state power to marginal areas of swampland,
mountains or deserts.” David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force,
1919-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 4.
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Africa, 1916-1939,” The Journal of African History 25, no. 4 (1984): 429-444; Priya Satia, “The
Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia,” The American Historical
Review 111, no. 1 (February 2006): 16-51.
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includes discussions of military aviation from 1911 to 1936 and from 1946 to 2007; this
latter part, which factors into my dissertation’s conclusion, has a section on French
airpower in the First Indochina War and American airpower in the Vietnam War. More
generally, Headrick asserts that local conditions need to be considered when examining
the links between technology and imperialism, which is an argument that informed my
own work.21
For military aviation and the French empire specifically, Martin Thomas has
studied how local intelligence gathering in North Africa and the Middle East influenced
British and French imperial policymaking. As part of his argument regarding the
“symbiotic relationship between intelligence and empire,” he incorporates discussion of
aerial reconnaissance and air policing.22 In another publication, Thomas contends that
airpower was one of the most apparent “innovation[s] in organized colonial violence”
that the French deployed as a means of maintaining and extending their authority.23 As a
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“Western imperialism,” Headrick points out, “was subject to environmental forces as
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final point, Thomas has analyzed airpower in the context of the strategies for defending
the empire that were drawn up in the mid-to-late 1930s.24
For the topic of civil aviation and the French empire, Dominique Legarde has
detailed the development of commercial aviation from the first decade of the twentieth
century through the era of decolonization. Focusing on aviation throughout the empire, he
describes the efforts of the myriad airlines, which often collaborated with military and
government officials, to establish air transport both from metropole to the colonies and
within the colonies themselves. In doing so, Legarde observes noteworthy connections
between empire and aviation during this period. “For more than half a century,” he points
out, “the performances of aviation have faithfully accompanied the colonial saga.”
Legarde identifies a common spirit of adventure as well as a shared idea that flight and
the far-flung territories of the empire each represented a type of last frontier. “In men’s
dreams and ambitions,” he contends, “the airplane and the colony could not more closely
coincide.” Legarde also notes that commercial aviation in the empire and the French
empire itself traced similar trajectories of ascendency and decline from the early
twentieth century until decolonization.25
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provides a straightforward description but no further analysis. Robert Bluffield, Over Empires
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Several other publications that deal with air transport in the French empire contain
useful information about Indochina. Among the numerous materials relating to the
history of Air France, three issues of the aeronautics journal Icare provide details
regarding air transport to and within Indochina.26 In addition, an older article by a
General L.-M. Chassin highlights events and personalities from the history of French
aviation in Indochina from approximately 1910 to 1940.27 Last, while focusing on
military aviation in particular, three books that were published as part of the 1931
Colonial Exposition in Paris present details about flight within Indochina from the 1920s
to around 1931.28
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A reference should also be made to Edward M. Young’s history of aviation in
Thailand. In this study, Young examines the development of Thai military and civil
aeronautics, with a focus on the period from 1911 to 1945. This book deserves mention
because it provides an illuminating comparative perspective.29 When placed beside my
dissertation, Young’s analysis reveals parallels between aviation in Thailand and aviation
in Indochina. These parallels were evident not only in terms of the development and the
utilization of aviation but also in terms of the challenges the Thai and French faced in
getting their respective air services off the ground.30
Two recent books were integral to my dissertation, providing information upon
which my work relied as well as historical analysis upon which my project aims to
expand and improve. Published in 2012, Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet’s L’aviation
française en Indochine: Des origines à 1945 is an “overview of the history of French
aviation in Indochina.” They point out that that their topic is one on which “nothing or
almost nothing had been undertaken or realized.”31 To rectify this situation, Cony and
Ledet offer a great amount of detail on all aspects of military and civil aviation in the
context of Indochina through the end of the Second World War. These authors thus seek
to document the day-to-day activities of the military squadrons—whether naval, army, or
air force—and the shifting material and administrative structures of these units. In
addition, Cony and Ledet report on significant long-distance flights between France and
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Among the common problems, the most apparent was the challenge of ensuring an
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Southeast Asia, and discuss the development of not only commercial aviation but also the
local aero clubs in Indochina.
The second major contribution to the history of aviation in French Indochina is
Jean-Baptiste Manchon’s L’aéronautique militaire française outre-mer, 1911-1939.
Based on his doctoral dissertation, Manchon’s text analyzes how military aviation
functioned as “a tool of colonial power.” Manchon explains that “the objective of this
study is to understand how and why French military aviation deployed in the empire
evolved from an aviation of domination, dedicated to the control and the development of
colonial territories, to an aviation of defense and protection.” He contends that the history
of the empire’s air forces is best understood as a three-stage progression. The initial
“confused phase” lasted from 1911 to around 1919; this was a period during which
“aviation tried to find its way, [and] pragmatism won out over overall coherence.” This
stage was followed by a “colonial phase,” which stretched from approximately 1920 to
1934, in which aircraft were primarily utilized for “civilizing” purposes in the empire
(une aviation militaire civilisatrice dans l’Empire). The final stage—the “imperial
phase”—lasted from 1934 to 1939 and consisted of “the unfinished progression toward
an aviation of defense and deterrence.”32
In more detail, Manchon applies the term “colonial aviation” (aviation coloniale)
to this first stage. He indicates that there was neither a clearly defined purpose for the
squadrons stationed in the empire nor a distinct difference between these units and those
located in the metropole at this time.33 Then, at the start of the 1920s, a shift occurred
regarding the role and structure of the colonial air forces. Because the French empire’s
32
33
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squadrons faced no imminent threat from an enemy air force, these units focused on
political and economic tasks within a given territory instead of undertaking properly
“military” missions and defense operations. Manchon asserts that this politico-economic
emphasis was the hallmark of the second stage, the period of “aviation in the colonies”
(aviation aux colonies).34 He determines that, in terms of both organization and
functioning, the peak of this second phase was from 1928 to 1933.35 Importantly,
Manchon emphasizes that aviation’s military and politico-economic duties were
interlinked, with the two operating in support of one another. In this manner, aviation was
able to contribute to the work of maintaining and strengthening the French empire.36
The third phase of Manchon’s analysis is “imperial aviation” (l’aviation
impériale).37 This transition to imperial aviation—which remained unfinished as Europe
was plunged into war in September 1939—was the result of a combination of factors that
arose during the course of the mid-to-late 1930s.38 According to Manchon, this third
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Regarding this transformation, a particular legislative text—adopted January 19,
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was also critical for aviation in the empire. Thus Manchon asserts that 1937 clearly signaled “the
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stage entailed a shift from a focus on non-military missions within the borders of a given
colonial space to the development of a service arm “dedicated principally to the tasks of
defense and air superiority.” The colonial squadrons were integrated into broader
strategies for protecting France and its empire, and the primary purpose of these air
forces thus became providing defense against external enemies in possession of
“powerful and developed” armed forces. Consequently, Manchon explains, “exclusively
colonial work...became a secondary concern.”39
Compared to Manchon’s and Cony and Ledet’s books, my study has a narrower
focus. The subject matter itself—aviation in French Indochina during the interwar
years—of course overlaps with aspects of these other two works. Yet there are notable
differences between my dissertation and what Manchon and Cony and Ledet present. My
analysis aims to address problematic elements and lacunae in their books while
underscoring different connections between the history of aviation and the history of the
French empire.
With Cony and Ledet, a basic problem is the lack of sustained critical
examination. In addition and in contrast to my dissertation, they do not seek to connect
their work to broader themes in the history of aviation or, for that matter, the history of
French Indochina. In other words, they do not fully explain the significance of their
contribution. Also, unlike Cony and Ledet’s book, my project does not include discussion
of Indochina’s aero clubs or the various long-distance flights during this period. Instead,
my work centers on aviation as it related to military, government, and commercial efforts
within the framework of French interests in Indochina and beyond. Thus the individuals
and initiatives linked to endurance flights—voyages that sought to set and break
39
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records—or to flying as sport do not factor prominently in my dissertation. It is important
to acknowledge, though, that the aero clubs and the bold attempts to fly farther, faster,
and longer did have a significant propaganda effect in favor of aviation in the French
empire.
With regard to Manchon’s book, my dissertation analyzes a particular area of his
wide-ranging study. In doing so, my project presents an interpretation of how Indochina’s
air force developed that differs from his three-stage argument for overseas military
aviation. Simply put, Manchon’s characterization of the shift in 1934 from the era of
“aviation in the colonies” to the short-lived period of “imperial aviation” does not
emphasize the continuity in purpose and activity of Indochina’s air force during the
interwar years. Also, Manchon seems to overestimate the immediate impact of the
creation of the air force, at least locally in Indochina. Finally, the broad scope and
military focus of Manchon’s work naturally leaves certain analytical and topical gaps,
especially with regard to the role of airlines and non-military aviation within Indochina.
Overall, in terms of the history of French colonial aviation, my dissertation argues
that Indochina presents a rich area of study. More so than anywhere else in the empire,
the aviation efforts in Indochina encapsulated all that the French hoped to accomplish
with aircraft. In other words, aviation, in all its iterations, was on full display in
Indochina as it was nowhere else in the empire. While planes were perhaps used more
extensively for a particular purpose elsewhere in the empire, nowhere else were aircraft
used in such a variety of ways during the interwar period. An analysis of aviation in
Indochina thus lays bare the totality of the hopes and the realities of aviation in the
French empire.
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The History of Indochina
My work contributes not only to the history of French colonial aviation but also to
the history of French Indochina. While filling a gap in the literature on this subject, my
dissertation adds another perspective to scholarly understandings both of the relationship
between the French and the native populations and of the French experience in Laos.
Through the lens of aviation, my project also provides a fresh perspective on French
relations with Thailand during this period. More broadly, and more significantly, my
dissertation contends that an analysis of aviation reveals much about the history of the
French experience in the colony.
Generally, published studies of different aspects of French Indochina include only
passing references to aviation. For instance, Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery’s
survey of the colonial period includes only brief mentions of aviation. In addition to
noting that aircraft were used in the reprisals that followed the Yen Bay uprising in the
fall of 1930, they cite air travel in the 1930s in their discussion of how the French worked
to improve metropole—colony communications in the first four decades of the twentieth
century.40 In other studies of the component parts of Indochina—or in texts that address a
specific aspect of history during the colonial period—aviation typically is mentioned only
in passing. These references tend to discuss either the usage of airpower against anticolonial activities and pockets of dissident populations in the late 1920s and early 1930s
or the establishment of commercial air travel to or within the colony.41
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While the relationship between colonizer and colonized is not the focus of my
project, my dissertation does show that members of the indigenous populations were part
of the French aerial endeavor in Indochina. Most of this participation took place on the
ground. Sources document individuals, typically Vietnamese men, working as aircraft
mechanics, in aeronautics workshops, or on airfield maintenance. Native personnel also
accompanied the French air force on missions, usually in the capacity of mechanics.
Notably, there were instances of the Vietnamese receiving flight training, serving as
pilots, or taking part in operations in which the French deployed airpower against
dissident groups. As Manchon notes though, the indigenous personnel “only rarely” were
involved in such policing missions.42 In addition, members of the local populations—
Michigan Press, 2000), 20, 36 n.32. Geoffrey Gunn, Rebellion in Laos: Peasants and Politics in a
Colonial Backwater (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2003), 121, 127; Gerald Cannon Hickey, Sons
of the Mountain: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands to 1954 (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1982), 319-321. Hickey also describes how aerial reconnaissance was
utilized in 1925 as a means of determining the best itinerary for a future road. For examples of
references to air travel both to and within the colony, see, Tully, 261; Penny Edwards,
Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation, 1860-1945 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i, 2007),
156; and Aline Demay, Tourism and Colonization in Indochina (1898-1939) (Newcastle upon
Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 141. Scholars have also discussed the symbolic
importance of flight in the context of Indochina. For instance, Panivong Norindr notes that, in
their advertisements and posters, travel companies like Air France depicted Indochina as an
exotic commodity. This graphic art contributed to French government and commercial efforts to
present the colony as “an alluring and commodified object, a familiar icon or sign to be desired or
possessed.” Panivong Norindr, Phantasmatic Indochina: French Colonial Ideology in
Architecture, Film, and Literature (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 4. Also,
Christopher E. Goscha, in his analysis of Jean Marquet’s 1928 publication The Five Flowers:
Indochina Explained (Les cinq fleurs: L’Indochine expliquée), demonstrates how the French
employed the symbolism of aviation to reinforce their colonial authority, knowledge, and
technological prowess. Christopher E. Goscha, Vietnam or Indochina? Contesting Concepts of
Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 1887-1954 (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies,
1995), 34. Certain of the aforementioned citations are incorporated—and discussed in more
detail—into the relevant chapters of my dissertation.
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For instance, during the First World War, Cao Dac Minh was an airplane mechanic for
the French before becoming certified as a pilot in the fall of 1915. Recalled to Indochina closer to
the end of the conflict, he perished in a plane crash on December 27, 1918, as he undertook a
flight in Cochinchina; Cao Dac Minh, for whom the central hangar at the Bach Mai airbase in
Tonkin would be named, was the first aviator killed in Indochina while in the service of military
aviation. In another example, a Vietnamese aeronautics mechanic, Sargent Hoang Van Hao, flew
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often elites involved in the colonial administration or regional nobles—traveled on
aircraft and were given short “first flights” (baptême de l’air) by French aviators.
Generally, these individuals seemed enthusiastic about French aviation, at least from the
French perspective.43 Finally, in more routine circumstances, native peoples submitted
requests for a variety of economically oriented tasks, including aerial photography work
and airdrops of business-advertisement leaflets.44
In the context of my dissertation, the overall picture of the relationship between
colonizer and colonized reflects Dierikx’s observation that “flying [in the colonies] was a
‘white man’s business.” As he explains, “the airplane was the colonizer’s new travel
instrument, an agent of European vigor and power” throughout Asia and Africa.45
Likewise, David W. Del Testa argues that “the availability of new forms of
transportation, mainly automobiles but to some degree airplanes, enhanced the
possibilities for separation of the Vietnamese and the French.”46 Del Testa’s point
reinforces how the French tended to view aviation not as a means of bringing colonized
on one of the aircraft that took part in the bombing campaign in Kontum in March 1929—this
mission is discussed in chapter six—and, along with three other French air force officers, was
cited for his distinguished service during the operation; Manchon reports that two more
Vietnamese non-commissioned officers participated in this particular assignment. Cony and
Ledet, 32; ANOM, GGI 66545, “Année 1929. Ordre Général No. 12,” April 24, 1929; Manchon,
345.
43
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63-78.
21

and colonizer closer together in Indochina but as a way to keep distance between the two
groups and the French above the natives, both literally and figuratively. Thus while the
indigenous populations participated in French aviation in the colony, their participation
was regulated by the French and was in the service of French interests. This is not to say
that the French would not deploy aviation to “help” their Indochinese subjects. In fact,
officials professed at least some feeling of responsibility to use aircraft to protect their
colonial protégés against external threats.47
Continuing, my analysis moves Laos more to the foreground in the history of
French Indochina. Indeed, Laos often appeared as an afterthought in the minds of
contemporaries and tends to play only a minor role in histories of the colony. It should be
noted that this neglect is not necessarily unjustified. As Martin Stuart-Fox observes, Laos
was the least important and least developed part of Indochina. The colonial
administration essentially viewed this protectorate as an economic and strategic extension
of French territory in Annam, Tonkin, and Cochinchina.48 As my analysis shows though,
Laos factored prominently into French officials’ plans regarding commercial air travel
and medical aviation. The protectorate also played a significant role in the earliest effort
at military air transport. In each of these three cases, the aviation work was part of the
drawn-out process of improving communications and access to Laos, thus “unblocking”
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this region of Indochina.49 In addition, my project demonstrates that Laos was one of the
primary targets for aircraft missions that the French launched in an effort to assert their
colonial authority.
Moreover, my dissertation reveals the complexities of the Franco-Thai
relationship in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Thai aviation frequently factored into French
discussions of aviation, from medical transport to propaganda tours, airmail to air
defense. The crux of the French position, in civil as well as military circles, was to
cultivate a positive relationship with Thailand. In doing so, France could maintain—and
then expand—its military and commercial presence in this area of the world; in this latter
regard, it was particularly important for the French to be able counterbalance Great
Britain’s predominant influence in the region. Also, France would of course benefit from
remaining on friendly terms with the countries that bordered Indochina. Conversely,
Thailand—and China as well—looked to the French as they worked to develop their own
air forces beginning in the early 1920s; the goal for these two nations was an
advantageous relationship with France that would allow for access to French aviation
resources.50
Describing aviation visits exchanged between Thailand and Indochina between
September 1930 and January 1931, Manchon writes that “Franco-Siamese fraternization
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was at its zenith.”51 Such amicable gestures “soon became rare” though. Manchon
explains that Thailand, convulsed by the Depression crisis of the 1930s and with a more
aggressive post-coup regime that looked less favorably upon the French, began to
reconsider its relationship with Indochina.52 Despite any surface-level indications to the
contrary, the Franco-Thai relationship had been somewhat tense since the start of French
imperialist expansion into Southeast Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Eventually, France—and Great Britain, too, in Malaya and Burma—forced Thailand to
relinquish large parts of what had been considered Thai territory. “Treaties with England
and France confirmed Siam’s independence and its borders,” Young writes, “but the price
of these had been heavy.”53 Unsurprisingly, the effect in Thailand was that “suspicion of
the colonial powers remained for a long time.”54
Finally, though powered flight had a comparatively short existence in the history
of French Indochina before the Second World War, this topic encapsulates not only
imperialists’ highest hopes for the colony but also the reasons that these hopes were never
fully actualized. The French viewed aviation as a powerful new instrument that could be
wielded in the service of the colonial project in Indochina. Eyeing the multi-purpose
potential of flight technology, metropolitan and colonial officials imagined that aviation
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would, as Pirie asserts for British colonial aviation, “modernise, maintain, protect,
reassert and legitimate Empire.” Yet, Pirie adds, “anticipation and intention exceeded
actuality and implementation: what was hoped for and promised from aviation was less
than what it actually achieved on the imperial stage.”55
Like Pirie’s study, my analysis underscores how colonial power and authority—
even in the form of a modern, multi-purpose machine like the airplane—were neither
omnipotent nor omnipresent. In the end, aviation failed to adequately rejuvenate,
maintain, and strengthen French colonial rule. My dissertation thus demonstrates in a
stark manner the weaknesses and the limits of French control and technological prowess
in the empire as well as the long-term consequences that these weaknesses had for the
French in Indochina and for the French empire itself.
Aviation provides a vehicle for understanding some of the reasons for why the
French project in Indochina faltered and then failed. As Pirie points out, studies of
colonial aviation in many ways “illuminate the embodiment, difficulties, dilemmas, risks,
evasions, muddles and struggles of imperialism in practice.”56 An examination of
aviation in Indochina indeed reveals much about “imperialism in practice.” Specifically,
my dissertation shows how a host of issues impeded the work of the colonial project in
Indochina: financial and material limitations; disagreements among officials; a
cumbersome, at times confusing, administrative machinery; the vulnerabilities of colonial
power, technology, and authority against local populations, geography, and climate;
and—as was plainly evident in the second half of the 1930s—a metropolitan government
that simply could not afford to sacrifice itself to protect its empire, especially the most
55
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distant parts. Many of the problems that worked against aviation in Indochina during the
interwar period—especially the challenge of obtaining resources from the metropole, the
insufficiency of the aerial infrastructure, and the unfavorable weather and geography—
were magnified during the Second World War and still more significantly during the First
Indochina War. As a result of France’s shocking defeat in this latter conflict, French
colonialism made its exit from Southeast Asia. In a larger context, by the end of the First
Indochina War, it had become clear that the French empire itself would not ultimately
survive. As Brocheux and Hémery contend in describing the French experience in this
conflict, the nation “exhaust[ed] itself in a war that was the first step toward the
extinction of its colonial empire.”57
Overall, then, my dissertation positions aviation at the intersection of multiple
facets of the history of French Indochina: technology; transportation and communication;
medicine; colonial development; social science; propaganda; international relations in
Southeast and East Asia; metropole-colony connections; and the complicated relationship
between colonizer and colonized, what Brocheux and Hémery describe as the “ambiguity
of the Indochinese colonial situation.”58 Therefore, in a different iteration of what Eric T.
Jennings accomplishes in his multi-faceted study of the French resort of Dalat, my
dissertation argues that aviation provides a type of “window onto the actual workings of
empire,” a means of “compar[ing] grand imperial schemes against results on the ground,
imperialist rhetoric against local practices.”59
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Dissertation Chapters
My project is organized topically around the different ways in which the French
used aircraft in the context of Indochina. The two sections—which are composed of
individual chapters—involve the concepts of transportation and communication and of
colonial development, internal policing and control, and external defense. Chapter one
offers an overview of how an aviation infrastructure was established within Indochina.
The development of this infrastructure was a fundamental part of getting aviation off the
ground in the colony. The necessity of preparatory groundwork—and the problems that
could and did result—reflects how aviation remained tethered to the earth despite its
capabilities to pass high above the landscape. The experience and trajectory of creating
an aviation infrastructure in French Indochina was similar to that of other European
powers that sought to launch aviation services within their empires.60
For a limited period of time and to a limited extent, the air force operated
scheduled transports within Indochina. These trial attempts of the 1920s and early 1930s,
the subject of chapter two, functioned as a precursor to non-military air service in the
colony and helped to stir up enthusiasm for air travel. The work that Indochina’s air force
accomplished in this regard literally and figuratively established the framework for future
60

For example, Robert McCormack identifies five factors that impeded Great Britain’s
efforts to get aviation off the ground in Africa, and these different impediments were certainly
apparent for French aviation in Indochina as well.60 While local geography and climate posed
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air transport. This chapter, therefore, reinforces the larger point that military and nonmilitary aviation in the French empire were often intertwined during the interwar period,
with the development of the former typically preparing the way for the installment and
functioning of the latter.61 By detailing these early efforts at air transport, this chapter
also highlights certain of the impediments—in particular, high costs and a lack of
infrastructure—that frequently hindered the use of aviation in Indochina.
Chapter three analyzes civil aviation, focusing on airlines’ efforts to organize
service for mail and passengers. Aviation companies—with the help of the metropolitan
and colonial governments—worked to develop routes to and within Indochina and
through the colony to East Asia. From the early 1920s, plans for launching civil air
service were envisioned with longer connections in mind. In examining how and why the
French developed air routes in these different contexts, this chapter reveals the various
challenges that arose to slow these endeavors. Notable among these difficulties were
foreign aviation competition and a perceived stubbornness on the part of both China and
Thailand. Indeed, the reality of flying from France to Indochina and beyond in the
interwar years was that foreign assistance and agreeability, while not always
forthcoming, remained necessary.
The final part of this section, chapter four, examines Indochina’s aeromedical
service. Air ambulances were used in the colony to transport patients, doctors, and
medicines. Furthermore, these medical flights were intended to function as a
demonstration of French mastery over the physical environment and a display of the
colonizers’ purportedly benevolent civilizing presence. In addition to the shortcomings of
61
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the aerial infrastructure and the lack of suitable aircraft, Indochina’s unpredictable and
uncooperative weather kept air ambulances on the ground in a manner that noticeably
frustrated its advocates. Two other issues that were more unique to the aeromedical
service also impeded its use in the colony. First, requesting an air ambulance at times
appeared as an extremely cumbersome process. Second, most areas of the colony simply
did not need an aeromedical service.
In how it was perceived and how it was utilized, aviation was not just a rapid
means of communication and transportation. Thus the second part of my dissertation
considers aviation from the perspectives of colonial development, internal policing and
control, and external defense. The employment of planes for photography and
reconnaissance is analyzed in chapter five. These missions—requested by colonial
officials, companies, scientific organizations, or even individuals—assisted in the larger
work of understanding, promoting, and developing the colony. Generally, the French in
Indochina envisioned the benefits that aerial photography and reconnaissance would
bring through the use of the aerial perspective. This vantage point was unimpeded,
literally above the messiness of the human and physical landscape below.62 Many of the
impediments that hindered aerial photography and reconnaissance were familiar to
military and colonial authorities: organizational difficulties; a lack of funding; the
challenges of the physical environment; and the limitations of the era’s technology.
Another issue was that, for certain aviation enthusiasts, government officials were not
providing enough support for aerial photography and reconnaissance work in the empire.
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Chapter six considers how aviation was employed within Indochina as a means of
combatting what is broadly defined as “internal threats” to colonial authority. Aircraft
were sent to areas of anti-colonial activity to bomb and strafe what were viewed as
dissident groups. Officials also deployed symbolic demonstrations of airpower that were
intended to astonish and coerce the local peoples and to reaffirm French colonial
authority; many of these missions were multi-purpose operations that were carried out in
the mountainous regions of Annam, Tonkin, and Laos. Whether actual violence was
inflicted or not, the overall goal of the missions analyzed in this chapter was the
maintenance of French colonial authority. Despite officials’ confidence that aviation
would function as the means of defeating supposed internal threats, this use of aircraft
was hindered by a host of issues. Chief among these were unfavorable weather,
unreliable flight technology, and an inadequate aerial infrastructure. Additional problems
were caused by aeronautics competition from Thailand and a fundamental misconception
of how colonized peoples would react to the sight of aircraft.
Chapter seven, which mostly details the period from 1934 to 1939, examines
airpower as a means of protecting Indochina against external threats, meaning the threats
that originated beyond the colony’s borders. The primary menaces were a politically
unstable China, a burgeoning Thailand, and an increasingly powerful and aggressively
expansionist Japan. From the beginning of the 1930s, it was very evident that an
ambitious Japan posed the greatest threat to the colony.63 While the French imagined that

63

Starting with Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in the fall of 1931, Brocheux and Hémery
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air defense would play a key role in safeguarding Indochina, officials also recognized the
deficiencies, in terms of both quantity and quality, of the colony’s air force. This chapter
shows that the failure to sufficiently reinforce Indochina’s air force was not a result of
metropolitan negligence or a miscommunication of the dangers posed. Instead, the
reinforcement process was mired in a morass of interconnected issues: political and
economic problems; an international situation that, in the second half of the decade, made
another war in Europe seem almost unavoidable; and, alarmingly for French officials, an
aeronautics industry that was ill suited for mass-producing modern aircraft on the scale
that would be required to face a mobilizing Nazi Germany.
The conclusion provides a short examination of how aviation factored into the
period from June 1940 though the end of the First Indochina War. This section includes a
discussion of the Franco-Thai conflict that broke out late in 1940, but the primary focus is
on the years of the First Indochina War. Neither Manchon nor Cony and Ledet offer an
assessment of the entirety of this particular span of years. While Cony and Ledet include
discussions of the Franco-Thai conflict as well as the remainder of the wartime period,
they justifiably end their analysis with the Japanese takeover of French Indochina in
March 1945; “the time of colonial aviation was definitely over,” these authors assert in
referencing this particular moment.64 While this point is valid, my conclusion suggests
that the experience of aviation during the First Indochina War was more connected to the
experience of aviation during the interwar years than Cony and Ledet indicate. While the
wartime necessities of the 1940s and 1950s required that military and non-military
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aircraft both function in a narrower scope than was the case during previous decades, the
hopes and the realities of aviation proved similar for both eras of flight.

A Note on Sources and Names
My dissertation utilizes published materials as well as archival collections.
Notable among the former are documents and books produced as part of France’s
colonial expositions and articles from aeronautics-themed journals or bulletins about
Indochina. Regarding the archival sources, my project incorporates materials from
administrators and representatives of commercial airlines, Air France in particular; these
documents consist mainly of correspondence and meeting minutes.65 Yet among the
archival sources—and indeed, among the entirety of the primary materials my research
incorporates—my dissertation most frequently references official correspondence and
reports composed by French authorities—the majority of whom were stationed in
Indochina—who were part of the government, the air force, or the military. Thus my
project relies heavily upon the perspectives—and the biases—of locally situated colonial
officials.
Moreover, in the pages that follow, several individuals are referenced in multiple
chapters. To hopefully assist the reader, some of the more notable of these people are as
follows: Jules Bosc, who served as the Resident Superior of Laos for a total of nearly ten
years between June 1918 and March 193166; Jules Brévié, Indochina’s Governor General
for a period of time from 1936 to 1938; Pierre Cordemoy, who published on aviation in
65
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the 1930s; Lieutenant Colonel Louis de Durand de Prémorel, the colony’s head military
officer (Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine, hereafter
Commandant Superior) from July 1929 until the end of 193167; François Glaize, who
served as chief of Indochina’s air force for a total of approximately five and a half years,
starting in mid-January 1920, prior to working as a representative for French aviation
firms in the late 1920s; Alfred Guyomar, who proceeded Glaize as head of the air force,
serving from late April 1919 until mid-January 192068; Inspector of Civil Aviation Louis
Hirschauer, who conducted several studies of aviation in Southeast and East Asia during
the mid-1930s; Marcel Puypéroux, an air force officer who was in charge of the Hanoi
squadron for a period of time in the mid-1930s; and, for clarification purposes, Major
General Richard Puypéroux, who was Marcel’s father and the Commandant Superior in
the early 1920s.
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CHAPTER ONE: DEVELOPING AN AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURE IN
INDOCHINA
In February 1930 Pierre Cordemoy wrote in the Bulletin de l’Agence Economique
de l’Indochine (hereafter Bulletin) that Indochina was one and a half times larger than
France and had an interior that remained “in large part devoid of transportation routes.”
The colony was “a vast field of action open to aviation.” At a conference held six years
later during the Exposition Internationale de Paris, a Monsieur Charvet reflected on the
progress of air transport in recent years as well as the significance of this development:
Commercial aviation has taken on a crucial importance in the relations between
the great colonial nations and their overseas territories. To convince yourself, you
just have to glance at the aerial map of the world: a well-conceived air network
appears as one of the centerpieces of the economic equipment of the great modern
colonial empires.69
During the interwar period, metropolitan and colonial officials worked with
military authorities to transform Indochina from a “vast field of action open to aviation”
to a colony with a “well-conceived air network.” Contemporaries believed that such a
network would not only improve conditions for the French within Indochina in multiple
ways but also provide a means of linking France to the colony and serve as a springboard
for accessing southern China. Overall, the goal was to make air transport to, within, and
through Indochina an efficient, safe, and sustainable option that the French could use to
further their colonial and commercial interests in Southeast and East Asia.
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However, before any of these benefits could be reaped, the French needed to
establish an aviation infrastructure in the colony.70 As a memorandum from the
government general observed in the fall of 1929, “aviation will only be able to subsist
regularly and economically when the country will be organized to allow aircraft to
circulate without too many risks. The basis of this organization is the aerial
infrastructure.”71 In its entirety, the task of installing this infrastructure included creating
a system for managing air traffic, planning route itineraries, and constructing a network
of landing sites, airfield facilities, and radio and meteorological posts.
This work proceeded in a careful, deliberate manner throughout the interwar
period, but a particularly robust effort was exerted during the late 1920s and early 1930s.
By this point, it was clear that the infrastructure that had hitherto existed had become
insufficient in light of the advances in aviation technology and the projected growth of
commercial air transport. With the general organization of the air network essentially
fixed by the end of 1930, the remainder of the decade saw continued efforts—even with
an economic climate that became increasingly unfavorable to colonial development—to
upgrade the infrastructure and catch up with the constantly evolving requirements of air
transport.
On the whole, the French consistently struggled to accomplish the goal of
providing Indochina with a sufficient air network. This is not to say that there was no
70
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worthwhile progress made during the interwar years. Indeed, the infrastructure certainly
was upgraded in terms of the quality of the airfields, the coverage and capabilities of the
radio and meteorological posts, and the ability to manage the circulation of air traffic.
Even so, by the end of the 1930s, the type of modern, safe, and efficient air network that
officials had envisioned at the start of the 1920s still did not exist. This fact proved to be
a major reason for why the realities of aviation in Indochina fell far short of French hopes
for how this technology could be used in the colony.

Reasons for Developing an Aviation Network within Indochina
Gordon Pirie contends that the establishment and maintenance of empire required
effective methods of transport. “People and nature may or may not be subdued,” he
explains, “but remoteness positively must be subdued.” Transportation links allowed
governments to “breach the horizon, spread into new land, occupy and unify distant
territory, and then to manage, defend and exploit it.”72 Pirie’s analysis of how civil
aviation could benefit the British imperial project offers parallels for what the French
hoped that air transport would do for their own empire. Indeed, aviation was expected to
serve empire in several ways, allowing for:
Better public administration (quicker personnel travel and document exchange);
cheaper and more effective aerial survey and management of natural resources;
quicker trade in small, light and precious commodities; less alienating (semi)permanent overseas settlement; more rapid receipt of letters and news; easier
social circulation by imperial elites.73
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In the case of the French empire in Southeast Asia, officials believed that the
development of an air network would have benefits for Indochina itself, for metropolecolony relations, and for French aeronautics interests in China. Within Indochina, a web
of air routes would make communications and travel faster and permit easier access to
remote areas. For instance, Emmanuel Chaumié, France’s Director of Commercial
Aviation, depicted the empire as consisting of expanses of unforgiving terrain in which
communications were “slow and difficult.” He thus argued that the installation of
aviation in the colonies had the potential to “truly transform not only the conditions of
economic life but even those of existence.” Similarly, Alfred Guyomar wrote about the
challenges of travelling between Cambodia and Cochinchina, noting that the river and
automobile routes did not offer fast enough access to Saigon. “Aircraft,” Guyomar
opined, “remain the only practical and swift solution” for bettering communications
between parts of these two territories.74
Aside from improving mail and passenger transportation, an air network offered
other benefits for the colonial project in Indochina. For instance, in August 1928 a
government-general memorandum judged that aviation had the potential to boost the
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colonizers’ status while strengthening the colony’s defensive capabilities.75 Other sources
likewise commented on how aircraft could serve to reinforce colonial authority and
power over the local peoples.76 A study from the Société d’Etudes et d’Entreprises
Aériennes en Indochine et en Extrême-Orient (hereafter SEEAIEO) declared that “the
airplane, even exclusively commercial, nowadays remains a great instrument of prestige,
even domination, if…it regularly displays its colors in the sky or makes the drone of its
motor heard even in the native houses, as far as the depths of nearly inaccessible forests.”
As this study’s author reasoned, “every influence to acquire or maintain over our
Indochinese protégés, we must maintain or acquire it.”77
Proponents of aviation also directly linked the development of air transport to the
French colonizers professed mission of civilizing and protecting the native populations.
In a report to air force commandant Raoul Augereau, Captain Pierre Paquier asserted that
the flying machine was a powerful physical representation of French paternalistic
benevolence. “By enabling air navigation to work in the best conditions of security,”
Paquier wrote, the colonial government “will very soon make accessible to this modern
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and admirable civilizing agent that is the airplane the most distant and most deprived
areas of the territory that it protects and administers.”78
Finally, officials considered the establishment of an air network in Indochina as a
means of achieving goals that went beyond fostering quicker transportation within the
colony. This larger context entailed creating a metropole—colony air link and developing
an aerial connection to China. By installing these long-haul lines, the French hoped to
fashion Indochina into an international hub for commercial aviation. The governmentgeneral memorandum of 1928 underscored this broader context, arguing against
“dwell[ing] on the study of routes designed to pass over only the territory of our colony.”
The memo observed, “we must refrain from only seeking the satisfaction of local,
immediate needs without a view to the future.” Such shortsightedness, the author pointed
out, would make France risk losing the opportunity to connect Indochina, “in favorable
conditions” and without costly alterations to itineraries, to what surely was to become a
grand network of international air routes.79
Scheduled air service between France and Indochina was viewed as a means of
tightening the links between metropole and colony. This strengthened bond was judged to
have benefits beyond simply reducing communication and travel time between France
and Southeast Asia. For example, the SEEAIEO study suggested that a France—
Indochina line would have a certain positive psychological effect for the colony’s French
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population. “The feeling of isolation that our nationals in the Far East may experience
will diminish,” the report noted, explaining that “the influence of the metropole on the
colony will increase; the union between [the two], their mutual support, will be
improved.” In February 1930, Chaumié similarly concluded that a regularly functioning
air route had the capacity to “bring our grand colony in the Far East closer to the
metropole.”80 Into the later 1930s, officials continued to highlight how air transport
served to tighten the links between France and its colonies.81
Politicians and colonial administrators also wanted to utilize France’s footing in
Southeast Asia as a springboard for accessing China by air. The government-general
memorandum from 1928 stressed this point: “Indochina’s privileged position needs to be
considered [because it] allows France to play a leading role in the realization of the
Europe—China line.” Air transport not only allowed for “close, amicable collaboration
with our neighbors [and] confirmation of our privileged position in the sale of aeronautics
material” but also provided France with a means of “peaceful commercial penetration in
the Far East.” With Southeast Asia situated only eight days from the metropole by plane,
Indochina was poised to gain an enhanced commercial and political status. Therefore, the
memo contended that an air network would make the colony “more than ever...worthy of
being called by our diplomats ‘the permanent base of French interests in the Far East.’”
Cordemoy also supported the idea that France needed to capitalize on Indochina’s
80
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position, placing the present-day jockeying for commercial aviation preeminence within
the context of the history of European competition for access to East Asia. He declared in
a January 1930 article that the “economic penetration” of southern China “still remains
one of the fundamental goals of Western civilization.” An air route to this part of the
globe was destined to become “one of the great aerial routes of tomorrow.”82

Managing Air Traffic within Indochina (1920s and 1930s)
As early as 1922, officials in France lauded the recent progress of aviation in
Indochina. Yet the metropolitan government was cognizant of the need to plan for the
future of air transport in the colony. In the opinion of Minister of the Colonies Albert
Sarraut, what was now required for Indochina was a government-directed system for
managing the increase in air traffic that would inevitably be brought about by the
development of commercial service. The Minister explained: “in preparation for the
eventual setting up of such [airlines], it is important to determine the conditions in which
they will operate and how...they will be able to use, together with military aviation, the
local air network.”83 With these points in mind, Sarraut proposed regulations and outlined
several key tasks for which the commandant of the air force would be responsible.
Specifically, the commandant was to direct the organization of the colony’s air network,
a job that that entailed the selection, construction, technical outfitting, supervision, and
upkeep of the local airfields. In addition, this officer was to act as the representative of
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the Aerial Navigation Service—itself part of the Undersecretary of State for Aviation and
Air Transports (hereafter Undersecretary)—and, in this capacity, was charged with
managing the development and functioning of commercial aviation within Indochina.84
That an air force official should be tasked with these various responsibilities was not an
illogical decision.85
From the outset though, this new position did not seem to be much needed in the
colony. Indeed, Sarraut’s projection for the growth of civil aviation appeared overly
optimistic. “Up to the present,” a memorandum from April 1925 remarked, “experience
has shown that these companies are not viable in Indochina and that the Department’s
expectations concerning the development of air travel in the colonies were somewhat
84
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excessive.” In addition, the memo frankly stated that air force commandant François
Glaize had not had much work to do as the delegate and estimated that “several years”
would pass before this position would truly be needed.86
Yet the current lack of civil aviation activity did not deter Glaize from
subsequently commenting on the challenges that, as head of the air force, he faced—or
would face—in attending to the variety of responsibilities that were assigned to him. In
1926 Glaize stated, “no means have been put in the hands of the Commandant of Military
Aviation to accomplish the tasks that come under the jurisdiction of this [civil aviation]
function, and it is only nominally that he holds this title.”87 He described how he
possessed neither the resources nor the time to manage the functioning of the entirety of
the colonial air services. Reflecting on the problem of having his office charged both with
military and with civil duties, he observed that the role of air force chief “sufficiently
absorbs his activity so that it is impossible for him to devote to these delegate functions
all the time that he should.”88
Glaize reasoned that as air services in the colony were poised to expand in the
near future, the current system for managing aviation—which he clearly believed to be
ineffective—needed to be changed. Arguing that some type of organ specifically dealing
with civil aviation was required, the commandant contrasted the administrative structure
for aviation in Indochina with the format in France. While the head of Indochina’s air
force was at present tasked with directing both military aviation and civil aviation, the
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metropole had two separate offices for these two branches of aviation.89 Glaize
characterized the setup in the colony as “detrimental to the development of aviation,”
further asserting that “the cause of aviation [in Indochina] suffers from the absence of an
agency for inspection and research.”90 Overall, Glaize’s comments imply that the
development and management of the air network in the colony required the dedicated
oversight of a single government bureau.
It appears that the type of department of which Glaize bemoaned the lack was
formed in 1928. A government-general decree of April 16 created a bureau of civil
aeronautics that was charged with researching and installing routes in the colony.91 Two
years later another directive—this decree was dated April 23, 1930—established an
aviation bureau (Bureau de la Navigation Aérienne) to replace the existing office. This
newer office’s mission involved not only the “creation and the maintenance of air routes”
but also the “monitoring of aerial traffic in Indochina.” Therefore, this bureau was to
continue the work of its predecessor.92
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Apparently, the creation of this department did not adequately address the issue of
managing air transport within the colony. In a report from the fall of 1936, Inspector of
Civil Aviation Louis Hirschauer determined that the problem related to the fact that the
positions of air force commandant and of delegate for civil aviation were veritable
revolving doors. From 1920 to 1936, Hirschauer counted seven different individuals as
having been in charge of military aviation.93 Similarly, between 1928 and the time
Hirschauer composed this report, the list of aerial navigation officials included five
people. Moreover, the position of Secretary General of Indochina, a key liaison in the
government general in matters of aviation, had switched at least six times from 1921 until
1936. Hirschauer’s thesis was that these seemingly constant substitutions had caused
great difficulty in establishing continuity of ideas for the development of air transport
services in the colony.94
Furthermore, Hirschauer found fault, as had Glaize, with having these services be
managed by the head of the air force. The argument that this officer should be responsible
for the entirety of the aviation-related duties in Indochina was “perfectly legitimate while
commercial aviation was very little developed and private aviation [was] nonexistent.” In
recent years though, private aviation had grown somewhat, and, more importantly,
international commercial aviation had significantly expanded—and continued to do so.95
Hirschauer thus contended, “the moment has come when we must realize that civil
aviation is henceforth called to play a leading role in the economy of Indochina.”96

93

This position saw more continuity from the summer of 1934 until late 1940. From
August 11, 1934, until November 27, 1940, only two officers served as air force commandant.
Manchon, 682.
94
Hirschauer Mission, 1936.
95
Hirschauer Mission, 1936.
96
Hirschauer Mission, 1936.
45

Considering this state of affairs, Hirschauer observed that “we find ourselves
obliged, we do not say to reorganize, but to organize civil aviation in Indochina.” Clearly,
he viewed the current structure for managing air transport as still lacking the oversight
required so that air traffic—the amount of which would surely increase—could circulate
efficiently within the colony. Hirschauer’s comment implies that, at least for certain
officials—and Hirschauer was a certainly a credible source in matters of colonial
aviation—the previously established civil aeronautics positions had not been satisfactory.
As a solution, Hirschauer proposed that the creation of a Director of Civil Aviation. Yet
as outlined by Hirschauer, the duties of this proposed office actually appear very similar
to those of the prior positions.97
In any case, the government apparently endorsed Hirschauer’s conclusion that this
type of position was needed in Indochina. On December 2, 1937, a decree established a
civil aviation department that was to be headed be a special director.98 At the end of the
decade, the colonial administration put forth another measure to improve the management
of air traffic within the colony. On March 15, 1939, Governor General Jules Brévié
issued a decree that created two regional centers for aerial navigation, located in Saigon
and in Hanoi. These centers were to function as part of the civil aviation service, and the
relevant duties were to be handled by the commanding officer at Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut
airport and his counterpart at Hanoi’s Gia Lâm airport.99 The jurisdiction of the northern
center included the routes, the entirety of the landing sites, and “all manifestations of civil
aviation activity” within Tonkin, Kouang-Tchéou-Wan, and the areas of Laos and Annam
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situated north of the Tourane—Paksé air route. Conversely, the southern center had the
same responsibilities but for Cambodia, Cochinchina, and the parts of Annam and Laos
located to the south of the Tourane—Paksé line. The airfields at Tourane and Paksé fell
under the authority of the Hanoi-based center.100
This section has demonstrated that from the later 1920s, officials deemed it
necessary that Indochina have an administrative office dedicated to managing what was
believed would be a future of increased air traffic. However, in a manner that was
representative of the plodding pace with which the overall aviation infrastructure was
installed in the colony, this type of oversight position was only fully in place as the 1930s
came to a close. Of course, the creation of a civil aeronautics bureau was only one
component of the machinery that was required to get aviation get off the ground. The
following section shows how the establishment of a network of air routes, landing sites,
airfield facilities, and radio and meteorological posts was also necessary if the French
hoped to have aircraft operate efficiently and safely within Indochina.

The Development of Indochina’s Aviation Infrastructure (1920 to 1930)
The late 1920s and early 1930s witnessed a particularly marked effort to organize
a network of airfields and air links within Indochina. In fact, colonial and military
officials had worked to create an aerial infrastructure in the colony since the end of the
First World War. By 1920, a program for “air routes of general interest” had been drawn
up. This blueprint, which remained viable until at least the latter part of the decade,
included a line along the coast, another on the Mekong River, and a third tracing the
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border between Tonkin and China.101 A scheme for categorizing the colony’s various
airfields was also developed in the early 1920s. Writing to the Governor General at the
end of May 1922, Minister of the Colonies Albert Sarraut discussed how the landing sites
around the colony could be grouped into three categories: auxiliary terrains (terrains des
secours), which were essentially landing fields for emergencies; secondary airfields
(aérohaltes), which would have a shelter for planes, a few supplies and spare parts, and
some radio and meteorological equipment; and primary airports (aérogares), which
would be outfitted with a full complement of facilities—hangars, various warehouses,
storehouses, workshops, and equipment for wireless communications and for weather—
and would serve as air force bases or terminuses for major air routes.102
A February 1924 memorandum provides more details about the colony’s air
network as it appeared in the mid-1920s. In this document, Glaize stated that there were
presently sixty auxiliary landing sites—approximately thirty of which were equipped
with aircraft shelters and other installations—and larger airbases at Haiphong, Bien Hoa,
and Bach Mai. Both civil aircraft and military planes could utilize these various airfields.
Moreover, several air routes, ten of which were listed as primary lines, linked
destinations around Indochina.103 Approximately two years later, Glaize described the air
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network as consisting of eighty terrain that were reasonably organized and reasonably
well situated.104
A 1937 article in the Bulletin summarized the logic that had guided the efforts to
develop Indochina’s infrastructure between 1918 and 1930. “On the unquestionable
premise that airplanes in this region were veritable cripples[sic]” who would be “in great
danger” if they ventured far from an airfield, the writer explained, “the doctrine was to
multiply the landing sites in such a way as to end up with a rather dense network so that a
plane forced to land could have some chance of finding itself in proximity to an equipped
area.” Officials thus focused on providing the maximum security possible for pilots,
which essentially meant constructing landing fields no more than fifty kilometers apart
along the colony’s air routes.105 This reasoning, moreover, underscores the extent to
which the local conditions—geography and climate in particular—and the unreliability
and fragility of the era’s aeronautics technology bothered officials as they worked to
install aviation in the colony.106
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By the end of the 1920s, certain officials were expressing satisfaction with the
progress made in providing French aviation with a safe, reliable air network in Southeast
Asia.107 Even so and with an eye to the future of flight in Indochina, the colonial and
military administrations had by this point determined that the existing infrastructure
needed to be reevaluated. Already in 1926, Glaize recognized that with the “normal
development of aviation,” officials could anticipate that Indochina’s aeronautics facilities
would soon require upgrades.108 Two years later, the work of analysis and planning was
under way.109 A government-general memorandum from the fall of 1929 subsequently
concluded that the infrastructure was “already rather advanced” but needed to be
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completed and, in some cases, modified. Furthermore, this memo described the colony’s
“radio-weather network” as essentially non-existent.110
While these assessments were being made in the late 1920s, the major changes to
the infrastructure only began around and after 1930. “In matters of aeronautics,” a
memorandum from late November 1930 stated, “Indochina has...devoted its efforts in
1929 and 1930 to the modification of landing sites.”111 This comment was reinforced by
the colonial administration’s financial expenditures for this work in the first half of the
1930s. Between 1930 and 1935, the government general allocated the most funds for the
construction and maintenance of airfields in 1930, with this amount being reduced each
year thereafter.112
In mid-January 1930 Lieutenant Colonel Louis de Durand de Prémorel, the
Commandant Superior, concisely explained the problems with the existing infrastructure.
The network of airfields in the colony was planned and constructed at a time when the air
force not only had few resources at its disposal but also was outfitted with planes that did
not require large runways for landings and takeoffs. However, de Prémorel believed that
this infrastructure had become “absolutely insufficient.” Most of the landing fields were
not large enough to accommodate modern aircraft, and, as a result of flooding and bad
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weather, several of these terrains were usable only part of the year and required costly
repairs after each season of poor weather. De Prémorel thus determined that it had
become necessary “to go back over the old aeronautics program with a view to its
adaptation to the new conditions required by aviation.” Captain Paquier pointed out that
this reassessment would be accompanied by an infrastructural reorganization that
included building new landing sites, enlarging certain others, and “decommissioning the
terrains that could not be improved (sites [that were] difficult to reach, regularly flooded,
not open to enlargement, or too far from inhabited places, etc).”113
A wide-ranging program was subsequently drafted to address these various issues.
The Bulletin reported that the overall goal was improving the existing airfields as
opposed to increasing their number.114 Regarding the colony’s air routes, the project
detailed a network that appears similar to what already existed within Indochina.115
Specifically, this program listed four main routes: the two Hanoi—Saigon lines; a line
between Vientiane and Vinh; and a line from Saigon to the Cambodian locale of
Sisophon. In addition, several “less important” routes linked with these primary lines.116
Moreover, it was advised that Vinh, Vientiane, Hanoi, and Saigon have airports that
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could accommodate the growth in air traffic that an increased civil aviation presence and
an upgraded infrastructure were likely to foster.117
Another component of the program of 1930 was grouping the colony’s air routes
and landing sites into different categories based on their intended purpose. An Air
Ministry directive forwarded to the government general in August 1930 stated that the
routes and airfields were to be categorized as either “general interest” (d’intérêt général)
or “regional interest” (d’intérêt régional); the former category suggested the potential for
use as an international line while the latter implied a use that was more local.118 The
colonial budget would be responsible for funding the infrastructure work for both groups.
These costs consisted of not only an airfield’s “purchase, organization, signalization,
[and] maintenance” but also the site’s access roads, water, electricity, piping,
radiotelegraphic equipment, and telegraph and telephone communications. The
“superstructure work”—the purchase and assembly of hangars, the construction of
workshops, warehouses, offices, and personnel quarters—would be the responsibility of
the Air Ministry.119
While the aviation project of 1930 was to address the deficiencies of the entire
radio-meteorological network, certain routes were particularly in need of improved
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coverage. Specifically, Chaumié noted that crossing Laos and northern Annam to reach
Hanoi was “very difficult” because of the region’s equatorial forests. Like other
contemporaries frequently observed when considering the possibilities of aviation in
Laos, northern Annam, and Tonkin, Chaumié identified the Annamese Mountains as the
most formidable obstacle.120 He wrote of the necessity of acting “with the utmost
prudence” in this area, arguing that a complete network of meteorological,
radiotelegraphic, and radiogoniometric equipment was required before planes could be
expected to provide regular service in this region. This was a view shared by the
Governor General as well as officials in the Air Ministry and the Ministry of the
Colonies.121
Over the course of 1930, progress was made on key parts of the colony’s four
main air routes. Already in February 1930, Cordemoy reported that renovation work had
started on the Vientiane and Vinh airfields and that the French planned on installing
twelve auxiliary terrains between these sites.122 Then, in late November 1930, a
government-general memorandum noted that the work launched at the beginning of the
year on eight auxiliary landing sites would be completed by the end of December.
Furthermore, the Vientiane airfield had by this point been upgraded, and the
improvements to the landing field at Vinh were to be finished toward the end of the
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year.123 The colony’s other primary lines were upgraded as well during the year. For
instance, the November memorandum stated that work on several terrains that were part
of the route from Saigon through Cambodia—which then connected to Bangkok—had
commenced at the beginning of the month. In addition, upgrades would be made along
the coastal itinerary that linked Saigon and Hanoi as soon the government general
received specific information from certain provincial administrators. Finally, a study of
the “insufficient” auxiliary terrains that interspersed the Mekong River line was
scheduled for December.124

Indochina’s Aviation Infrastructure after 1930
With the general framework of the infrastructure established by the end of 1930,
the remainder of the decade saw efforts to complete, and then improve, Indochina’s air
network. Specifically, government and military officials worked to upgrade the colony’s
airfields, streamline the functioning of air routes, and increase radio-meteorological
coverage. In doing so, the French were seeking to keep pace with—and often to catch up
with—not only the projected growth of air transport but also an aeronautics technology
that was constantly modernizing. Though impeded by the era’s economic crisis, the
infrastructure work continued through the decade.
Jean-Baptiste Manchon points out that the program for Indochina’s air network
that was drawn up in 1930 was followed until the start of the Second World War.125 Yet
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this observation does not mean that, in the years after the plan was drafted, further
changes were deemed unnecessary. Indeed, in his report from 1934, Hirschauer noted
that colonial officials were proposing measures that aimed to lower the expenses
associated with the air network. In particular, to ease the financial burden of airfield
maintenance—a burden that had recently been weighing heavier on the colony’s general
budget—the colony’s Secretary General and the president of Hanoi’s Chamber of
Commerce suggested that the number of functioning airfields be reduced. Hirschauer,
considering the issue from the perspective of pilot safety, determined that this proposal
was not an option at present. With the types of aircraft in use, the current infrastructure
represented the minimum “in a region where every landing outside of the airfields is
impossible without accident.” Hirschauer explained that it would be several years—a
period during which more modern, more powerful aircraft would hopefully be sent to
Indochina—before officials could contemplate reducing the density of the colony’s air
network. “If at the end of this time,” Hirschauer asserted, “the airplanes are still able to
reach important airfields, to fly for 100 or 200 kilometers in the poorest atmospheric
conditions with a stopped motor, on that day we will be the first to say: the plan is
excessive and you can do away with 20, 30, or 40 percent of the airfields.”126
The need to improve Indochina’s air network to accommodate newer and more
powerful aircraft was a more pressing concern than Hirschauer’s comments seem to
indicate. Hirschauer himself observed in the fall of 1936 that modifications were
required. He remarked that the layout of Indochina’s airfields had not, on the whole, been
discussed in the section of chapter three that deals with air transport within Indochina. For the
most part though, these modifications did not fundamentally alter the appearance of the aviation
infrastructure.
126
Hirschauer Mission, 1934.
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revised since his previous mission to Southeast Asia. According to his 1936 report, the
colony’s air network was comprised of ninety-eight terrains for airplanes and twenty
landing areas for seaplanes. In addition to the two Hanoi—Saigon lines, the primary air
routes included a line that linked Bangkok with Hanoi via Vientiane and a connection
from Bangkok to Saigon via Cambodia.127
Hirschauer stated that this web of landing sites, while impressive, still did not
fully correspond to the needs of modern aviation. Elaborating, he explained that the
network was planned at a time when the aviation presence in Indochina consisted only of
single-engine military aircraft. Until the mid-1930s, the logic for constructing the aerial
infrastructure thus remained the same: place terrains relatively close to one another at
regular intervals so that a plane could easily reach an airfield in case of mechanical
failure.128 However, Hirschauer argued that with the power and weight of modern aircraft
and the increasing likelihood of flying during non-daylight hours, “the question arises
under a very different aspect today.” Already by 1935, Christophe Cony and Michel
Ledet point out, most of the colony’s runways were ill suited to handle year-round newer
aircraft that were heavier and faster than the planes produced at the start of the decade.
The totality of this situation led Hirschauer to assert that “a comprehensive revision of the
airfields” would be a sensible objective for 1937. This modification plan basically aimed
to decrease the number of landing fields by examining which terrains were rarely used
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Hirschauer Mission, 1936. As depicted in a Bulletin article, the airfield network
remained essentially the same in the late spring of the following year. See, for example,
“L’Aviation en Extrême-Orient,” 34.
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Hirschauer believed that the number of landing sites was not superfluous.
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and decommissioning these sites. The available resources, while limited, would then be
employed to upgrade the remaining airfields.129
While the Air Ministry had joined with colonial officials in 1934 to develop a
program for improving the primary landing sites within Indochina, this project’s goals
evidently had not been satisfactorily met by the fall of 1936. A significant reason for this
lack of progress involved financial constraints. In fact, this prior plan had proved to be an
expensive undertaking from the start. Cony and Ledet write that “the work was such that
its absorbed practically all the funds of the aerial navigation budget for 1935.” Then,
beginning in 1936, drastic cuts to the Air Ministry budget affected this effort over the
longer term. Even though the government general managed to partially compensate for
the diminished funding from the metropole, the project nonetheless remained subject to
delays.130
Regarding the status of Indochina’s meteorological network around this time, the
number of stations along certain routes was judged “insufficient” in the fall of 1934.131
Officials were attempting to address this inadequacy, at least in part. Cony and Ledet note
that between 1934 and 1935, the meteorological service was focused on improving the
coverage along the Indochinese portion of the route that linked Bangkok and Hanoi via
Vientiane and Vinh.132 Whatever the extent and success of this work—and possibly an
indication that this project, too, had stalled due to funding problems—Hirschauer
observed in his 1936 study that the colony’s meteorological network had not been
significantly modified since his previous mission. While appearing reasonably satisfied
129
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with the number of meteorological stations, Hirschauer offered critiques of the radiotransmitting system, which helped to broadcast local weather conditions.133
Nearing the end of the decade, commentators continued to point to improvements
that were still needed for the airfield, radio, and meteorological facilities along the
colony’s main air routes. Speaking at the Exposition Internationale de Paris in 1937,
Charvet stated that the landing fields situated along the two primary itineraries—the
north-south link from Tonkin to Cochinchina and the east-west line that connected Laos
with Hanoi—were “in proportion to the aviation of fifteen years ago, not only by their
size but...by their radiogoniometric equipment.”134 Charvet placed the colony’s
infrastructural deficiencies in a global context, which suggests an undercurrent of concern
that French aviation would be bested by foreign competition. He declared that the
“backwardness in which the organization of the infrastructure and ground equipment in
Indochina finds itself in comparison to other areas of the world” could not be
overemphasized. Charvet thus urged public authorities to strive to ensure that the
colony’s problems “will not much longer remain one of the black spots of imperial
aviation.”135
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Around the same time Charvet delivered these remarks, officials in Indochina
were seeking to address some of the complaints that he had voiced. In a letter from
December 31, 1937, Governor General Brévié informed Minister of the Colonies Marius
Moutet that over the course of the upcoming year, the colonial government planned to
devote a “considerable effort” toward improving and expanding the aerial infrastructure.
Brévié specified that the general budget had 1,110,000 francs earmarked for various
airfield upgrades and runway construction projects in 1938. The Air Ministry
provisionally designated another 300,000 francs to finance this program, whose total
funding—1,410,000 francs—was an increase of 500,000 francs from the previous year’s
allotment for aviation projects. The scope of this plan was indeed extensive. Included in
the overall program was improvement work to the facilities at Gia Lâm, Vinh, Vientiane,
Tan Son Nhut, Tourane, Phnom Penh, Paksé, and Luang Prabang.136

Conclusion
Installing a reliable aviation infrastructure required more than just constructing a
handful of airstrips. What was ideally needed was a network of different types of landing
sites, radio-meteorological posts, and a cluster of ground facilities to house supplies,
personnel, tools, and planes. In addition, an efficient management structure was required
to oversee the circulation of air traffic. Cognizant of these different components, the
French endeavored to lay the foundation for air transport in Indochina. Furthermore, the
infrastructure was planned and developed with goals in mind that were larger in scope
than mail and passenger delivery within the colony’s borders. Drawn up in its basic
136
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features at the start of 1920s, this infrastructure program was pursued with particular
vigor in the late 1920s and early 1930s as the French sought to meet the needs of a flight
technology that was continuously modernizing and an aviation presence that was
projected to considerably expand. Despite the economic woes of the mid-to-later 1930s,
officials continued to strive for the goal of providing Indochina with an air network suited
to the requirements of the present as well as the future.
On the whole, this infrastructure consistently seemed to be a step behind the needs
of modern air transportation. The French undoubtedly made progress with regard to
improving the infrastructure: runways were lengthened and reinforced; the airfield
network was given more coherence; radio-meteorological posts were upgraded; and a
system for better management of air traffic was put in place. Yet these achievements
were, more often than not, a response to what had already become a glaring need or the
fulfillment of an objective that had been outlined in prior years. In other words, French
aviation was typically catching up with its infrastructure needs as opposed to setting a
standard to which other aviation services could aspire in the 1920s and 1930s.
A reliable infrastructure was doubtless of critical importance for the functioning
of aviation in general. This reality was even more crucial for the particular situation of
time and place in which the French found themselves in Southeast Asia. In an era when
the aeronautics technology itself was relatively fragile and unreliable, this was not only
an environment where geography and climate were unfavorable to setting up aviation but
also a location where the chief source of materials and funding was located thousands of
miles away. As the remainder of this dissertation demonstrates, the inadequacies of this
infrastructure would play a major role in why aviation failed to achieve all that the
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French hoped it would within Indochina. Even into the years after the Second World
War, the air network was a topic of central importance for French aviation in Indochina.
The need for a reliable air network—and, indeed, the consequences of not having one in
place—would be dramatically underscored during the First Indochina War.
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CHAPTER TWO: MOVING MAIL AND PASSENGERS ON MILITARY PLANES
In mid-July 1926, Deputy Léon Archimbaud submitted a report to the Chamber of
Deputies that summarized the seemingly indefatigable transport capabilities of the
military aircraft deployed in the empire:
In the colonies during recent years, France as well as other countries have
acquired experience [that] clearly emphasizes the important role of military
aviation. Above inhospitable regions devoid of transportation routes, the
airplane...is not stopped by difficult trails, bridgeless rivers, mountains covered
with virgin forests, foul swamps, or unfriendly tribes.... [The airplane] traces its
path straight through the sky and in a few hours travels distances that require
weeks or months by ordinary means.137
Archimbaud’s comments indicate that military planes were recognized as making a key
contribution to colonial transport by the mid-1920s. Indeed, the period in which the air
force was most conspicuously involved with regular mail deliveries—and very limited
passenger service—within Indochina lasted from the 1920s until the early 1930s. By the
middle of the decade, civil aviation proceeded to take on the majority of these
responsibilities.
Indochina’s military squadrons were involved in three key instances that related
to transporting post and people during the aforementioned period. The first of these was
an aerial tour across the colony that was undertaken in January 1921. This voyage was
crucial for arousing interest and inspiring confidence in the functioning of long-distance
air services. The journey also motivated efforts not only to connect Hanoi and Saigon but
also to improve communications to parts of Laos. Moreover, the government dialogue
surrounding this trip encapsulates many of the hopes, anxieties, and practical problems
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that the French encountered in working to develop air transport in Indochina. Second, the
air force operated a short-lived line that functioned in the mid-1920s and represented the
colony’s first scheduled air service. This route linked the Kratié airbase in Cambodia with
the Savannakhet landing field in Laos; this itinerary was briefly extended south from
Cambodia to Saigon. Last, military aircraft undertook mail and limited passenger flights
between Hanoi and Saigon in 1929, continuing this service sporadically in the first half of
the 1930s. This line not only was the realization of the type of transport touted by the
1921 mission but also at last linked the colony’s northern and southern hubs through the
skies.
Overall, the flights on these routes were not reminiscent of a regularly scheduled
airmail or passenger service. Instead, the primary focus was propaganda—in the case of
the Kratié-to-Savannakhet line, this effort was directed toward counterbalancing
Thailand’s presence in the region—aircrew training, and filling out the colony’s air
network while establishing a foundation for commercial services.138 Conversely, the
actual delivery of letters, cargo, and people typically appeared as a secondary concern.
Moreover, French officials consistently voiced apprehension about the safety of these
transports and at times even questioned the necessity of such flights.139 Authorities
expressed further concerns about the costs and funding of what were in fact very
138
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expensive mail lines. To exacerbate this issue of cost, customers did not seem willing to
readily trade the standard means of transport for a service that, while more glamorous and
swifter, was undoubtedly a pricier option. Thus the more practical purposes of these
routes related to the said tasks of reconnoitering itineraries, providing training, and
projecting French power and colonial authority.140
As a final point, Indochina’s air force provided transport in two other capacities as
well. In addition to delivering passengers and mail in certain instances when the regular
modes of transportation failed, military planes carried out various as-needed transports.141
While these supplemental and on-demand uses are briefly discussed in the following
section, this chapter’s focus is the January 1921 aerial tour and the two military airmail
lines because these flight occasions facilitated the development of non-military air
service.142

Temporary and Supplemental Transports of Passengers and Mail in Indochina
At the start of the 1920s, many areas of the empire remained isolated and without
an adequate transportation network. As a result and in the absence of commercial air
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service that was “organized and sustainable,” military aviators were charged with
ferrying “important people of the colonial world.” In fact, pilots deployed in the empire
undertook this type of mission as early as the end of the Belle Époque.143 Within
Indochina, the air force was carrying passengers on as-needed basis from the early 1920s.
Jean-Baptiste Manchon characterizes these transports as some of the “first significant air
missions” undertaken in the colony. For example, the head French administrator in Lao
Kay was flown from Hanoi to his residence in northern Tonkin in January 1922, and, in
April, Major General Ernest Blondlat and Colonel Réné Debailleul traveled by air from
Saigon to Hanoi. Similarly, in recounting the “politically important” air force missions in
the southern half of the colony in 1923, Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet include the
transport of Indochina’s Director of Financial Inspection (Directeur du Contrôle
Financier de l’Indochine) from Saigon to Dalat and a regional aerial tour for Léon
Garnier, the French Resident in Dalat; during his time in Dalat, the pilot also gave plane
rides to numerous passengers, at least one of them an indigenous notable.144
Overall, this selection of flights reflects the types of everyday military transports
that were carried out in the colony during the interwar period. Yet in Indochina and
throughout the empire, it was only in the 1930s that there was significant growth in the
usage of this service.145 A trajectory of increasing use was not always evident though. For
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example, writing from Hanoi in late January 1935, Captain Marcel Puypéroux observed,
“it is quite obvious that at present the local governments or the provincial administrators
do not officially call upon, so to speak, our aerial collaboration.” He theorized that the
reason was linked to meager monetary resources, stating that officials perhaps were
concerned about the cost of air transport. More generally, Puypéroux argued that
“important people” and colonial officials should utilize air travel more frequently than
was currently the case.146 Of course, for reasons of security and of necessity-versus-cost,
requests for military transports were not always granted; this proved to be the case even
into the 1930s, when aviation had become more firmly established in Indochina and
flying had become a safer, more regular means of travel.147
On occasion, military aviators also undertook airmail deliveries and a few
passenger transports when roads and rail lines were temporarily disabled. For instance,
when the Red River flooded in September 1923 and September 1924, seaplanes from
Tonkin’s squadron were called on to deliver mail between Haiphong and Hanoi. Once
again in September 1926, Cony and Ledet indicate, the air force was assisted with
transport after the region around this waterway became inundated. Round-trip postal
flights were deployed daily from September 16 until September 28, when the railroad
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connecting Haiphong and Hanoi was restored; overall, these twenty-six voyages carried a
total of 351 kilograms of mail.148

The Hanoi—Saigon Aerial Tour of 1921
In the years immediately after the First World War, colonial and military officials
were actively investigating the possibilities for connecting Hanoi and Saigon by air. Most
notably, a test flight between the two cities was organized in January 1921 in
coordination with a multi-purpose air operation to Xieng Khouang in Upper Laos.149
Cony and Ledet characterize this pair of missions, which involved a total of eight aircraft,
as the air force’s “first grand sortie.” Aside from their political significance, these longdistance voyages—along with another noteworthy operation that had taken place over
several days in December—had demonstrated “all the advantages of linking the four
grand provinces of Indochina by air.”150 Observers indeed recognized the potential value
of the Hanoi—Saigon voyage even before it was launched. On January 9, interim
Governor General Maurice Le Gallen described the planned flight as having “economic
and political” aims that related to the establishment of regular air routes in the colony. He
148
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later noted that the mission had allowed him to personally examine the economic
possibilities of a rapid connection between the northern and southern parts of
Indochina.151
While the benefits of the aerial tour were appreciated, certain individuals objected
to parts of the operation, voicing concerns about the risks of the flight and the possible
consequences of a failed attempt. Major General Richard Puypéroux, serving as
Commandant Superior, was the source of much of this apprehension. He linked his views
to a broader argument in favor of exercising discretion regarding the cost and purpose of
the missions undertaken by the air force. These remarks underscore how the French
desire to utilize aviation as a tool of empire was not tantamount to unbridled enthusiasm
and rash action.
In a letter to the Governor General drafted on January 4, 1921, Puypéroux
emphasized that meticulous preparation was required for any significant aerial
operation—especially when the passengers included high-ranking colonial officials—
taking place during what was still the developmental phase of military aviation. This
careful planning would both reduce the risks and increase the likelihood of success. He
further warned that the completion of a given long-distance mission did not necessarily
mean a future of routine flights. In other words, officials would be mistaken in
concluding forthwith that the prior accomplishment of a round-trip journey between
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Hanoi and Thakhek was an indication that such a result would henceforth be repeated
“when we want and at a date determined in advance.”152
Puypéroux had expressed similar concerns the previous month, which had
prompted a dispute with air force commandant François Glaize. Specifically, the Major
General questioned the necessity of Glaize’s proposal for an aircraft to travel to Thakhek
as part of a reconnaissance operation; this assignment was likely related to the flight that
was carried out in January 1921.153 In Puypéroux’s estimation, the proffered mission—
unlike certain other operations—lacked a “tangible objective.”154 He characterized
Glaize’s journey as being similar to an air rally (raid), and he remain opposed to such
flights—“these have no practical utility”—as long as the colony’s air routes had not been
outfitted with a sufficient number of auxiliary landing sites. Furthermore, Puypéroux
linked what he understood to be an unnecessary mission to the larger need to carefully
map out how military aviation would function in Indochina. Otherwise, the air force
would flounder from task to task without a discernible goal while wasting precious
resources. Puypéroux accepted the likely reality of needing to quickly arrange “a few
very exceptional, very urgent, and very confidential missions” but still emphasized the
importance of drafting longer-term plans. “In the absence of such established projects,”
Puypéroux wrote to the Governor General, “the work of aviation is done without
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ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Général de Division Puypéroux, Commandant Supérieur des
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” January 4,
1921. This letter is found after “Bordereau récapitulatif des pièces adressées à Monsieur le
Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” March 9, 1921. As a reminder, Major General Richard
Puypéroux was the father of Marcel Puypéroux.
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On November 20 Glaize had notified Puypéroux of his intent to deploy a plane to
Thakhek to inspect the recently finished airfield. ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Chef de Bataillon
Glaize, Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine à Monsieur le Général de Division,
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine,” November 20, 1920.
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As an example of a mission with a more clear aim, Puypéroux cited a flight to Tran
Ninh that was intended to intimidate certain dissident elements among the area’s population.
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continuity, in fits and starts, often following a passing impulsion, that is to say, with the
maximum expense for the minimum return.”155
In a response to these comments, Glaize stressed that the Thakhek mission had a
purpose: “the reconnaissance...of an airfield considered important [italics original].” The
operation was not “simply an ‘air rally,’” he protested, pointing out that the flight had “a
very precise goal determined by the installation of the Hanoi—Saigon route.” He then
stated that this reconnaissance work was part of the previously approved program for
organizing Indochina’s air network. Glaize also mentioned that the specific missions of
the colony’s air force—as well as the funding required—were subject to some uncertainty
due to situational needs, weather conditions, and the nascent state of this service arm.
Nonetheless, Puypéroux maintained that Glaize’s argument had not altered his original
opinion regarding the Thakhek operation.156
For the Hanoi—Saigon aerial tour scheduled for January 1921, the seaplane trip
between Thakhek and Saigon was especially concerning to Puypéroux due to lingering
questions about safety. He again used the air-rally comparison, noting that the selected
itinerary not only possessed too few auxiliary airfields but also had had not been
thoroughly reconnoitered. Puypéroux wrote that such flights, while impressive and
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ANOM, GGI 66492, Le Général de Division Puypéroux, Commandant Supérieur des
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” December
2, 1920.
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ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, Commandant de l’Aéronautique
d’Indochine à Monsieur le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe
de l’Indochine,” December 3, 1920; ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Général de Division Puypéroux,
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur
Général de l’Indochine,” December 8, 1920. While recognizing that the air force had experienced
difficult beginnings in the colony, Puypéroux contended that this service now required a more
specific aviation program with which all the relevant authorities—himself included—needed to
be familiar; this latter part of his observation suggests that there had been a lack of clear
communication among French authorities regarding the air force’s missions and plan of
organization.
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courageous, inevitably included “contingencies,...risks, [and]...mishaps” and advised the
Governor General against the mission. Furthermore, he judged that the failure of the
operation would have broad, long-term repercussions for French Indochina. Puypéroux
explained that “the moral consequences of a non-success, from the viewpoint of French
prestige as well as that of the future of Indochinese aviation itself, appear to me too
grave...[to] express in all frankness my way of seeing this subject.”157
Governor General Le Gallen himself appeared disinclined to draw too much
attention to the flight, commenting on January 9 that he worked to “limit the publicity
made around my trip.” Likewise, the mission report noted that the Governor General
“wishes that the air rally be disclosed as little as possible.” The report left the specific
reason unstated, but it can be assumed that this thinking was influenced by the voyage’s
potential to cause alarm within the Thai government; this supposition is grounded in the
fact that this document included the reminder that flying over Thailand was formally
prohibited. In addition, lending credence to concerns about Thailand, a French military
official pointed out that as the Mekong River marked the Thailand—Indochina frontier,
foggy conditions could lead a French pilot to land in Thai territory. The implied problem
was that such a situation could potentially cause diplomatic or political issues. In fact,
competition with the aviation services of other nations in the region played a part in the
decision to arrange the January 1921 operation. Le Gallen made a point about pushing
ahead with such aeronautics missions and not “restrict[ing] our own rise through too
much caution.” This focus on marching forward was a way to ensure that French aviation

157

ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Général de Division Puypéroux, Commandant Supérieur des
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” January 4,
1921.
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did not lag behind in comparison to “the [aerial] activity of certain of our neighbors.”
While left unsaid, the main concern was probably Thailand.158
Another, more evident reason for not wanting to arouse too much public notice
prior to the completion of the tour was that a failure would be detrimental to French
aviation, in terms both of prestige and of materials and personnel. Indeed, the mission
posed various hazards made more dangerous by the technological limitations of the time:
long distances, an incomplete network of landing sites, and uncertain weather—
particularly east of the Annamese Mountains. Thus a successful journey was not to be
taken for granted.
In the end, despite Puypéroux’s protests and urgings of caution, the Hanoi—
Saigon operation was carried out as planned. Le Gallen explained to Puypéroux that as
Governor General, he was obligated “to make aviation produce the maximum” from both
a military viewpoint and the viewpoint of economic policy. Le Gallen further stated that
his work in promoting flight technology—“this arm of science and progress”—was
aligned with the “political goals” of his office.159
The mission report described the aerial tour as a three-part voyage: Hanoi to
Thakhek, undertaken by two airplanes; Thakhek to Khong, traveled by a pair of
seaplanes; and Khong to Saigon, also to be carried out by two seaplanes. A telegram to
the Minister of the Colonies recounted a slightly different version of the journey. This
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ANOM, GGI 66492, “[Le Gouverneur Général à] Le Général de Division,
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur
Général de l’Indochine,” January 9, 1921. This letter is found after “Bordereau récapitulatif des
pièces adressées à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” March 9, 1921. ANOM,
GGI 66492, “Ordre d’exécution”; ANOM, GGI 66492, Le Général de Division Puypéroux,
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur
Général de l’Indochine,” December 2, 1920.
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ANOM, GGI 66492, “[Le Gouverneur Général à] Le Général de Division,
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine,” January 9, 1921.
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dispatch noted that the operation started on January 13, 1921, as two airplanes—one with
Le Gallen as a passenger—departed Hanoi and arrived in Vinh after a turbulent flight
marked by unfavorable weather. The following day the aircrews, now accompanied by a
pair of seaplanes from Haiphong, crossed the Annamese Mountains in the direction of
Thakhek. On January 15, the single seaplane that remained in service—the other plane
required minor on-site repairs for a slightly damaged float after it had been forced to land
upstream from Thakhek—voyaged south toward Khong with Le Gallen onboard. A lack
of fuel forced this aircraft to stop short of Khong, leaving the journey to Saigon for the
next day; for this final leg of the trip, it appears that some aircraft from Squadron Two
had flown to meet Le Gallen’s plane so that they could travel as a group back toward
Saigon.160
To French officials beyond the colony’s borders, Le Gallen extolled the positive
effects of both his flight and the operation to Upper Laos.161 In addition, the triumphant
completion of these missions—the flight to Xieng Khouang in particular—fostered an
increased interest within the colonial administration for developing an air route to this
part of Indochina. In a telegram of January 26, the Governor General declared himself
“henceforth a convinced supporter” of utilizing a Mekong River air link to “unblock”
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ANOM, GGI 66492, “Ordre d’exécution”; ANOM, GGI 66492, “Télégramme
Officiel. Gouverneur Général à Colonies, no.1-S,” January 17, 1921. Cony and Ledet indicate
that this escort contingent from Saigon consisted of an airplane and three seaplanes that had been
dispatched several days prior. Cony and Ledet, 51. It should be noted that these authors offer
certain details that differ from some the departure, itinerary, and aircrew information found in the
archival material. For example, they write that two seaplanes left Thakhek for Khong on January
16. Cony and Ledet, 51.
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ANOM, GGI 66492, “Télégramme Officiel. Gouverneur Général à Colonies, no.1-S,”
January 17, 1921. Le Gallen informed the Minister of the Colonies that he had cabled all of
France’s representatives in Southeast Asia, emphasizing to them that these voyages were
accomplished without any special preparation and by relying on currently available military
aircraft. The Governor General left it to the Minister to spread the news of “the prowess of our
aviation” in the metropolitan press in a manner that “best serves the interests of our fine colony.”
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Upper Laos. Le Gallen aimed to promptly proceed to working on such a route. In a
dispatch sent the following day, he indicated his intention to commission a study for the
establishment of a seaplane line connecting Cochinchina to this region. Similarly, the
mission report pointed out that an airmail service could connect Saigon with Vientiane
and Luang Prabang, thus improving the communications infrastructure of the “so very
deprived ” protectorate; this account also evaluated different possibilities for postal lines
that linked Upper Laos with Saigon and Hanoi.162
While the success of the Hanoi—Saigon flight may have alleviated Puypéroux’s
worry about the risks and ramifications of that specific voyage, in the months that
followed he continued to stress economy and prudence in aviation missions. The
immediate reason was that the Minister of the Colonies had implored Puypéroux “to
practice the most rigorous supervision” in managing the funds delegated under the
Colonial Budget for the operation of the armed services, which was an appeal related to
the larger aim of reducing expenditures. Additionally, the metropolitan government
desired that the colony’s civil services exercise discretion in utilizing aviation, the
employment of which was often “very expensive.”163 Consequently, Puypéroux proposed
in late April 1921 that air force tasks should only be approved if they demonstrated a
“precise and well-demonstrated need.” Moreover, with this same goal of economy in
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ANOM, GGI 66492, “Télégramme Officiel. Gouverneur Général à Résuper Laos,”
January 26, 1921; ANOM, GGI 66492, “Télégramme Officiel. Saigon [à] Colonies,” January 27,
1921; ANOM, GGI 66492, “Effets et résultats des présentes missions.”
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As a point of clarification, the administrative structure of the air force hindered the
extent to which Puypéroux, as the head military official in the colony, could exercise direct
control over the financing of this service. While the decree of January 19, 1920, had placed
Puypéroux’s office in charge of military aviation in Indochina, the air force was to operate at the
disposal of the Governor General for non-military missions. Though the requestor of a given task
helped with the costs of the operation, the colonial budget ultimately assumed the majority of the
financial burden.
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mind, Puypéroux underscored that authorized missions should end when the stated goal
was achieved.164
Though the direct impact of Puypéroux’s campaign for caution is unclear, the
colonial and military administrations did proceed in a deliberate fashion when
considering how to build on the progress represented by the January 1921 missions.
Speaking to the positive effects of this pair of flights, a telegram dispatched in midJanuary emphasized that this “magnificent achievement...will have [a] very favorable
impact” both within Indochina and beyond the colony’s borders.165 Working to translate
this “very favorable impact” into concrete results for Indochina’s air network, officials
thereafter started investigating several options for scheduled air routes. In the summer of
1922 and seeking to follow efforts made in Thailand, French West Africa, and
Madagascar, Glaize contemplated developing air transport along three itineraries: Saigon
to Luang Prabang; Vinh to Vientiane; and Nha Trang to Tourane. However, Major
General Ernest Blondlat, the head military official in the colony at this point, ultimately
advised the Governor General against the plan. The cited reasons were the comparatively
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ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Général de Division Puypéroux, Commandant Supérieur des
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” April 28,
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76

high cost of air travel—estimated at six to ten times more than traveling by automobile—
and the scarcity of express traffic.166
The next spring witnessed the first significant airmail flight, as a cargo of letters
was delivered from Saigon to Hanoi on April 11 via the Mekong River and a crossing of
the Annamese Mountains at Thakhek. Manchon points out that the journey resembled a
single, long-distance trek that included mail transport rather than the start of a regular
postal line. Even so, Cony and Ledet, citing a contemporary colonial bulletin, note that
the success of this flight had generated interest in the creation of a regular airmail link
between the two cities.167 While a scheduled postal service would be created over two
years later, the itinerary of this military line did not exactly follow what had been
investigated between January 1921 and April 1923.

The Kratié—Savannakhet Line (Mid-1920s)
One of the elements included in a military aviation program outlined in an early
February 1924 memorandum was the establishment of a trial airmail line on a yet-to-bedetermined route. Glaize, who authored this document, emphasized the importance of this
task as he ended the memo.168 When developed, the first air service within Indochina—a
route from Kratié to Savannakhet—was understood to accomplish multiple goals that
extended beyond the immediate delivery of postal materials on military planes. While the
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Cony and Ledet, 69.
Cony and Ledet, 84; Manchon 399. This plane carried 330 letters taxed by the postal
authority in addition to some government and military correspondence. Cony and Ledet, 84.
Though not part of a scheduled route, the first airmail delivery between Annam and Tonkin took
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Gouvernement Général,” [February 3, 1924].
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transport value was recognized, officials came to view this usage as either too expensive
to maintain or impractical once major improvements to the region’s ground-based
communications network were completed. The fulfillment of other roles—namely,
propaganda and expanding the web of air routes within Indochina—proved an equally, if
not more, significant and compelling motivation.
These other objectives were evident in early discussions of what would become
the Kratié—Savannakhet line. Writing to the Governor General on June 30, 1925, Major
General Andlauer referenced a letter from a week prior that mentioned installing a
detachment of planes on the Mekong River not only for political and military purposes
but also for postal, economic, and medical missions.169 Given the opinion that Thailand
would act similarly, the colonial administration sensed the importance of arranging
regular flights along the river and near the frontier.170 At the end of September, Glaize
recounted to the Governor General that a recent Franco-Thai agreement had included
authorization for both signatories to deploy unarmed aircraft along the Mekong River.171
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ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Général de Division Andlauer, Commandant Supérieur des
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site was outside the neutral zone outlined in this accord. The French thus theorized that the Kratié
base could have certain war supplies stockpiled so that the aircraft would be “ready to act quickly
at the first opportunity.” In addition, Andlauer noted that placing a military aviation detachment
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Moreover, he explained that Thailand possessed a burgeoning air force, and the nation
would “probably very quickly take advantage of the latitude that is left to it.” Thus it had
been recognized that the French needed to demonstrate their aviation capabilities more
regularly and with more authority than in the past; this task was deemed particularly
important for influencing “our Laotian protégés” living along the waterway.172
The actual airmail line appeared as somewhat of a secondary concern to French
military officials. When referenced, the subject of airmail typically related to the more
general need to develop the air network within Indochina. Indeed, on June 4, 1925,
Glaize observed that the “military services” were thoroughly involved with the
organization of the aerial infrastructure because “they alone are qualified at this time for
the execution of such a task.” For the Kratié—Savannakhet route specifically, discussions
of airmail were informed by the challenges of transportation in this area of Indochina,
especially Laos. The report from June 1925 described the Mekong River between these
two locales as an area in which rapids significantly obstructed transit between the upper
and lower sections of the waterway. Addressing how the proposed air link could improve
this situation, Glaize asserted that the usage of aircraft for deliveries of both mail and,

at this site would help unify the colony’s air force by providing “concrete [and] effective” contact
between the northern and southern squadrons. ANOM, GGI 66344, “Projet d’installation sur le
Mékong d’un détachement d’hydravions,” June 29, 1925; ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Général de
Division Andlauer, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le
Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” June 30, 1925.
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stationnée à Kratié pour le transport du courrier entre ce point et Savannakhet.” This study
follows a letter titled “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine à
Monsieur le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de
l’Indochine,” September 25, 1925 [hereafter “Etude”].
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eventually, personnel appeared “particularly appealing in a region as poorly equipped
with transportation routes as Laos.”173
The Director of Post and Telegraph also analyzed this air route, and his measured
appraisal serves as a realistic assessment of the line’s transport potential. Like Glaize, he
similarly stated the advantages of utilizing aircraft to ameliorate communications in an
area where transportation was a “difficult and very lengthy” process. The Director
determined, however, that the Kratié—Savannakhet itinerary was not of great interest in
and of itself because rail and automobile lines currently ensured exchanges of
correspondence between Saigon and Savannakhet via Nha Trang, Tourane, and Dong Ha.
He did note that this coastal path could be modified if the proposed air service both saved
an appreciable amount of time over the terrestrial routes and allowed for the delivery of
the entirety of the mail. The airmail option was nonetheless viewed as having a limited
fiscal value. The Director pointed out that the quantity of correspondence sent from
Kratié to Upper Laos averaged 200 to 250 kilograms per week, parcel post excluded.
Given the relatively large number of package deliveries, he judged that aircraft would
unlikely be able to handle the transport of these items. “Therefore,” the Director
explained, “the revenue from the establishment of a surtax on correspondence other than
letters will not be very high.”174
Within Laos, the French administration was more enthusiastic about the potential
for aviation to help the region. Both Resident Superior Jules Bosc and Interim Resident
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Superior Jean-Jacques Dauplay had consistently requested that “regular and permanent”
air transport be developed within the protectorate. Such a service would compensate for
the “lack or irregularity” of other means of communication and provide “economic and
political advantages” for Laos. Dauplay further contended that the establishment of air
transport had become “all the more indispensable” due to current budget difficulties that
would delay the completion of the local road network, a project that was itself understood
to be critical to ensuring Laos’ prosperity.175
Following this commentary from the summer of 1925, a decree of December 19
authorized the use of the Kratié seaplanes for weekly round-trip flights to Savannakhet.
This line was inaugurated on February 9, 1926, as a plane departed Kratié early in the
morning, stopped at Stung Treng and Paksé, and arrived in Savannakhet after midday.176
Even prior to the first flight, officials had envisioned lengthening the line both in a
southern direction toward Saigon and a northern direction toward Thakhek; the southerly
prolongation of the route was approved around November 9. Discussing the eventual
extension to Cochinchina, Cony and Ledet highlight the promotional effort of the Friends
of Aviation League of Saigon (Ligue saigonnaise des amis de l’aviation). This aeroclub’s work to cultivate powered flight in the colony helped unblock the required funds in
the spring of 1926.177 By mid-March, Glaize estimated that the air force would be
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prepared to undertake voyages on the new itinerary at the beginning of April. Indeed, the
first round-trip flight on the Saigon—Kratié line was carried out between April 3 and
April 8. Thereafter, weekly service was offered from the remainder of April through May
and June. When needed, the trips were extended north to Savannakhet.178
Despite the success represented by the establishment of a regular air route, the
amount of mail that was transported remained quite limited. According to Cony and
Ledet, the overall postal cargo was “insignificant and even non-existent on certain days.”
Following a rainy-season stoppage in the summer of 1926, transports resumed on
October 31 only to cease the following day due to an operating deficit. A governmentgeneral decree subsequently put an end to the Saigon—Savannakhet link on November
16. Already by early September though, officials had been considering discontinuing this
service.179
Other contemporaries, also keenly aware of the line’s shortcomings, offered
corrective measures during the fall. On October 9, for instance, the Director of Post and
Telegraph judged that the results for the Kratié—Savannakhet service had fallen short of
expectations. To remedy this situation, he proposed a reduction in the surtax rates for
certain postal materials; this expedient was intended to “encourage the public to utilize
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this swift means of communication more often.” The Director’s remarks indicate that the
comparatively high cost of transporting letters and parcels by air was perceived to be
dissuading people from utilizing this service. Moreover, the public was apparently not
convinced—at least to the extent that French officials hoped—that the time saved by
sending their correspondence by plane was worth the extra cost of employing airmail.
The surtax issue had been debated in the fall of 1925 as well, prior to the inauguration of
the Kratié—Savannakhet line. At stake in these discussions was how to develop a service
that people would be inclined to use but that was also reasonably cost effective. In sum,
the French seemed to recognize that however exciting the prospect of airmail seemed to
be for the public, simply having such a service available was not enough to convince
people to utilize it.180
In their overall evaluation of the functioning of the Saigon—Savannakhet line,
Cony and Ledet observe that the required expenses were completely disproportionate to
the line’s results. While the expectation was that the transports would yield ten thousand
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piasters during the year, the actual profit was “completely null.” In fact, the service
consumed the twenty-six thousand piasters that were earmarked for it, and this amount
did not even include the twenty-thousand-piaster operating cost of the Kratié base and its
annexes. Furthermore, the line was inaugurated during a difficult year for military
aviation in terms of obtaining monetary resources, a situation that is perhaps indicative of
an ill-timed decision to launch a trial airmail route. Cony and Ledet explain that 1926
witnessed a financially driven decrease in the number of missions that the colony’s air
force carried out. While the funds assigned by the colonial budget for gasoline and
supplies had not been augmented between 1921 and 1926, the value of the franc—the
currency in which this sum was calculated—had dropped considerably in relation to
Indochina’s piaster. In addition, local, piaster-based fuel prices had markedly increased.
The result was that the funds provided by the metropole financed 1350 flight hours in
1921 and only 420 flight hours in 1926.181
Almost two-and-a-half years later, French officials were considering launching
another military transport service. The goal this time was to set up regular airmail and
limited passenger flights between Hanoi and Saigon. Compared to the Saigon—
Savannakhet line, this route was a longer, more ambitious course of travel that had
greater potential for traffic and—despite how officials in Laos may have felt—offered
more practical utility. Yet just as with the prior service, colonial and military authorities
viewed the proposed line as having other uses that were equally, if not more, important
than meeting an immediate demand for air transport. In other words, the Hanoi—Saigon
route also was imagined more as a multi-purpose air link that included mail delivery
rather than a regularly operating air service.
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The Hanoi—Saigon Line (Later 1920s)
In a letter from mid-April 1929, the Minister of the Colonies reported the Air
Minister’s interest in developing a scheduled airmail route between Hanoi and Saigon.
These military transports were to function in coordination with French postal ships
arriving in Saigon so that mail could more quickly circulate between metropole and
colony. As the Director of the Post, Telegraph, and Telephone (hereafter PTT Director)
asserted, the proffered plan “will not fail to improve the postal connections [within
Indochina] and those between Tonkin and the metropole.” Furthermore, the Minister of
the Colonies remarked that this line—the operation of which eventually would be handed
over to aviation companies—would demonstrate “the advantages offered by air transport”
and serve as training for pilots and crew. Cony and Ledet note, in addition, that that these
flights would function as “excellent publicity for military aviation.”182
Though local aviation firms had attempted some mail deliveries in the first half of
1929, commercial airmail was an impractical option at this point.183 The colony’s
administrative and military authorities agreed with the PTT Director that the air force
should be charged with carrying out the Hanoi—Saigon postal trips.184 The itinerary
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would follow the coast of Annam, a course of travel that Governor General Pierre
Pasquier characterized as the best and safest choice for linking the two cities.185
Pasquier’s opinion was informed by a study from mid-June composed by Chef de
Bataillon Mathis, then serving as the interim head of military aviation. This report
concluded that the littoral route was preferable to traveling along the Mekong River.
While much shorter than the coastal itinerary, the Mekong River option offered aviators
less security and more uncertainty than a path that traced the coast of Annam.186
Mathis outlined a schedule for about fourteen round-trip voyages or a total of
twenty-nine flights—fifteen from Hanoi to Saigon and fourteen in the reverse direction—
in a period stretching from June 23 to January 6, 1930.187 The itinerary of the route
purportedly would allow for airmail service to several localities between Hanoi and
Saigon, namely, Vinh, Hué, Tourane, and Nha Trang.188 When the postal line was
actually operating, the only stopover routinely utilized was Tourane. Indeed, because of
its location approximately halfway along the route, Tourane’s airfield was to play a
strategic role as a transfer and resupply point. According to Cony and Ledet, the journey
from Tonkin to Cochinchina was envisioned as a single day’s trip, with nine hours
l’Indochine,” June 19, 1929; ANOM, GGI 66569, “Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Mathis,
Commandant p.i. l’Aéronautique d’Indochine relatif au projet d’organisation d’une liaison postale
aérienne entre Hanoi et Saigon en correspondance avec les paquebots poste touchant Saigon,”
June 14, 1929 [hereafter “Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Mathis”].
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ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre
des Colonies,” August 20, 1929. Pasquier explained that this itinerary already had significant
infrastructural work along its length, and the route could be utilized in the future by commercial
aircraft as a branch of an international line stretching from Europe through Asia. He also noted
that the coastal itinerary could be incorporated into defense plans for the colony.
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following the river, a pilot not only had to navigate the “very serious obstacle” that was the
Annamese Mountains but also had to manage flying over a landscape outfitted with significantly
fewer landing sites than the littoral itinerary.
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dedicated to flying and one hour reserved for the Tourane stopover. During this short
interval, the postal cargo would be entrusted to the relevant aircraft and preparations
would be made for departure. In other words, the pilot arriving in Tourane from Hanoi
would hand over the mail to another aviator who would then travel to Saigon.
Meanwhile, the plane from Tonkin would wait at Tourane to receive the postal material
coming from Cochinchina.189
A round-trip voyage had in fact been carried out before Mathis drafted his report
in mid-June, and another flight was completed the following month.190 Even with these
initial successes, Governor General Pasquier was not willing to conclude that this line
should immediately become a regularly functioning service. These two journeys, he
explained, were trial flights along a lengthy itinerary that was still “basically equipped”
and offered too many risks for scheduled deliveries to be considered at present.
Highlighting the importance of augmenting the route’s infrastructure, Pasquier stated that
until such work was finished, flights on this line could take place only intermittently. He
added that these missions could include mail transport but without any guarantee. The
director of Indochina’s recently established Bureau of Civil Aviation also weighed in on
the safety issue. Writing to Pasquier on June 21, this official observed that the line
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Regarding the June operation, two aircraft undertook the southerly journey on June 4
then returned to Hanoi four days later, stopping at Tourane on each trip. The second transport
started on July 7, as a group of planes traveled from Hanoi to Saigon with fifteen kilograms of
mail for the outgoing postal ship; this vessel arrived in Cochinchina on July 9. Next, a cargo of
between 130 and 140 kilograms of letters were transferred to the aircraft on July 10 for delivery
to Hanoi that evening. ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur
le Ministre des Colonies,” August 20, 1929.
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needed more airfields and auxiliary airstrips along its length in order to provide aircraft
with as much security as possible.191
As with other uses of aviation in Indochina—which subsequent chapters will
reinforce—authorities had to account for weather and atmospheric conditions as they
studied the Hanoi—Saigon airmail link. Mathis noted that the most favorable periods of
the year for flying did not coincide in the north and south of Indochina, but he did not see
this reality as constituting an insurmountable hurdle to launching the air service. He
reasoned that the meteorological coverage allowed aircraft to travel on the route “without
too much difficulty” for most of the year. This was not a unanimous perspective,
however. At the end of August, Major General Aubert, the head military official in the
colony, communicated to Pasquier that he had reassessed his previous endorsement for
immediately proceeding with deployments on the coastal route. Aubert judged that
meteorological protection currently could not be assured in a satisfactory manner along
this itinerary. The remoteness of the landing sites only compounded this problem.
Therefore—and in a manner similar to Commandant Superior Puypéroux several years
prior—Aubert viewed the voyage between Tonkin and Cochinchina as more akin to a
long-distance air rally than a routine flight operating with the necessary conditions of
security. With these points in mind, he decided to temporarily postpone these aviation
missions. Aubert closed his letter to Pasquier by asserting that the Hanoi—Saigon line
could regularly function only with the type of safety conditions that had been emphasized
in Air Ministry circulars distributed in April and June. This requisite would be met,
191

ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre
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Aubert explained, when aviators were provided with an adequate blanket of
meteorological coverage.192
Another concern about this airmail route—and another issue that had factored into
discussions about air transport in previous years—was how potential customers would
respond to the comparatively steep cost of using this service. Generally, the public was
electrified about what aviation successes represented and enjoyed the spectacle of such
flights. In Indochina, this enthusiastic response to receiving letters from France sent via
airmail was, at least in part, undoubtedly related to the novelty of this means of
communication. In the summer of 1929, for instance, the Governor General recounted the
excitement that followed the delivery of metropolitan mail transported by air from
Saigon: “the European population [in Hanoi] unanimously expressed its satisfaction in
receiving mail from France a few days in advance.”193
However, this enthusiasm did not immediately translate into a clientele surge for a
given air service. Pasquier estimated that potential patrons in the metropole would likely
consider the postal surtax to be too high to justify what was—in terms of the days
required to travel from France to Southeast Asia—a marginal amount of time saved with
airmail. For individuals in Tonkin, air transport would save only some time at departure;
as a result, the majority of these potential customers would simply continue to have their
correspondence sent via the maritime route. Furthermore, the prior experience of an
accelerated automobile-and-railroad postal service between Hanoi and Saigon provided
Pasquier with “absolutely conclusive” evidence regarding how the public would likely
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respond to an airmail option. He reported that the amount of mail delivered via these fasttrack transports was “insignificant” even though this service both had a low surtax and
allowed for expedited delivery.194 “Therefore,” the Governor General reasoned, “we can
affirm that the airmail line is not likely to pay for the expenses that it would bring about.”
He maintained that the interest of the route lay primarily in its use for training and
propaganda purposes.195
Like Pasquier, the PTT Director was cognizant of the challenges of compelling an
appreciable customer base to actually use the air service on a regular basis; his analysis
perhaps informed the Governor General’s outlook regarding this postal link. The PTT
Director indicated that the public would be hesitant to utilize an airmail line that
permitted delivery only forty-eight hours faster than other means of transport while
carrying a surtax that was six times higher than that of transports on the accelerated
automobile route. In other words, the argument was that, for most people, the time saved
by using the airmail line would not justify its comparatively high cost.196
Reflective of how military air service was often viewed as a temporary substitute
rather than a permanent replacement for land and water transports, an issue that spurred
officials to campaign for the coastal mail route was the incomplete status of the Hanoi—
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The PTT Director deduced that the auto-and-rail link functioned with an annual
deficit; he noted that the revenues from surtaxed postal items were “far from offsetting” the
operating expenses. ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Directeur des Postes, Télégraphes et Téléphones de
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l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” June 10, 1929. As a solution to
the potential traffic problem, the PTT Director suggested that certain additional stops could be
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on the Hanoi—Saigon route.
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Saigon railroad. After the railroad construction was finished though, Pasquier observed,
this airmail “would in all likelihood lose much of its interest.”197 A government
memorandum similarly remarked that the air service “will no longer be indispensable”
once the railway was operational.198 Hence the French understood the advantages that air
travel offered for passenger and mail transport but were equally aware that other means
of travel, while slower, were less expensive and more practical for the time being.
After a successful round-trip journey—the legs of the trip were completed on
August 4 and August 7—the postal flights between Hanoi and Saigon were suspended
because of severe weather. Pilots attempted to resume service near the end of October,
but these efforts fell short due to another bout of unfavorable weather.199 A letter of
November 26, 1929, stated that the voyages between Hanoi and Saigon thus far
undertaken should not be considered as part of the scheduled postal service discussed by
the Minister of the Colonies in April and the Governor General in August. In addition,
the number of round-trip deliveries that were actually carried out was far fewer than the
figure of fourteen projected by Mathis in mid-June. These trial flights had nonetheless
facilitated the work of establishing an air route between Tonkin and Cochinchina, and,
eventually, the creation of the type of airmail line that French officials had described in
the spring and summer. Moreover, Cony and Ledet explain that with the satisfactory
performance of these transports on two-seater aircraft, the next step was to upgrade the
coastal infrastructure. In doing so, the military could proceed to using single-person
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planes; this move suggests not only a more efficient utilization of material and men but
also, in all likelihood, more space for postal cargo.

The Hanoi—Saigon Line (1930 and Beyond)
The air force revived the coastal airmail line several months after service stopped
in 1929. A total of nine round-trip journeys—thus eighteen individual flights—were
carried out at somewhat regular intervals between March 2 and October 19, 1930.
Overall, the planes transported 1880 kilograms of mail on a schedule that aimed to
correspond with the arrival in Saigon of ocean liners from Europe. Even at this point
though, these transports were still viewed as test flights rather than a scheduled airmail
route.200 In fact, at least one official had unsuccessfully solicited the colonial
administration in May for more regular usage of this service.201 In response, SecretaryGeneral Graffeuil commented that the air force presently lacked the means necessary for
scheduled trips. Providing more detail, Major General Aubert stated that with the current
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organization of this air force, this type of proposal “would lead to risks absolutely out of
proportion to the results that [the PTT Director] intends to achieve.” He noted, in
addition, that his opinions from the previous August—that more safety was required on
lengthy itineraries before such routes could offer scheduled air service—remained
valid.202 Nevertheless, the operation of Hanoi—Saigon line in 1930 stood as a notable
achievement for the French in Indochina: an airmail link that connected the colony’s two
major cities and functioned according to a more or less regular timetable.203
During the next few years, officials aimed to further improve airmail service
between Hanoi and Saigon. Captain Puypéroux recounted that in 1931 and 1932, weekly
round-trip flights were arranged to work in conjunction with aircraft arriving from
France, in principle from April to December. Cony and Ledet offer more information on
this line. They confirm that the air force’s slate of missions for 1931 included postal
flights, and, for 1932 as well, they cite several airmail trips with deliveries to Hanoi and
Saigon. While these efforts indeed represented progress for air transport within
Indochina, the line was stopped the following year. Puypéroux reported that the flights
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were carried out with “nearly total consistency,” but the service was nonetheless
terminated at the end of 1933 due to a lack of funds.204
As land-based transportation improved in Indochina and elsewhere in the French
empire during the 1930s, the air force’s scheduled mail routes were considered a less
practical option in terms of both costs and benefits. Manchon notes that, outside of
Madagascar, these airmail services were eventually abandoned in favor of the type of asneeded transports that were better aligned with the “nature and equipment” of the air
force. The growth of commercial aviation also brought about the gradual cessation of the
military postal lines, but this development was neither unplanned nor lamented. In
perhaps the final instance of regular airmail service in the interwar French empire,
military planes shuttled mail between Rabat and Tunis via Algiers for a few months in
1935; this task was subsequently handed over to civil aviation.205
For Indochina specifically, by the mid-1930s the Hanoi—Saigon air route had lost
much of its utility as a scheduled service. Considering the risks of the flights, this line no
longer provided a justifiable amount of time to be saved in comparison to the nearly
finished coastal railway. By the start of 1934, the construction of the Transindochinese
Railroad had progressed enough to allow for transports in only a few days. When the
entire rail line was inaugurated in the fall of 1936, the travel time was reduced to fortysix hours. For several years after 1933, then, military airmail was employed on an ad hoc
basis.206 Puypéroux, for example, observed that pilots carried out two round-trip postal
flights between Hanoi and Saigon in rapid succession at the end of October 1934. This
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assistance was requested to make up for several closures to the land route through Annam
in the wake of a severe typhoon.207

Conclusion
Prior to the launching of regular commercial service in Indochina, the colony’s air
force was tasked with providing limited mail and passenger transports on scheduled
routes from the mid-1920s to the early 1930s. The establishment and functioning of these
lines—along with the organization of long-distance flights in general during this period—
reflects how the colonial and military administrations devoted earnest attention to
ensuring that aviation missions would be undertaken in the safest possible conditions.
Nevertheless, officials expressed concern, and even outright disapproval, about these
operations. The reasons related to lingering worries about safety, cost, and necessity,
especially when the use of aircraft was weighed against available land-based modes of
transportation. Taken as a whole, both the protests against such flights and the attention
paid to decreasing the risks—and thus reducing the chance for failure—demonstrate that
however surefire and powerful aviation may have appeared as a tool of empire, flying
during this era presented a more fallible reality.
From the perspective of productivity, consistency, and revenue, the military
routes in Indochina failed to excel. The Kratié—Savannakhet and Hanoi—Saigon lines
not only had relatively short existences but also were expensive to operate and were
utilized infrequently and inconsistently. However, these routes were more successful in
terms of pilot training, propaganda, and laying the framework for future civil air service
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in the colony. Generally, officials recognized that these two air links, along with the
aerial tour of January 1921, had fulfilled the aforementioned purposes. From this trio of
trial attempts, commercial routes—the subject of the following chapter—were
progressively developed to, within, and through Indochina in subsequent years.
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CHAPTER THREE: MOVING MAIL AND PASSENGERS ON CIVIL PLANES
The June 1930 issue of the Bulletin de l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine
(hereafter Bulletin) reproduced an extract of a recent interview with Air Orient’s
managing director Louis Allègre.208 Allègre outlined the route from France to Southeast
Asia that the company was presently preparing. A seaplane would travel from Marseille
to Beirut, which would be followed by an automobile ride to Damascus, a distance of
about one hundred twenty kilometers.209 Other aircraft would then carry the cargo and
mail to Baghdad and on to Karachi. Due to various reasons—chief among these were
budgetary limitations and a lack of infrastructure—the journey from Karachi to Calcutta
initially would utilize the existing railroad connecting these cities. The material would
finally be loaded on a seaplane for the remaining leg of the trip, Calcutta to Saigon via
Rangoon.210
Allègre’s description hints at the difficulties that the French encountered as they
worked to get civil aviation off the ground and regularly functioning during the interwar
period. Several factors—each of which was magnified in an increasingly competitive
commercial aviation market—hindered the development of French air transport to,
within, and through Indochina in the 1920s and 1930s. Chief among these factors were
208
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the thorny nature of diplomacy, high costs and poor profits, infrastructural deficiencies,
and the limits of the era’s flight technology.
Significantly, this chapter demonstrates how the French, in seeking to further their
colonial project, were at times required to utilize negotiations, cooperation, and
purportedly equal terms instead of the “standard” imperial means of coercion, which
typically amounted to a combination of brute force and agreements that were blatantly
unfavorable to non-European populations. Indeed, French interactions with Thai and
Chinese representatives on the topic of air services in Southeast and East Asia usually
consisted of a series of back-and-forth exchanges, periods of waiting, and flat-out denials
of French requests. With regard to China in particular, French efforts were consistently
derailed by the political turmoil that disrupted China from the late 1920s through the
1930s; this turbulence was not only internal but also included a buildup of tensions with
Japan and, eventually, a full-scale conflict with this increasingly belligerent nation.
Additionally, the French were competing with other European powers and the United
States for aerial supremacy in this part of the globe.
The French had success with civil aviation during the 1920s and 1930s though,
especially when compared with the experiences of other types of French aviation in
Indochina. In particular, the French were able to develop, and then improve, air transport
within Indochina and between metropole and colony. In addition, the French succeeded
in winning aviation access to China. As André Evrard notes, Air France was the first
foreign airline to operate service to China under its own national flag as opposed to
offering flights in joint efforts with the Chinese.211 Ultimately though, the work of
211

André Evrard, “La situation de la compagnie Air France en Indochine au cours des
années 1939/1940,” Icare no.163 (1997): 85.
98

developing air routes to, within, and through Indochina was—as Allègre’s interview
indicates—a protracted, difficult process that produced air services that were never as
lucrative, widely used, or expansive as the French hoped. Indeed, like the military lines
that preceded them, these civil air links were costly to operate and, for most of the
interwar years, hindered by the era’s technology.

Civil Air Routes within Indochina (1920s)
Beginning in the first half of the 1920s, attempts were made to develop
commercial aviation in Indochina, but these early organizations typically had an
ephemeral existence.212 A degree of relatively longer-term success was won with the
Compagnie Aéronautique Française (CAF), which directed the formation of the
Compagnie Aéronautique Française d’Extrême-Orient (CAFEO) in May 1922. In
addition to selling French aeronautics materials in Southeast Asia, this firm sought to
operate several lines within Indochina; by November 1922, this network was envisioned
as being composed of the following routes, with stopovers along certain of these
itineraries: Vinh—Vientiane; Hanoi—Vinh; Kratié—Thakhek; Vientiane—Luang
Prabang; and Can Tho—Saigon—Phnom Penh. However, the promised government
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In March 1920, aviator Charles Ricou founded an aero-club in Portuguese Macau. He
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Ultimately, by the summer of 1922 and faced with financial difficulties, Ricou had abandoned
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pilot Etienne Poulet worked to establish an aviation company in Saigon in the first months of
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Phnom Penh. This attempt experienced some success by the end of year—plane rides and
propaganda voyages—but the larger project never fully materialized. As a final example, a
company under the name Marcel Chrétien existed very briefly in Indochina. In 1925 and 1926,
this firm conducted several photography missions for topographic studies. Christophe Cony and
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funding for parts of CAFEO’s plan never materialized, and, in February 1924, the
company discontinued test flights; CAFEO was dissolved the following year.213
Later in the decade and undeterred by CAFEO’s failure, CAF launched another
program for developing commercial air service in Southeast Asia. The airline that was
formed on this second attempt, the confusingly and similarly named Compagnie Aérienne
Française, was established at the end of the summer of 1928; the firm’s seaplane facility
was inaugurated toward the end of March 1929. By February 1930 and after some initial
aerial studies, the firm’s commercial activity within the colony included the following:
“first flights” (baptêmes de l’air) for “a rather large number of Annamites and Chinese”;
regular air transport of an unspecified type; touristic excursions to Angkor Wat and
Dalat; and aerial photography tasks. Yet in another failed attempt at planting a civil air
service in Indochina, the Compagnie Aérienne Française ceased operations in the course
of 1930 due to the absence of new clientele and the wearing out of its planes.214
The formation of the Société d’études d’aviation (SEA) in July 1926 represented
the establishment of a somewhat longer-term civil aviation presence in the colony. By
early 1927 this firm, which aimed to investigate the “applications and the development of
aviation in Indochina and the Far East,” had narrowed its focus to assisting with cadastral
surveys and setting up air routes between Saigon and Bangkok and Saigon and Hanoi. At
the start of April 1928, SEA was incorporated as the Société d’Etudes et d’Entreprises
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Aériennes en Indochine et en Extrême-Orient (hereafter SEEAIEO).215 Then, on October
22 of the following year, Air Asie was created from SEEAIEO and as a subsidiary of Air
Union Lignes d’Orient (hereafter AULO).216 From November to early December 1929,
this new airline conducted several test flights within the colony. In 1930 Air Asie planned
to launch scheduled service within Indochina while also carrying out trial voyages toward
China.217 By mid-July 1930, Air Asie and AULO had combined to create Air Orient,
whose administration continued these prior efforts to develop commercial air transport to
and within Southeast Asia.218
The rapid pace with which aviation firms were established, merged, and
dissolved—and thus the seemingly constant transformation of the French civil aviation
landscape in Southeast Asia at this time—would continue until the formation of Air
France.219 The primary reason for these frequent changes likely related to the limited
availability of aeronautics and financial resources.
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At points when more than one airline existed within Indochina, the relationship
between the companies was, at least according to one source, more competitive than cooperative.
At the start of 1930, a letter to the Governor General maintained that the two local commercial
firms, the Companie Aérienne Française and Air Asie, quarreled over requests for missions. Each
of these firms appeared to have drawbacks in this writer’s opinion. While Air Asie was “filled
with good intentions” and offered much lower prices than its competitor—and perhaps
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Civil Air Routes within Indochina (1930s)
In July 1931 Cordemoy argued that Indochina’s air routes should be viewed as
components of longer international links and not as exclusively interior connections that,
in general, were “too short to have a commercial traffic of interest.” The Hanoi—Saigon
line, he had observed in February 1930, was particularly important as such a link in what
appeared as a burgeoning chain of international air routes.220
In actuality, the development of scheduled commercial service between the
capitals of Tonkin and Cochinchina—long a goal of aeronautics enthusiasts and officials
in the government and military—was a protracted process. Indeed, even though coastal
and Mekong River itineraries between Saigon and Hanoi had been traversed by aircraft
relatively frequently since the mid-1920s, regularly operating civil air transport was not a
reality until the middle of the following decade. While weekly flights were undertaken
from late November 1932 until the end of the year, this service was suspended until the
infrastructure between the two cities was completed; this task required almost two years
to finish. In January 1935, air force captain Marcel Puypéroux indicated that Air France,
which had been formed in the summer of 1933, would offer a direct Hanoi—Saigon link
in the near future. In the late spring of 1938, it was reported that there had been interest
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the previous year in establishing such a route, and this service was presently the subject
of ongoing negotiations with “the relevant authorities.”221
Concerning the action taken in 1937 toward developing Hanoi—Saigon line,
certain French officials appeared anxious to ensure that this route would soon function as
planned.222 This worry stemmed from the opinion that the current agreement for British
Imperial Airways planes traveling through Indochina could have unpleasant commercial
repercussions for the colony. As Antoine Baffeleuf explained in late October 1937, the
itinerary for Imperial Airways’ regularly scheduled service between British Malaya and
Hong Kong, in operation since March 1936, traversed the length of Indochina from south
to north and included stops in Saigon and Tourane. Yet according to this agenda, neither
mail nor passengers, whether destined for or in provenance from the French colony,
could take advantage of these stops. “To date,” Baffeleuf lamented, “Indochina alone
seems to have remained a stranger to the lively movement apparent in neighboring
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countries in support of the development and the improvement of their commercial and
postal relations by air.”223
Louis Hirschauer, the Inspector of Civil Aviation, also had voiced disapproval
over this Franco-British arrangement in 1936 when the agreement was drafted. He
described the frustrating situation for those in Indochina—specified as rice exporters—
who, while seeking to travel or send mail to Hong Kong, watched Imperial Airways’
planes bound for this destination land and depart from Saigon without taking on any local
customers or postal material:
They see…an aircraft that contains letters to Hong Kong from their
competitors in Batavia and Singapore, letters that will be the same evening
in Hong Kong, while their own letters destined for Hong Kong, not being
able to be loaded on this airplane…, must take the train to Hanoi and from
there be transported next day…to Hong Kong or Canton!
As a result, businesspeople in Indochina were faced with a distasteful situation in which
their correspondence to China arrived two or three days after the mail of their commercial
rivals. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Hirschauer reported that this state of affairs, which would
hopefully be soon remedied, fostered in the colony an “atmosphere unfavorable to Air
France.”224
By the later 1930s, scheduled air service had been established between Saigon
and Hanoi, but the specific itinerary continued to evolve until the end of the decade as
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officials modified which destinations were served and how often the route operated. For
instance, on April 29, 1939, Governor General Jules Brévié wrote that an agreement had
been signed with Air France for round-trip flights each week on a Saigon—Vientiane—
Hanoi itinerary.225 This line was scheduled to open on July 1 after a series of test flights
between Hanoi and Vientiane in May and June.226 In order for this service to function as
planned, French officials had to obtain authorization from the Thai government for
French planes to pass over a portion of Thai territory—a section between Savannakhet
and Vientiane—as they traveled from Saigon to Vientiane.227 By the end of the 1930s,
civil aviation had expanded, albeit rather slowly and not without difficulties, throughout
the colony. This growth did not occur in isolation though; the development of these
services took place so as to eventually connect with air routes that linked France to
Indochina.

Connecting France to Indochina (Mid-1920s to 1930)
The second half of the 1920s was the start of a period in which authorities in
France and Indochina worked to realize the establishment of a route to the colony, with
the goal being air service that was both reliable and regularly operating. This effort
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signaled a move away from—but not a complete abandonment of—the record-setting
speed and distance flights that had hitherto characterized aviation to this part of the globe.
The problems posed for developing a Europe—Southeast Asia link were broadly
categorized as either political or technical, with the former of these appearing as the more
challenging concern.228 Indeed, in the second half of 1934, an evaluation of Air France
and its routes remarked that the French imperial air network could not be expected to be
as powerful as that of Great Britain. The logic was that Air France mainly operated along
a “grid of international links that...must inevitably meet, on the majority of its lines, the
competition of national companies that every state of appreciable importance
maintains.”229 In other words, France was required to negotiate and contend with the
governments through which French commercial lines passed. In a related vein, because
much of the infrastructure for these routes was within foreign territory, Air France and
the French Air Ministry French consequently tended to be without “direct means of
action” when improvements were needed.230
By the late 1920s, France had managed to make concrete progress to overcome
the political hurdles of the route, namely, the need to negotiate agreements for flights and
landings within the various territories that separated metropole and colony. A short article
that appeared in the Bulletin in April 1929 described this ongoing process. An accord had
been signed with Italy, which was necessary for the first portion of the France—
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Indochina route that extended across the Middle East to Baghdad. French officials had
planned talks with Great Britain for the second part of the connection, from Baghdad to
Rangoon.231 On July 22, 1929, the Minister of the Colonies wrote that these negotiations
were soon to begin, with France’s goal being to arrange for Anglo-French cooperation for
an air route through British India.232
This possibility did not materialize as planned, however. A Ministry of the
Colonies letter of November 22, 1929, noted that the British government had determined
that beginning in 1930 and until the end of the rainy season of 1931, all air traffic—
British and foreign alike—would be prevented from passing over India. The cited reason
was the need to undertake extensive infrastructural work in this region.233 French officials
were incredulous about this rationale though. Vital Ferry explains that the British delayed
granting AULO authorization for regular flights through the Indian subcontinent in no
small part because Great Britain was not keen on having French commercial aircraft
utilize sites in the area as stopovers while Imperial Airways remained without a
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functioning route to Southeast Asia.234 For French officials, this type of maneuvering on
the part of Great Britain was, to a certain extent, expected. “Great Britain has always
been anxious to control the Indies route,” a report stated at the beginning of August 1928.
“It is this unchanging desire that inspired its foreign policy during the last century.”235
The French were more successful in reaching an agreement with the Dutch for the
transport of mail between Europe and Indochina. At the beginning of October 1929, a
telegram from the Governor General mentioned an accord for a fortnightly service in
which Air Asie would ferry to Saigon a quantity of mail that had been transported to
Bangkok on a KLM plane. At the end of October, the Minister of the Colonies discussed
the specifics of this collaborative effort, explaining that the airmail between Bangkok and
Saigon would circulate on a weekly schedule—the circuit was completed every two
weeks—and this particular cargo was to be transported only on French aircraft piloted by
French personnel.236 This Franco-Dutch coordination allowed the inaugural delivery of
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airmail from France to Indochina on December 9. In the reverse direction, the first
Saigon—Bangkok airmail service was carried out from December 16 to December 18 via
Phnom Penh and Battambang.237
By the first months of 1930, French officials were actively examining two
itineraries for the Indochina portion of France’s air link to Southeast Asia. The first
option entailed traveling from Rangoon to Vientiane and then Vinh while the second
involved aircraft proceeding from Rangoon to Bangkok and then Saigon.238 The former
route, which Chaumié preferred, allowed for relatively easy coastal access to Hanoi and
appeared advantageous in terms of a possible extension to China in the future.239
Ultimately though, Chaumié determined that the “most prudent and the most logical”
solution was to have the line pass through Bangkok.240
At the end of May 1930, Chaumié updated the Minister of the Colonies on the
program for the section of France—Indochina route beyond Baghdad. The Air Ministry
had earmarked funds for the extension and support of the airmail line from Baghdad to
from the fall of 1929, French and Dutch officials sought an accord with the British that would
entail the responsibilities for air service in Western Europe and in India rotating among the routes
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Saigon as part of its budget for the 1930 to 1931 fiscal year. More specifically, this
support would help fund: approximately five round-trip postal voyages on the Baghdad—
Karachi and Calcutta—Saigon portions; about twelve round-trip flights between Bangkok
and Saigon, scheduled to correspond with KLM’s airmail service to the Dutch East
Indies; and several reconnaissance flights between Rangoon and Vinh. Before
undertaking any of the airmail trips though, Chaumié added, AULO needed to conduct
several test flights on the Rangoon—Saigon course of travel so that the company could
definitively select its itinerary and landing sites.241
Whatever itinerary French officials chose for reaching their colony in Southeast
Asia, France needed to sign an accord with Thailand so that French aircraft could deliver
their cargo to Indochina. A SEEAIEO report frankly summarized the need to find a
means of cooperating with Thailand: “from Rangoon to Indochina, there is a wall, Siam;
we must cross it…by establishing a Franco-Siamese line.”242 A preliminary discussion of
a French air route through Thailand occurred in the fall of 1927. In a proposition
submitted to Thailand on November 5, French officials proposed the establishment of a
Franco-Thai company that would undertake the operation of both the Rangoon—Vinh
section of a Europe—China air link and an accessory line from Phitsanulok, located in
Thailand, to Saigon.243

241

30, 1930.

ANOM, GGI 66529, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” May

242

SEEAIEO, “Etude.” For more details about this source, see footnote nine in chapter
one of this dissertation.
243
ANOM, GGI 66529, “Note sur l’Activité Internationale en Extrême-Orient en Matière
d’Aviation Commerciale et Postale,” August 1, 1928. An earlier proposal for a jointly operated
airmail service, albeit on smaller scale, was offered to the French by Thai officials in December
1922. According to this scheme, the governments would share the cost of routes linking Thailand
to Laos and to Cambodia. Legarde, who cites this proposal, does not indicate if the proposition
ever moved beyond the planning stage, but it appears unlikely that it did. Legarde, 17-18.
110

Though seriously considered by the Thai, the French project was rejected. A
French government memorandum from August 1928 stated that despite the negotiating
skills of François Glaize—by this point, he was working as a representative for what was
to become SEEAIEO—and a proposal that was reasonable, the French effort was stymied
by “the repugnance of the Bangkok government at any idea of subvention as well as a
traditional suspicion of bold innovations.”244 Yet this memo was pleased to report that
“new events have occurred since January that in all likelihood modified Siamese opinion
and won the cause of Colonel Glaize.” Specifically, the document cited the completion of
the Tokyo—Paris leg of French aviators Dieudonné Costes and Joseph Le Brix’s global
circumnavigation and the creation of a bureau for civil aeronautics in Indochina. On April
17, 1928—three days after Costes and Le Brix completed their journey and the day after
the establishment of the civil aviation department—Thailand notified the French
company of their agreement to this proposal in principle.245
The following year, the operation of a Rangoon—Vinh air route became the
subject of more serious diplomatic discussions. Thailand’s Prince Purachatra, wanting his
country to be prominently involved with the development of commercial aviation in
Southeast and East Asia, traveled to Paris in March 1929 to explore the option of a
Franco-Thai air service that would operate between Rangoon and Bangkok.246 The
agreement that ultimately resulted—this accord was signed by the Prince and French Air
Minister Victor Laurant-Eynac on April 9, 1929—entailed the creation of a route from
Rangoon to Vinh via Phitsanulok and Vientiane; this trunk route would have branch lines
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toward Bangkok, Saigon, and Hanoi. The Rangoon—Vinh flight would be undertaken
alternately by a “special French company with Siamese participation” and a “Siamese
company with French involvement.”247
In his history of Thai aviation, Edward M. Young states that a modified version of
this proposal was submitted to the respective governments in June. According to a
Ministry of the Colonies letter of July 22, 1929, the terms of the agreement were that a
French airline and a Thai airline would alternate in providing service between Rangoon
and Vinh.248 Moreover, the prior stipulation for reciprocal participation was removed,
and, as Young explains, each of these companies “would have complete freedom of
action within its own sphere but would cooperate on ground facilities and infrastructure
along the common route.” Ratified in early 1930, this five-year agreement would expire
at the end of 1934 but could be canceled with one-year advanced notice.249
The early 1930s would see the establishment of scheduled air service between
France and Indochina. During the remainder of the decade, this route would be improved
as travel time was reduced and flight comfort and reliability increased. Yet much like
contemporary maps of France’s air route to Indochina depicted an irregular line
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connecting metropole to colony, the development of scheduled service to destinations
throughout Indochina was achieved in fits and starts and not without adjustments.

Connecting France to Indochina (1931 to 1940)
A letter from the Air Ministry to the Ministry of the Colonies, dated August 12,
1930, outlined how the upcoming months would unfold for French commercial aviation
in Southeast Asia. Air Orient would carry out round-trip mail voyages between Bangkok
and Saigon twice a month in coordination with the Dutch route through the region; this
service was to operate from the beginning of October 1930 to the end of March 1931.250
In addition, from January 1931 until the end of March, these French flights would be
arranged to alternate with the extension of the company’s Marseille—Baghdad line as far
as Saigon.251 The inaugural journey on this long-haul route began on January 17, 1931,
with the departure of a seaplane from Marseille. Ten days later a tri-motor airplane
loaded with sixty kilograms of mail touched down in Saigon.252 The completion of this
circuit was significant for France, in terms of both national prestige and aviation
progress. This voyage represented the first time that the metropole—colony air
connection was carried out solely by the French.253 By the end of February, round-trip
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service from France to Southeast Asia had been fixed to operate twice each month;
during the intervening weeks, Air Orient arranged for French mail to be transported on
KLM planes between Baghdad and Bangkok. With the addition of several more tri-motor
aircraft to its fleet, Air Orient was able to begin offering weekly flights to Indochina
starting on May 7, 1932. In turn, this adjustment allowed the company to free itself from
needing Dutch assistance on the line.254
Officials also sought to develop a regularly scheduled line from France to Hanoi.
This goal proved elusive until the mid-1930s despite both the importance of this city as
Indochina’s administrative headquarters and the progress already made in connecting
France with Saigon.255 Even when the link to Hanoi was realized, the specific itinerary
for reaching the city shifted several times, much to the displeasure of certain colonial
administrators. When Hirschauer composed his report in the fall of 1934, the route from
Rangoon to Hanoi via Phitsanulok and Vinh was still not open, in no small part because
Phitsanulok was not yet properly outfitted to serve as a stopover. Once operational, this
route was to function as the “principal artery of the Orient line,” with an eventual
extension toward southern China. According to this plan, Saigon was to be linked with
Phitsanulok via an annex line through Bangkok.256
To connect the metropole with Indochina’s colonial capital, Air France scheduled
two round-trip trial flights between Saigon and Hanoi at the end of 1934. Each of these
voyages—one in November, the other in December—was arranged so that they would
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coordinate with the timetable for the France—Saigon flights.257 In addition, at a meeting
of the airline’s general administration committee (Comité d’administration générale,
hereafter GAC) on October 18, 1934, the managing director noted that a reconnaissance
mission was soon to be deployed to examine the infrastructure between Bangkok and
Hanoi as part of the preparations for future air service between these two destinations.
This study indicated the preference, at least for the present, for the Bangkok—Hanoi
itinerary over the route that passed through Phitsanulok. At the end of January 1935, it
was reported that service on this route was scheduled to start at the beginning of
February.258 As a temporary measure and to avoid disrupting the organization of the
existing Bangkok—Saigon air link, the flights on this route would continue; the line
connecting Bangkok and Hanoi would function as a branch route for the time being.259
Hirschauer had indicated in the fall of 1934 that the course of travel linking
Bangkok and Hanoi would pass through Vientiane and Vinh, with the former site being
be used as stopover only provisionally.260 This longer-term plan did not find unanimous
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support within the French administration in Laos though, as certain officials expressed
disappointment with Air France’s decision for Vientiane. The protectorate’s Resident
Superior pleaded with Governor General René Robin to highlight the “undeniable
advantages” of utilizing this city as a regularly scheduled stop.261 The Resident
emphasized that national prestige was intertwined with the decision about establishing a
stopover at Vientiane; he explained that outfitting this site for regular flights would bring
to an end the lamentable situation of airmail between France and Laos being carried
along Thai or Dutch lines and passing through—and paying postal taxes to—foreign post
offices. The Resident declared, “it would be humiliating...that a French air route, financed
in large part by the national budget, serves several foreign countries,…traverses French
Laos while neglecting its capital, and compels the French in Laos to continue crossing the
Mekong to Siam in order to find an easy means of communicating with their country.”262
Meanwhile, the diplomatic back-and-forth between French Indochina and
Thailand continued. By the mid-1930s, the French were examining another option for
linking the metropole with the colony, namely, a direct route from Calcutta to Hanoi via
Mandalay.263 By the end of 1935, French officials were actively investigating this
the Phitsanulok—Vinh itinerary was fully outfitted; the stopover would not provide enough
revenue to make up for the additional expenses resulting from the Vientiane detour, which was a
distance of about 160 kilometers.
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The Resident pointed out that upgrading the Vientiane airfield for the locale’s usage as
a permanent stopover would not require too great of a financial investment. Moreover, while
admitting that flying to Vientiane extended the route, he perceptively noted that this added
distance was, comparatively, not that much in terms of a journey from France that already
required eight to nine days by air. Additionally, the Resident argued that Vientiane would provide
revenue that was “far from being trivial” and included the following sources: metropole—colony
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alternative, which was itself emblematic of the continued effort to develop faster air
service between Europe and Hanoi. Just as significantly, the Mandalay itinerary freed
French planes from the obligation to make a stopover in Thailand. Such a maneuver was
viewed as a way to pressure the Thai government to concede to what the French believed
were less exacting terms than the arrangements of the current Franco-Thai agreement;
Thailand had evidently denounced this agreement, which, in any case, would soon expire.
As Indochina’s Secretary General explained in January 1936, the French aimed “to
demonstrate to this kingdom that the passage through their territory is far from being
obligatory.” This alternative route was, therefore, “a means of leading [Thai
representatives] to reduce the demands that they have expressed for the renewal of the
convention.”264 Shortly thereafter, Franco-Thai negotiations apparently came to a lengthy
standstill. As November 1938 came to a close, the French still had not received a
response to a counterproposal delivered that March to Thai representatives.265
As the previous paragraph suggests, the specifics of the talks between French and
Thai officials during the mid-to-late 1930s are not completely clear. The archival and
Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin,” January 10,
1936; AN 19830162/2, “Comité d’administration générale. Procès-verbal de la séance tenue le 17
février 1938”; and Hirschauer Mission, 1936.
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au Tonkin,” January 10, 1936. The development of a metropole—colony connection that avoided
Thailand was a topic French officials had researched previously. At the end of January 1930, a
footnote to a Ministry of the Colonies letter mentioned that, for reference only, an itinerary would
be examined that would bypass Indochina’s western neighbor; as an option, a route was proposed
that connected Muong Sing—located in the extreme northwest of Laos—to Dien Bien Phu and
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Bangkok to Saigon; Bangkok to Hanoi; and Vientiane to Saigon. This counteroffer was in fact
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secondary materials consulted for this chapter are similarly fuzzy on this matter. Sardain,
in discussing the accord of 1930, notes that this agreement would be “tacitly renewed per
five-year period.” In addition, Young indicates that the French were at least somewhat
responsible for the diplomatic discord between Thai and French representatives during
this period.266
Aside from the Mandalay route, the French investigated other courses of travel
that would allow for quicker air service to Southeast Asia while decreasing French
reliance on Thai locales as stopovers. In the fall of 1936, for example, Hirschauer
outlined an itinerary that would link Calcutta with Vientiane via Rangoon, thus bypassing
Bangkok. Though lengthier than the Mandalay line, this option not only had the
advantage of being used “as early as tomorrow” but also was shorter than the current
Calcutta—Hanoi route, which included stops at Akyab, Rangoon, Bangkok, and
Vientiane. Moreover, according to this proposal, Vientiane would function as the
terminus for a Mekong River route to Saigon as well.267
Yet the implementation of the plan described by Hirschauer encountered technical
and diplomatic issues that hindered its realization. The result was that, for the next few
years, Bangkok continued to be used as a stop for French commercial aircraft traveling to
Indochina. At a GAC meeting held in mid-February 1938, Air France’s managing
director elaborated on why this layover was maintained. Not only were there still
challenges relating to nighttime flying across the Annamese Mountains but also
“diplomatic difficulties” (difficultés diplomatiques) concerning the abandonment of the
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Thai capital as a stopover. Consequently, this official estimated that for a period of at
least two years, the main air link would continue to pass through Rangoon, Bangkok, and
Saigon before connecting to Hanoi.268
There were several notable developments for French commercial air service to
Southeast Asia between the summer of 1938 and the signing of the armistice in June
1940. In July 1938 the itinerary for the metropole—colony route was again altered.
Having acquired a fleet of more powerful aircraft by this point, Air France announced on
July 26 that, starting the present week, the company’s Indochina service would be
adjusted so that the line from Bangkok to Hanoi via Vientiane—a route that Cony and
Ledet describe as quite unprofitable—would no longer be utilized.269 This adjustment
would bring to an end flights on the branch line connecting Bangkok and Saigon, a
change that in turn would result in Saigon regaining its status as the principal terminus
for the air connection with the metropole. This reshuffling would also cause the airfield at
Vientiane to be momentarily removed from Indochina’s regular air network.270
Though French planes would eventually be obligated to avoid Italian territory in
the Mediterranean and Africa, the outbreak of war in Europe at the beginning of
September 1939 did not markedly alter air service between France and Indochina. Then,
on June 25, 1940, France signed an armistice with Germany and Italy, which resulted in
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the subsequent grounding of all French aircraft, military as well as civilian. From this
point and until further notice, Evrard writes, all flights required authorization from
France.271

The Air Link to Southern China and Beyond (Later 1920s to 1940)
In addition to creating a route from the metropole to Indochina, French aviation
interests aimed to link the colony—and, by extension, France—to parts of East Asia as
far as Japan.272 Similar to how France’s civil aviation efforts unfolded in Southeast Asia,
this endeavor to develop air service beyond Indochina was a drawn-out process that
required years and lengthy negotiations to produce results. Yet by the summer of 1940,
the French had succeeded in gaining aerial access to China.
By the late 1920s the French were cognizant that various foreign competitors—
namely, Germany, Holland, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States—were also
seeking to become involved with commercial air transport to and within China. France
thus needed to be prominently involved with the course of travel between Rangoon and
Canton in order to deter, at least temporarily, other nations’ aviation initiatives in the
region.273
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Yet the development of a French air route to China witnessed only tentative steps
forward in this decade. As mentioned previously, in the late 1920s François Glaize
started working on behalf of French commercial aviation interests in Asia. His duties in
this capacity included examining the possibility of an air link between Vinh and Canton
via Hanoi. With this goal in mind, Glaize reached out to Chinese authorities in Canton
and in Peking at the end of November 1927. This initial attempt was frustrated by the
political turmoil within China around this time.274 The following month Glaize again
wrote to the French consul in Canton, requesting that this official reinvestigate the
opinion of Chinese authorities regarding the Vinh—Canton project. In a letter from
March 9, the consul explained that the government in Canton appeared interested but was
preoccupied with certain economic concerns. Unfortunately for the French, the Chinese
authorities, in an attempt to alleviate these woes, were in contact with British officials in
Hong Kong to discuss an industrial-economic agreement. “For the moment,” the consul
observed in perceptively summarizing the situation, “the British seem to have a great
advantage over us…. The close relations that exist between the Chinese in Hong Kong
and Canton give the British a privileged place.”275
Additional talks between French and Chinese representatives took place in April
1928. The officials in Canton reemphasized their enthusiasm for the proposed route but
were noncommittal regarding several different options for the line. Writing on April 30,
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the French consul judged that the Chinese not only were anxious about the political
instability within their country but also harbored “a more or less admitted hostility
against any enterprise in which foreigners have a stake and that consequently seems to be
a takeover attempt.” This official continued his unflattering assessment of the Chinese:
“out of hatred of the foreigner, out of national pride, out of vanity, they are opposed to all
Sino-foreign collaboration.” In concluding, the consul remarked that the Chinese were
interested in a given undertaking only to the extent that they ascertained in such a project
a means of enriching themselves. Even with the hesitations of the local Chinese
authorities and the consul’s negative appraisal of the situation, Indochina’s government
general remained optimistic about eventually realizing an air link to Canton.276
Almost two years later on April 11, 1930, Glaize drafted a letter to Nanking to
remind the Chinese Republic’s Minister of Communications that a study had been
submitted at the end of August 1929 regarding a Sino-French air route between Haiphong
and Canton. Stating that he had not yet received a response about this proposal, Glaize
reiterated that the French were interested in concluding an agreement that was absolutely
equal and beneficial for both sides. He stressed that, due to its proximity to southern
China, only French Indochina—and French aviation—was in a position to reasonably
offer “complete equality between the two countries, where each one would obtain from
the other an authorization for operation along a combined route.”277
Moreover, Glaize asserted that the development of this line was an opportunity
for China to “define...the position that it intends to take with these international air links
276
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and on the question of Canton.” Elaborating, he noted that agreements for international
air transport were being negotiated “almost everywhere.” While British officials in Hong
Kong doubtless aimed to connect their imperial enclave to India via a route that would
pass over Indochina, the French in Indochina sought authorization for their own flights
through India. “Before long,” Glaize warned, “a Franco-British accord could happen that
would resolve these questions of aircraft passage; but then the line would lead to Hong
Kong and not to Canton.” He pointed out that this type of agreement would effectively
allow planes flying on an Anglo-French route to avoid landing in “a strictly Chinese
location.” The reason, Glaize explained, was that such an arrangement permitted aviators
to “request the application pure and simple of the International Convention of Aerial
Navigation of 1919.” Under the terms of this document—the signatories included China,
France, and Great Britain—commercial planes were granted certain rights to pass over
the participants’ territories. In sum, the Anglo-French accord that Glaize described would
have the effect of essentially excluding Chinese aviation interests.278
With this pressure applied, Glaize stated that the terminus of the route—Hong
Kong or Canton—depended on whether or not Chinese authorities wanted to proceed
with negotiations with the French. As a means of hastening the Chinese government’s
decision, Glaize informed the Minister of Communications that his company was
presently prepared to send representatives to Canton to so that a satisfactory agreement
could be reached. On May 21, 1930, the French received a response in which the Minister
of Communications suggested that several French envoys could be dispatched to
Nanking, which was the government capital, in order to more easily resolve the question
278
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of the Canton—Haiphong route. Yet this particular attempt does not appear to have
yielded tangible results because, as recounted in Hirschauer’s study from 1934, another
proposition for a joint aerial venture was offered in 1932. This proposal also failed to
produce an agreement for air service.279
In 1934 the French continued in their pursuit of an accord for Sino-French air
transport. This work, which ultimately had the same result as previous talks, began in
May and focused on a line connecting Canton and Hanoi. As part of these efforts, Glaize
approached the Nanking-based China National Aviation Corporation (hereafter CNAC), a
Sino-American firm, about acting as a local intermediary for Air France in the Chinese
capital. Yet, as Hirschauer reported, government officials were reluctant to authorize a
foreign airline to operate in Chinese territory. He cited both apprehension about Japan’s
response and “assured irritation” that negotiations had been conducted with Canton.280
Then, in October, an attaché for the French Air Ministry made another attempt to reach
an agreement with the government in Nanking. The terms offered were that personnel
from a Chinese airline—Hirschauer presumed the airline would be CNAC—would use
French equipment to operate a Canton—Hanoi route. In addition, Air France, upon being
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granted permission to pass over Chinese territory, would fly between these two cities.
Given the “extremely vigorous pressure of the Japanese,” Hirschauer anticipated that
China would soon consent to this request for overflying rights.281
By the start of 1935, French aviation interests were keenly aware of Great
Britain’s goal of—and recent efforts toward—connecting Hong Kong to the British
imperial air network across Southeast Asia. This reality provided additional motivation,
and urgency, for France to become involved with the China—Europe mail circuit.
Sardain writes that during the course of the year, representatives from CNAC informed
the French that their airline would soon be in a position to offer service between Canton
and Hanoi. On September 30, 1935, an accord was concluded in Nanking that allowed a
Chinese company to fly between Hanoi and Canton via Fort Bayard.282
In his study of CNAC, William M. Leary notes that the Chinese Ministry of
Communications awarded the contract for this route to CNAC, much to the dismay of
certain Chinese military officials. As reported in the Far Eastern Survey in late January
1936, these officials objected to having the Sino-American CNAC be the designated
airline. Their concerns, which were voiced to the Nanking government, related to the
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possible negative repercussions of further foreign involvement in Chinese commercial
aviation. Moreover, the military leaders campaigned for the Southwestern Aviation
Corporation (hereafter SWAC) to operate the Canton—Hanoi air link; formed in 1934,
SWAC was a Canton-based Chinese firm whose brief existence ended with bankruptcy in
1938. Pointing out that the governments of Kwantung and Kwangsi jointly owned SWAC
and the company’s planes were piloted by military aviators, Leary argues that the
“nationalistic argument” of military officials “was largely if not wholly specious.” He
further explains that “South China remained the center of opposition to Chiang Kai-shek,
[and] the militarists pushed the claims of Southwestern in order to demonstrate their
independence from Nanking. CNAC became caught in the middle.”283
In the midst of this contentious situation and prior to launching service on the
Canton—Hanoi route, CNAC attempted a pair of flights in mid-to-late February 1936.
During the second of these voyage, authorities in Canton barred from proceeding further
the CNAC plane arriving from Shanghai. As a result, CNAC decided to suspend
operations on this line “until Canton and Nanking could settle their dispute.” Leary
observes that “the action of the Cantonese dealt a sharp blow to the prestige of the
Nationalists.” Officials in Nanking subsequently sought to soothe this escalating tension,
at least temporarily: the Nationalist government “swallowed its pride, withdrew the
contract from CNAC, and awarded the route to Southwestern.”284 Admittedly, the exact
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relationship between the September 1935 agreement, SWAC, and CNAC is not entirely
clear.285
On July 10, 1936, SWAC inaugurated its Canton-to-Hanoi air service. Reflective
of the tenuous existence of this airline, Hirschauer was uncertain about the sustainability
of this Franco-Chinese arrangement. “It is precarious,” he tersely acknowledged in
commenting on this route, which he also described as having a mediocre value.
Recognizing that the French fleet would shortly be outfitted with a model of newer, more
powerful aircraft, Hirschauer contemplated a more reliable program for French
commercial aviation in this region. “We have...to consider a complete transformation of
our services toward the Far East,” he determined. In Hirschauer’s opinion, the French
were thus “oblige[d] to examine the realization of a very sound connection” that linked
Canton, Hong Kong, and Hanoi.286

equipment. As a further hindrance, Air France continued to employ a type of aircraft on which “it
was pointless to carry the slightest freight.” Hirschauer Mission, 1936.
285
According to Cony and Ledet, French officials had previously entered into
negotiations with SWAC representatives in order to find a more efficient means of delivering
SWAC passengers and mail from Long Tchéou to Hanoi; the present schedule required a flight
from Canton to Long Tchéou and then an automobile ride to Hanoi. For French interests,
improving this transportation scheme would allow for easier access to departures from Hanoi on
Air France’s link to the metropole. The chosen solution was simply a direct flight between
Canton and Hanoi; this service, operated by SWAC, came into force in January 1936. As they
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providing flights in the present conditions, the organization and the materials of the company
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representative about this possibility in October 1936. The proposal—which essentially entailed
the creation of a Sino-French airline—“was not categorically refused.” The French appeared
unlikely to accept the offer though, particularly since another option for dealing with SWAC was
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In the meantime, CNAC had concluded an agreement with Imperial Airways that,
beginning November 5, 1936, allowed CNAC’s planes to stop in Hong Kong as they
traveled on the company’s route from Shanghai to Canton. Hirschauer expressed his
shock: “three months previously, we were still convinced that…CNAC would never
receive authorization to land on an English base without giving an advantageous
compensation in return!” Indeed, CNAC had been granted this permission without any
apparent concession. With this development in mind, Hirschauer observed that the
French and the British had each authorized a Chinese airline to land in their respective
territories—SWAC in Hanoi and CNAC in Hong Kong—without receiving any flying
accommodations in return.287 “But times change, viewpoints evolve,” he opined,
explaining that “the English truth of June 1936 was no longer that of October 1936…and
who knows if the Chinese truth of July 1936 will still be that of July 1937?”288
While CNAC was allowed to fly to Hong Kong starting in November 1936,
French aviation interests moved to gain access to the British enclave shortly thereafter.
On December 17, 1936, Air France’s general manager reported that the airline was
presently prepared to reattempt negotiations with the Chinese for extending its service
from Hanoi to Hong Kong.289 Yet, as had typically been the case with the efforts to
expand France’s air network in this part of the world, the achievement of this extension
was a protracted process. In fact, it was not until the early spring of 1938 that the French
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were able to conclude an agreement with the Chinese. This accord, which was signed on
March 25, permitted Air France to carry out weekly round-trip flights between Hanoi and
Hong Kong, with a stopover at Fort Bayard; these voyages would be coordinated with the
schedule for the France—Indochina connection.290 Transport on this line was set to begin
in the summer, as an Air France communiqué announced that passenger and cargo
service to Hong Kong would start on August 10.291
Assessing the Hanoi—Hong Kong route several months later, officials appeared
pleased with the line’s performance. At a late-November 1938 conference involving
government and Air France representatives, it was suggested that the airline should
double its “very satisfactory” service between the two cities.292 Yet a source observed
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that the Chinese apparently declined to renew the agreement for this route. The reason
given was that the Chinese delegates were no longer interested in only the Hanoi—Hong
Kong line but also desired to collaborate with the French on developing a link from
Hanoi to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province.293 Negotiations for China to provide
financial assistance for Air France to operate between these two cities—this service
would then connect to Hong Kong—started by August 1939 but were soon interrupted by
the outbreak of war in Europe. On April 17, 1940, French and Chinese representatives
finally signed an agreement for air service to connect these two cities with Hanoi.
According to Cony and Ledet, the terms of the agreement stated that Air France, with
Chinese financial assistance, would provide fifty-two round-trip flights each year on a
Kunming-Hanoi-Hong Kong route. However, this line was never inaugurated.294

Weighing the Costs of Commercial Air Service and Indochina
A prominent theme in the history of French commercial aviation to Indochina is
that this enterprise was never profitable.295 As Hirschauer pointed out in 1936, “one will

starting from 1939, the French worked to reach agreements with several other foreign airlines that
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Emmanuel Chadeau characterizes Air France’s efforts in the later 1930s as split
between managing its aerial network in Europe and the “ruinously expensive development toward
Indochina.” Similarly, Robert Espérou notes that the commercial return for French air routes
tended to be much lower for long-haul imperial lines than for the connections within Europe.
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not fail to notice that the operation of the Far East line is very costly when it comes to its
return.” He calculated that Air France’s commercial revenue for this line in 1935
amounted to 7.5 million francs—the majority of which resulted from airmail—but the
company’s expenses for this period stood at 26.7 million francs. Thus it is perhaps
unsurprising that Air France relied so heavily on government subsidies for the
functioning of its imperial routes during this era.296 Of course, the need for such
significant financial assistance was only magnified by the economic woes of the 1930s.
Moreover, the task of ensuring that aircraft were up-to-date, reliable, and
competitive consistently proved to be a challenge for French government and airline
officials. “Whatever the excellence of the maintenance,” Hirschauer opined, “the
airframes gradually become distorted, the metal of the engines wears out, and, as the
route’s [flying] material is deteriorating at a uniform pace, the day that the failure appears
will be a kind of epidemic.” Already by the mid-1930s, observers were commenting on
the need to replace the existing aircraft with a newer, more powerful model. With regard
to the Air France fleet operating between Damascus and Saigon, Hirschauer estimated
that September 1935 represented a date by which the following milestones would be
reached: the entirety of the airframes would have surpassed 2500 flights hours; ninetenths of the engines would have exceeded 1500 flight hours; and twelve of these engines
would have eclipsed 2000 flight hours. The impending exhaustion of the firm’s
aeronautics equipment had potential negative consequences that extended beyond safety
concerns. This material situation could hinder Air France’s ability to offer scheduled
flights while also damaging French influence in Southeast and East Asia as European
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competitors—KLM in particular—showed themselves capable of providing faster air
service to these areas of the globe.297
An additional hurdle faced by French aviation in this period was that due to both
the cost of the journey and the carrying capacity of the era’s planes, the volume of people
and mail transported remained rather limited; indeed, Hirschauer reported in 1934 that
passenger traffic on the France—Indochina route was presently “very low.” Aside from
the fact that relatively few people needed or desired to journey by air from Europe to
Southeast Asia at a given time, a primary cause for the limited traffic was that, simply
put, air transport was expensive.298 Cony and Ledet provide an example of the high price
of flying in the 1930s. In late November 1931, Minister of the Colonies Paul Reynaud
returned to France by plane after completing an administrative tour of Indochina during
the fall. Cony and Ledet ironically note that booking passage on this line “cost[ed] a mere
20,000 francs.”299
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In addition to being expensive, air travel between France and Indochina was an
arduous experience for passengers. This characterization remained apt through most of
the 1930s. By the summer of 1931, ten to twelve days were required to fly the nearly
twelve thousand kilometers between Marseille and Saigon, with an average of eight days
needed to journey from Baghdad to Saigon and through the nine stops in between. At the
start of 1933, the time needed for the metropole—colony voyage had been reduced to
eight days in the summer and nine days in the winter. Hirschauer reported that Air France
required this same interval—an average of eight and a half days—to travel from
Marseille to Hanoi in the fall of 1936. In comparison, Imperial Airways operated between
London and Singapore in nine days, and KLM flew between Amsterdam and Singapore
in only six days. For Air France, even with the incremental reductions in travel time, the
trip to Southeast Asia remained a step-laden, multi-conveyance process involving both
land and air transport into the late 1930s.300
Despite the various challenges of linking France to Indochina by air, this line was
not without tangible value. Moreover, the experience of air travel improved during the
1930s. Indeed, Cony and Ledet describe an increase in traffic and cargo on this route
each year from 1931 until 1933. By the end of the 1930s, the volume of material and
passengers traveling along the line from France to Hanoi and Hong Kong had augmented
considerably in comparison to earlier in the decade.301 Air France also worked to
upgrade its fleet for the Indochina route in the later 1930s. At the end of November 1937,
for example, an airline representative informed the Resident Superior of Tonkin that the
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inaugural flight on the new Dewoitine D.338—“one of the best machines currently
circulating on the world’s commercial air routes”—was scheduled to arrive in Hanoi on
December 1.302 Moreover, the Resident himself asserted that the incorporation of this
aircraft model “marks an important development in our aerial relations with the
metropole.” Indeed, a report from May 1938 stated that Dewoitine D.338 not only
allowed the France—Indochina journey to be reduced to five and a half days but also
provided passengers with enhanced comfort in the plane’s more spacious cabin.303 This
estimation of the reduced travel time was for the most part accurate; Cony and Ledet
observe that in the first months of 1939, the France—Saigon flight required five days
while Hanoi could be reached in six. An additional half-day was needed to fly to Hong
Kong.304
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Conclusion
During the interwar period, metropolitan and colonial officials worked with
aviation firms to develop air routes to, within, and through Indochina. Never understood
as different projects, these efforts were viewed as being intertwined and leading toward a
larger goal: the creation of a single transportation circuit that was rapid, profitable, and—
for national prestige—conspicuous. The establishment of these different air services
proved to be a drawn-out and challenging process. From the mid-1920s until the start of
the Second World War, commercial aviation hopes consistently bounded far ahead of the
realities of air travel. The French were obligated to deal with foreign competition and
what was considered an uncooperative attitude on the part of Thailand and China. Indeed,
the reality of flying from France to Indochina and beyond in the interwar years was that
foreign assistance and agreeability, while not always forthcoming, remained necessary.
Furthermore, French commercial aviation encountered obstacles that related to
technology, infrastructure, funding, and revenue; these issues proved problematic for
other types of aviation in the colony as well.
Though success was achieved with more difficulty and at a slower pace than
aviation and government representatives had hoped, civil air transport had doubtless
improved between 1920 and the end of the 1930s. While the number of routes and
destinations expanded, air traffic increased, and service was offered with more regularity
and speed. The following chapter, which considers medical aviation within Indochina,
analyzes how the French sought to put the transport capabilities of planes to use for
delivering patients, medical care—and even French civilizing power itself—to sites
around the colony.

135

CHAPTER FOUR: MOVING PATIENTS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES
Speaking at a conference for colonial medical aviation held in Paris during the
1931 Exposition Coloniale, Marcel Olivier, the fair’s Rapporteur General, had “expressed
the hope of colonial officials in the development of medical aviation” when he asserted,
“if the doctor treats, the medical aircraft saves!”305 Six years prior, Deputy Léon
Archimbaud discussed how aircraft had provided crucial medical assistance in the French
empire, stating that airplanes “have already saved human lives by transporting sick
patients, wounded patients, doctors, and medicines.”306
This pair of remarks shows the hopes for “medical aviation”—a term that this
chapter uses to denote all manner of duties in the aeromedical realm—as well as the
benefits and uses of air ambulances during the interwar period. In Indochina and
throughout the empire, military and medical officials worked with colonial administrators
to employ aircraft for evacuating sick and injured people and transporting medicine and
healthcare personnel. In addition, medical aviation was viewed as a means of gaining
control over the colonial landscape; the logic was that the possibility of swift access to
medical care would make the tropical climate and inhospitable regions of Indochina less
daunting for Europeans. Finally, the aeromedical service was used to bolster the image of
France as a benevolent civilizing force, as medicine deliveries and aerial evacuations
were said to offer a tangible example of France’s proclaimed civilizing mission in
Southeast Asia. To demonstrate the aptitude of aircraft for these various tasks, the
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proponents of medical aviation often highlighted several purported benefits of flight
technology, namely, speed, comfort, and safety.307
As was the case with other types of aviation in Indochina though, the hopes and
the realities of medical aviation diverged. In addition to the deficiencies of the aerial
infrastructure and a lack of suitable aircraft, the colony’s unpredictable and uncooperative
weather hindered the use of medical aviation. Two further challenges—neither of which
had as negative an effect on the usage of aircraft for other purposes in the colony—
proved troublesome to the development of the aeromedical service. Specifically, medical
aviation struggled to “get off the ground” due to the complexities of actually requesting
an air ambulance. Moreover, there was simply a lack of need for aeromedical services in
most areas of Indochina. In fact, by the early 1930s, discussions of medical aviation
among colonial and military officials appeared to indicate that air ambulances were all
but unnecessary and practically unused. Though the aeromedical service did see an
increase in usage by the time France capitulated to Nazi Germany in June 1940, colonial
medical aviation never reached heights that its proponents had envisioned.

Initial Attempts at Medical Aviation in the Metropole
While the use of aviation for medical purposes was an idea proposed as early as
1910, aerial evacuations were not systematically employed by any of the belligerent
nations during the First World War.308 Yet prior to the end of the conflict, more
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sophisticated technology had been developed for delivering medical aid via aircraft.
Specifically, a paper presented to the Académie nationale de médecine in September
1918 reported on the functioning of a new medical airplane known as the “Aérochir.”
This device was described a “radio-surgical airplane” that was capable of transporting a
two-person surgical team and the requisite materials to perform on-site procedures.309
Despite the successful demonstrations of the Aérochir in early March 1919 and the belief
that this aircraft could potentially have “great utility” in the empire, the French
government decided not to purchase the plane. In fact, air ambulances had already been
employed in the colonies by this point, as several aeromedical flights had been carried
out in Morocco in September 1918.310

Discussions of Medical Aviation in the Empire
As the previous paragraph suggests, the colonial domain appeared to offer more
possibilities for medical aviation than did continental Europe. Many areas of the empire
were without the established ground-based transportation networks that crisscrossed
Europe, and, in addition, they often lacked a sufficient number of medical personnel and
Flying Hospital,” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 76, no.12 (December 2005):
1174-1175. David M. Lam explains why airplanes were not regularly used for medical purposes
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healthcare facilities. Moreover, certain regions of overseas France consisted of cities and
villages separated by expanses of deserts, forests, and mountains. Colonial spaces such as
these thus required a form of transport that could traverse vast stretches with relative
ease. A circular of October 21, 1922, from the Minister of the Colonies described the
difficulties that colonial medical services faced in providing timely assistance,
referencing “the shortage of medical personnel in the colonies, the inadequacy of
communication routes, [and] the considerable distance from certain healthcare
facilities.”311
On several occasions during the interwar period, colonial medical aviation was a
topic of discussion in the Chamber of Deputies. For instance, Jacques Chassaing, a
physician who had worked to organize aerial evacuations in the First World War,
explained to the assembled Deputies in November 1926 that aeromedical transport was
particularly useful in mountainous regions and deserts and in areas that were either
lacking in security or possessed insufficient communication and transportation networks.
Two years later Pierre Roux-Freissineng similarly reported to the Chamber on how
aircraft offered a means of compensating for the inadequacies of the medical services and
the shortage of doctors in French West and Equatorial Africa.312
Observers generally identified three ways in which aircraft could be utilized to
assist with medical care in the empire. First, planes could evacuate a patient toward a
healthcare facility. Second, in cases where the sick or wounded individual was incapable
of being transported to a hospital, a doctor could travel by air to the patient. Third,
311
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aircraft allowed healthcare services to “exercise medical observation,” especially during
periods of epidemics. In such a scenario, the standard modes of transport theoretically
could not be used due to quarantine measures; a publication that appeared in conjunction
with the 1931 colonial exposition elaborated: “by aircraft, the specialist doctor will
rapidly be taken close to indigenous localities affected by plague, recurrent fever, [or]
cholera, to provide support to the local physician and…the necessary prophylactic
measures.”313

The Appeal of Using Aircraft for Medical Purposes
When discussing the advantages of air ambulances, observers typically cited three
key assets: speed, safety, and comfort. Regarding the first of these benefits, sources
remarked that a swift means of transportation was particularly valuable in the expanses of
inhospitable landscape found in the empire. As noted in the ministerial circular of
October 1922, an automobile ambulance was suitable for short, uncomplicated trips and
in areas with well-built road networks. However, for longer journeys or travel through
regions ravaged by infection, planes were preferable because they provided “rapid
transport...with a desirable amount of security.”314
Similarly, in explaining how the benefits of medical aviation greatly exceeded the
drawbacks, the book from the colonial exposition emphasized the speed of aircraft.315 In
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fact, this writer contended that, overall, utilizing aeromedical transportation was actually
cheaper than doing without this technology. The logic was that the costs associated with
slower modes of medical evacuation—namely, “the losses in human capital,” the
“interminable days of hospitalization,” and the pensions for invalidity—were higher than
the total expenses of employing an air ambulance service. Moreover, the publication
pointed out that a faster evacuation “makes it possible to reduce to a minimum” the
number of dressings required for infected wounds; this comment implied that an
aeromedical delivery allowed a patient to receive care in a timely fashion, thus limiting
the spread of infection.316
Observers also viewed air ambulances as a relatively comfortable option for
patient transport. As the book from the colonial exposition stated, “there is no mode of
transport better tolerated than the medical aircraft.” Because the patient could be
stabilized in a recumbent position at the center of the plane, the writer argued, the air
ambulance “prevails over the comfort of any other vehicle.”317 Likewise, two French
officers praised aeromedical transport as both smoother and faster than conventional
means of evacuation. The airplane, they declared in 1921, had “the dual humanitarian

such concerns, aircraft appear to have been a relatively safe choice for medical transport in the
French empire. For example, Manchon reports that in Morocco and the Levant from the
establishment of aeromedical services until the end of August 1926, there had been only two
accidents out of a total of more than three thousand aerial evacuations. More generally, the
Colonial Exposition book noted that an air ambulance put the patient in no more mortal danger
than did general anesthesia. In any case, Cowell reasoned that “the possible risks consequent on
air transport are less dangerous than the certainty of fatal consequences if the man is not
evacuated rapidly to hospital.” Manchon, 414; Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices
militaires en Indochine, 100; Cowell, 264.
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purpose of sparing the wounded from horrible suffering…and giving them…every
chance for surgical salvation.”318
Contemporary sources recognized that an aeromedical service would greatly
benefit the French in Southeast Asia. In 1920, for example, Alfred Guyomar wrote that
the air ambulance was valuable for an area like Indochina, where “communications are
difficult and important urban areas are rare and distant.” In addition, the colony had only
a few major medical centers (grands centres sanitaires), a fact that in and of itself made
rapid transport to a healthcare facility difficult. Furthermore, as one writer noted with
regard to the size of the territory, “the distance of the interior urban areas is sometimes
such that it does not allow repatriates, convalescents, or those suffering from severe
anemia after tropical maladies to be taken [quickly] to ports of embarkation.” The
expansiveness of Indochina exacerbated the colony’s perceived shortage of physicians.
Though “few in number,” the doctors were responsible for “extremely vast districts” and
were obligated to travel “by rudimentary means” through “chaotic regions.” Aircraft
appeared to provide a solution for these challenges: “the airplane, even if not exclusively
medical, will serve the doctor as a means of transport [italics original].”319
Sources also presented air ambulances as the best option for evacuating patients
within Indochina. For instance, the publication from the colonial exposition presented a
318
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lengthy comparison that highlighted how aeromedical transportation was the safest, least
painful way to reach a medical facility. With a skilled aviator at the controls of a reliable
aircraft, the patient was provided with “security [that] is greater than with the fragile
sampans or the automobiles that drive on rutted colonial roads.” The author elaborated on
the undesirable scenario in which an individual needing medical care would find him or
herself when being transported by land: “evacuated by cacolet or litter along rutted, rainsoaked paths, the sick suffer difficult journeys. Jolted on the ground, they are then loaded
on dugout canoes, sampans, or ferryboats and reach their destination only after [a]
considerable [number of] stops.”320 This ordeal was further aggravated by the colony’s
unforgiving climate, whose humidity and “sauna temperature crushes the willpower and
thought…of even a fit European.” Spending a lengthy amount of time in this oppressive
atmosphere could only complicate illness and injury. To make matters worse, the
conditions of overland transport had the potential to expose a wound to various types of
organic matter, thus causing or advancing an infection.321

Medical Aviation in Indochina
The circular of October 1922 pointed to the organization of the aeromedical
services in North Africa and the Middle East as models of how medical aviation should
be arranged elsewhere in the French empire, namely, French West Africa and
Indochina.322 Indeed, according to historian John S. Haller, by the mid-1920s the French
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experiences in Morocco and the Levant had “demonstrated conclusively” that aerial
evacuations were essentially as safe and no more costly than ground transportation.323
Yet even prior to this directive, colonial and military officials were working to establish
an aeromedical service in Indochina. By the middle of the 1920s, the French were putting
the colony’s limited number of medical planes to use for a variety of relevant tasks.324
Also by this point in the decade, officials had drawn up regulations for authorizing and
funding aerial evacuations within Indochina.325 Air ambulances were most frequently
utilized in the colonyfor transporting medicines, patients, and physicians. In addition,
medical aviation did occasionally function as a form of propaganda that aimed to both
provide a sense of security to Europeans and reinforce the image of France as a
benevolent civilizing power.
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In early March 1919 and with the First World War having mercifully ended the
previous fall, Minister of the Colonies Henry Simon informed Governor General Albert
Sarraut that the duties of Indochina’s nascent air force included medical transportation.
Then, during the last six months of 1921, the squadrons in Tonkin and Cochinchina each
received a pair of airplanes that were to be employed as air ambulances.326 A test flight
for one of these aircraft—“constructed and equipped to transport the wounded and
operate [on patients] if needed”—was carried out at the airfield near Saigon at the
beginning of December 1921.327
Despite this seemingly promising start, medical aviation in Indochina soon
experienced a setback. Two of the medical aircraft were subsequently been destroyed
while attempting to land, and, by early February 1924, replacements had yet to be
furnished.328 Moreover, colonial authorities were not confident in the capabilities of the
remaining pair of air ambulances, with two officials agreeing that these “very fatigued”
planes needed to be supplemented by additional aircraft.329 A low point for medical
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aviation appears to have been reached by the end of May 1925. On May 28 it was
reported that the Tonkin squadron “does not even have a surgical airplane.”330
While this material situation had improved by the end of the 1920s, this progress
brought medical aviation to a satisfactory level of operation for only a brief period of
time. By the beginning of 1929, the aeromedical service once again counted four total
aircraft.331 In a report dated January 3, Major General Aubert, the colony’s Commandant
Superior, stated that each of these planes “is in good condition [and] ready for use.” He
judged the current fleet of air ambulances as sufficient for the colony’s needs, observing
that it was, for the moment, unnecessary to outfit other, non-specialized aircraft for use as
medical transports.332 However, by the fall of 1930, the quality of the aeromedical service
had once again degraded. In October of that year, Lieutenant Colonel Louis de Durand de
Prémorel described Indochina’s Breguet 14 Tbis airplanes as “obsolete aircraft” with
“well-worn engines.” While indicating that these planes were still capable of assuring
“some services,” de Prémorel felt that this model needed to be replaced by another type
in the foreseeable future. Likewise, in November the colony’s Inspector General for
Health and Medical Services remarked that the “flying material” currently in use seemed
to be “a bit old” and needed to be modernized.333
sur l’organisation de l’aviation militaire sanitaire en Indochine (Exécution des prescriptions de la
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As the air force presence in Indochina expanded during the 1930s, the
aeromedical service was improved in terms of quantity, quality, and functioning. At the
start of 1933, the colony’s four squadrons each received a Potez 29 airplane; these
aircraft were to replace the “antiquated Breguet 14 Tbis limousines.”334 Five years later,
there were six air ambulances in Indochina, two of which were held in reserve, and, by
the spring of 1940, seven Potez 29s were stationed in the colony.335 The local network of
landing fields and hospitals became better coordinated as well. According to a May 1931
report from Captain Pierre Paquier, specific “medical terrains” (terrains sanitaires)—
alternately “medical airfields” (aérodromes sanitaires)—were designated within
Indochina’s expanding web of landing sites; Paquier indicated that these special landing
fields were reserved for use by the air force for medical purposes. Moreover, the medical
airfields were organized into a network of five large zones that corresponded to the five
principal hospital centers within Indochina: Hanoi, Saigon, Hué, Vientiane, and PhnomPenh.336
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From the early 1920s, the aeromedical service was charged with an assortment of
missions within Indochina. While the air force carried out the majority of this work, civil
aviation was involved in at least some capacity.337 In addition to transporting patients and
medical personnel, air ambulances delivered medical supplies on request. In late
November 1922, for instance, air force commandant François Glaize reported that the
Service de Santé had inquired about having “a certain amount of fresh vaccine”
transported by plane. More broadly, a guidebook for Indochina stated that aircraft ferried
up to five million doses of vaccines each year by 1931.338
Despite what this figure for deliveries of medicines suggests, the majority of
aeromedical missions in Indochina involved the transport of medical personnel or
patients. The specifics of these flights variety a great deal. In describing the work of
medical aviation in the colony, the publication from the colonial exposition included the
following examples: the transport of a gravely ill noncommissioned officer from Lai
Chau in northwest Tonkin to Hanoi; the evacuation of a seriously injured Lieutenant
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Boulmer from Quang Yen in northeast Tonkin to Hanoi in January 1930; and the delivery
of a civilian with a life-threatening head wound from Luang Prabang to Vientiane.339
Presumably one of the most notable patients to be evacuated by air was Emperor Bao Dai
near the end of 1938.340 This transport is especially noteworthy because it represents one
of the few instances in which the local population—though, in this case, the
representative was a royal official who was probably more highly regarded by the
colonizers than was a regular native——was directly in contact with a technology to
which the French controlled access.
Officials understood that, aside from supplying lifesaving assistance, an
aeromedical mission could have a propaganda effect that was beneficial to France’s
imperial cause. The logic was that an aeromedical transport—a dramatic display of
French capabilities in flight technology and medicine—would serve not only to reassure
those Europeans residing in the colonies but also to demonstrate French authority and
benevolence among the colonized. The author of the colonial exposition book explained
that medical aircraft played a “psychological role” (rôle moral de l’avion sanitaire) by
alleviating the anxieties of Europeans in Southeast Asia341: “a European [who is] isolated
in the Indochinese brush will know that, in the event of an accident or grave illness, he
339
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can be transported rapidly to a healthcare facility.” In a presentation on medical aviation,
E.M. Cowell likewise argued that “colonists have a greater sense of security when they
know that in case of illness, they or members of their families can be rapidly transported
to hospital.”342
In addition, medical aviation was recognized as having a positive effect for
France’s proclaimed civilizing mission. Officials planned for Europeans and nonEuropeans alike to have access to air ambulances throughout the French empire. In 1926
Chassaing, for example, noted that in Morocco and the Levant, aerial evacuations were
available to all patients. Similarly for Indochina, Secretary General René Robin pointed
out to the Minister of the Colonies that “it goes without saying that [medical aviation]
would apply without distinction to all Europeans and to all the Natives of Indochina.”343
Yet officials also understood that using medical aircraft to help the local populations was
a means of enhancing French colonial authority. Remarking that air ambulances provided
aid to “indigenous nomads,” a military physician asserted that this particular assistance
“plays a most important role in the pacification and the colonization of regions subject to
the influence of France.” This official, a Dr. Martinet, stated that an airplane both
multiplied a doctor’s influence and increased the prestige of aviation in the eyes of the
native peoples. As a result, the aeromedical service “constitutes an agent of medical
propaganda rather than a clinic branch.” Similarly, another writer described how, “in the
indigenous milieu,” aviation doubtlessly contributed to advancing both “medical care
policy” and the work of “bush doctors...in their civilizing mission.” This observer thus
342
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declared that the continued progress of the aeromedical service was intertwined with “our
civilizing work in Indochina.”344
A late-December 1930 letter from Jules Bosc, the Resident Superior of Laos,
provides a more specific example of medical aviation functioning as both lifesaver and
propaganda tool. In this correspondence, Bosc recounted a discussion with the chief army
physician in Luang Prabang Province, a doctor Vogel, while the Resident was conducting
an aerial tour in Upper Laos earlier in the month. Vogel reported that a European woman,
suffering from a severely infected abscess in her arm, required an operation that required
two doctors and a general anesthetic, none of which the local facilities had available.
Consequently, one of the aircraft that accompanied Bosc was dispatched to Vientiane to
retrieve an additional physician and the medicine. The mission achieved its goals, and the
patient underwent a successful operation the following day. Bosc highlighted how the
plane had delivered timely aid in a seemingly miraculous manner. He characterized the
outcome of the surgery as an “unexpected result that could not have been obtained
without the providential support that the airplane was able to furnish at the critical
moment and in a minimum amount of time.”345
While Resident Bosc’s commentary underscores the vital aid that aircraft
delivered, Bosc also emphasized the important propaganda effect of this aerial assistance.
The news of this event “spread like wildfire” and even seemed to have a dramatic effect
on the local population. In the most favorable conditions, the Resident explained, the trip
from Luang Prabang to Vientiane regularly required around two weeks. Thus the
344
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indigenous peoples “had difficulty conceiving the miracle by which the voyage [by
plane]…has just been accomplished in less than four hours.” In Bosc’s view, the French
reaped immediate benefits from this flight: “there’s nothing like it for fueling a
propaganda in favor of French aviation.”346

Limitations and Impediments to Medical Aviation in Indochina
Along with deficiencies in infrastructure and aircraft, challenging weather
conditions and an overly complex system for requesting missions hindered the progress
of medical aviation in Indochina. A final—and perhaps decisive—issue in the slow
development of aeromedical services was that, simply put, this type of assistance was not
often needed in the colony. The overall situation, then, was that medical aviation was
judged to be of great benefit to the French and their colonial project, but only when used
in certain parts of Indochina. Problematically though, these areas—Laos and parts of
Tonkin—lacked sufficient infrastructure and aircraft and had weather that was
unfavorable to flying.
Various officials pointed out that the reason that aerial evacuations were not often
required was that much of the colony already had more convenient options available for
medical transportation. This proved to be the case even as early as the first half of the
1920s. For example, in September 1923 Secretary General Robin informed the Minister
of the Colonies that an air ambulance service was for the most part unnecessary in
Cochinchina, Cambodia, the coast of Annam, and the middle region and delta of Tonkin.
Each of these areas, Robin wrote, possessed either a river route or a road or rail network
346
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that allowed for “rapid evacuation” of sick or wounded patients to a healthcare facility
“supposing that they cannot be treated on site.” In addition, the Secretary General
examined the option of using non-military planes as air ambulances. Robin concluded
that the part of Indochina in which civil aviation was most developed, Cochinchina, in
fact did not need to rely on aerial evacuations because the territory was equipped with
both enough accessible healthcare facilities and adequate means of transporting the sick
and wounded.347
The Secretary General did note, though, that medical aviation could be usefully
employed in Laos and the upper region of Tonkin. Robin observed that these two areas
not only were difficult to access but also lacked a “significant medical center.” However,
according to the information he had obtained, “these remote parts of the colony do not
have...organized landing sites.” As this comment implies, the absence of a suitable aerial
infrastructure in the colony impeded the development of medical aviation precisely where
this service seemed to be most needed. Robin’s point thus reinforces a larger theme of
this dissertation, namely, the large extent to which the deficiencies on the ground—the
infrastructure in this instance—prevented aviation from taking full flight in Indochina.348
In late May 1925 Major General Andlauer, Indochina’s Commandant Superior,
described the insufficiencies of the aeromedical service.349 He reiterated Robin’s
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observation about the limited accessibility to, and infrastructure within, the areas of the
colony in which air ambulances would be most beneficial; more specifically, he
identified the upper regions of Laos, Tonkin, and Annam as lacking hangars, airfields,
and shelters. Moreover, Andlauer reported that the meteorological service tended to have
incomplete coverage of the parts of the colony that were mountainous and remote. The
Major General found that the prospect of planning and carrying out any type of aviation
mission in these particular areas was challenging. “In the presence of the uncertainty of
voyages in the upper region,” he stated, “I would not take it upon myself to order, for a
fixed day and a defined hour, either an actual aerial military operation, or an emergency
medical mission.” Andlauer contended that the weather caused further difficulties, as
aircraft were unable to reach the upper part of Tonkin for twenty to thirty consecutive
days at certain times of the year.350 Obviously, not being able to deploy an aerial
evacuation when needed—and having lengthy periods in which planes could not be sent
to certain regions—could have a fatal outcome in urgent cases.
The issue of an inadequate aerial infrastructure and how it affected medical
aviation continued to concern French officials into the late 1920s. In January 1929 Major
General Aubert observed that the problem with Indochina’s aeromedical service was that
the available aircraft were “virtually unused.” In fact, only a single aerial evacuation had
occurred since the Breguet 14 Tbis airplanes had arrived in the colony seven years
earlier.351 “These mediocre results,” Aubert explained, “are the consequence of the
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difficulties into which we run in the cases where the utilization of medical aviation would
genuinely be advantageous.”352
Like Andlauer, Aubert echoed Robin’s opinions regarding the parts of Indochina
in which medical aviation would be most helpful. Aubert also agreed that aeromedical
transport was not needed in the delta regions of the colony because much of this area
already had terrestrial routes that allowed for evacuations that were “almost as rapid as by
air.” which was a view shared by other officials as well.353 As Aubert remarked at the end
of his report, “the medical airplane is not regularly usable in Indochina where there are
methods that are simpler, cheaper, and nearly as rapid.” In Laos and northern Tonkin
though, an air ambulance service “would present an interest of the first order.” In
Aubert’s judgment, medical aviation was especially valuable in circumstances “where the
conditions of distance, terrain, and atmosphere are brought together.”354
This trio of conditions was of course apparent in Laos and northern Tonkin.
However, for these very reasons, flying to these areas was still “unpredictable, dangerous,
and even impossible.” Like other contemporaries, Aubert pinpointed unfavorable
weather and the shortcomings of the aviation infrastructure as the primary obstacles for
pilots seeking to travel to these regions. “Certain areas will be a hindrance either during a
part of the year, due to the meteorological conditions,” Aubert wrote, “or permanently,

352

ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Général de Division Aubert, Commandant Supérieur des
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” January 3, 1929.
353
This view was shared by other officials as well. For instance, a military physician
noted that, in general, the densely populated areas of Indochina were “well-served” by roads and
possessed “well-appointed” medical services. This doctor determined that medical aviation was
needed only in the mountains of Laos and certain parts of upper Tonkin. “Compte-rendus et
voeux des congrès: Journées d’Aviation sanitaire coloniale,” 7.
354
ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Général de Division Aubert, Commandant Supérieur des
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” January 3, 1929.
155

due to the total absence of terrains and the impossibility of constructing them.”355
Concerns about the local weather and infrastructure were voiced as late as 1931. As the
publication from the Colonial Exposition commented, these problems “limit the
possibilities of medical aircraft.”356
Several months after Aubert drafted his report, air force commandant de Prémorel
lamented to Aubert that “medical aviation in Indochina does not render the services that
we have the right to expect of it.” In this letter from mid-August, de Prémorel declared
that the colony’s aeromedical service “seems to have been completely lost from view.”
As evidence, he cited the lone aerial evacuation that had been carried out in 1928 and
added that no air ambulances had thus far been utilized in 1929. To increase the
frequency with which medical aircraft were deployed, de Prémorel proposed a program
for enhancing the functioning of local aeromedical service. More specifically, this fourpart plan entailed the following measures: upgrading the airfield network; streamlining
the process for requesting aerial evacuations; replacing the Breguet 14 Tbis aircraft with
“more modern airplanes” that could more easily manage the smaller landing fields that
dotted the hilly terrain where air ambulances were most often required357; and defining a
355
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set of the regulations for the aeromedical services.358 Seeming to validate at least part of
this program, Aubert replied that an aeromedical service could not be consistently
employed where it was most needed—Laos and northern Tonkin—until improvements
were made to the regions’ airfields and the Breguet 14 Tbis was replaced by a different
model of air ambulance.359
A memorandum from the fall of 1929, likely composed after this written
exchange between de Prémorel and Aubert, identified another issue that impeded the
work of medical aviation in Indochina: the complicated process for actually requesting an
air ambulance.360 This problem was becoming apparent earlier in the decade. As Cony
and Ledet remark in analyzing the procedure for summoning an aeromedical transport in
the early 1920s, “to call upon an Aérochir is not easy.” At this point in the decade, they
explain, only the Governor General and the Commandant Superior could approve such a
mission. Unsurprisingly, this requisite authorization could significantly delay the
deployment of a critically needed air ambulance. Cony and Ledet provide an example
from January 1924 of precisely such a scenario: while the commander of the Cochinchina
squadron awaited flight clearance from the government in Hanoi, the chief physician in
Saigon’s hospital was unable to travel by plane to Qui Nhon to perform an emergency
difficult to fly and needed over six hundred meters of “well-cleared runway” to take off and land
safely. Manchon, 416.
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operation. The mismanagement of this incident contrasted sharply—and the French were
aware of this contrast—with the functioning of Thailand’s aeromedical service, which
was regularly carrying out transports by this time.361
Returning to the end of the 1920s, the memo from the fall of 1929 determined that
the paperwork involved with ordering an aerial evacuation had of late become excessive.
Specifically, this memo’s author pointed to a decree issued by the Minister of the
Colonies on July 10, 1929. This decree, which sought to expand the use of air
ambulances in the empire, was a modification of an earlier directive that dealt with
aviation requests more generally. Assessing this prior directive—which was dated June
29, 1927—the author noted that the decree was intended to save time when requesting
medical missions. “Only the Governor General’s authority comes into play,” the
memorandum explained, stating that “the order must come from him.”362
Yet the memo judged that the directive of July 1929 needlessly complicated this
process. According to this later decree, the Commandant Superior—either “on request or
requisition from the Governors or Residents Superior”—was charged with making
arrangements for military aircraft to be used as air ambulances for non-military
personnel. The author lamented that the more recent directive “runs the risk of delaying
evacuations[,] however urgent they may be.” As an example, the memorandum
referenced a case in which a M. Tesson had submitted a request “around October 7” for
an aeromedical transport to deliver his wife and infant from Xieng Khouang to Hanoi.
Having to first be approved by the Commandant Superior, the request only reached the
361
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appropriate air force official on October 14. An additional delay resulted from the fact
that a dispatch still needed to be sent to the Resident of Xieng Khouang regarding the
condition of the local airfield. The memo’s author commented that while this particular
example was not an urgent mission, “there is no doubt that in the event of illnesses or
serious injuries the patient would have plenty of time to die before the airplane could
rescue him.”363 Indeed, as depicted in the publication from the 1931 exposition, the
system for requesting an air ambulance in Indochina certainly appears as a complex, stepladen procedure.364
Into the early 1930s, discussions continued about how to increase both the
efficiency of medical aviation and the frequency with which aeromedical transports were
utilized. In March 1930 the Governor General distributed a circular that aimed to regulate
aerial evacuations in the colony. For de Prémorel though, this circular had not given
medical aviation “the scope that one would hope to see it have.” Consequently, de
Prémorel requested that Major General Gaston Billotte, the Commandant Superior,
organize a panel to investigate how to make the aeromedical service “function regularly
and be ready in case of conflict.” In particular, de Prémorel proposed that the commission
examine eight questions relating to this service’s operation. Prominent among the issues
363
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to be studied were: the aforementioned circular; the needs and materials used for medical
transport and how these were allocated; the “medical organization of aviation centers”;
and the maintenance required to keep airfields prepared for “immediate use.”365
In a subsequent letter to the Governor General, the Commandant Superior
endorsed de Prémorel’s recommendation for the panel. In addition, Billotte, like other
officials, observed that the colony’s air ambulances had not rendered the type of
assistance that was reasonable to expect from an aeromedical service. As he remarked in
late October 1930, “one is astonished to see that in a colony such as Indochina, for more
than seven months, this mode of transport has not been utilized a single time”; in fact,
Manchon points out that the calendar year of 1930 would see only three medical missions
carried out in the colony.366
By the latter part of November 1930, the Governor General also had expressed
approval of the commission, which was scheduled to meet at the start of 1931. Yet he
was hesitant to support the entirety of de Prémorel’s suggestions. In particular, the
Governor General believed it premature to devote too much attention to developing the
aeromedical network while remote areas of the colony remained without “decent
airfields.” Without large-scale improvements to the infrastructure, Secretary General
Graffeuil wrote on November 7, medical aviation would “barely have the chance to
develop.” He contended that the aeromedical service “will truly expand only on the day
that this [infrastructure] program will have been realized.” In Graffeuil’s opinion, any
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new regulations for medical aviation would succeed in making aerial evacuations “within
everyone’s reach” only if the colony’s hubs were served by nearby airfields that could be
easily accessed. Likewise, Inspector General Gaide—Gaide was part of Indochina’s
medical administration—agreed that improving the aviation infrastructure would lead to
improvements for the aeromedical service. He stated that the proposed commission could
not make any useful contribution to the development of medical aviation as long as the
colony lacked a network of landing sites that could be utilized throughout the year. Gaide
thus considered the panel’s object of study—“the medical organization of the aviation
centers”—to be of tertiary importance, behind upgrading both the aerial infrastructure
and the air force fleet.367
Gaide’s assessment appears as a reasonably accurate forecast for the trajectory of
medical aviation within Indochina over the course of the 1930s. Work on the colony’s air
network would of course continue through the end of the decade, but, as Cony and Ledet
observe, aeromedical transports became more frequent with the arrival of first batch of
Potez 29 aircraft at the beginning of 1933.368 For the period between late February 1931
and the first weeks of March 1940, Cony and Ledet identify at least twenty-six aviation
missions that involved medical objectives.369
Even so, certain of the difficulties that hindered the expansion of medical aviation
in the 1920s and early 1930s—namely, infrequent use, a lack of suitable aircraft, and the
367
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local climate—remained problematic as the decade came to a close. Despite the progress
made in the realm of aeromedical transport, certain officials remained unsatisfied with
the extent to which medical aviation was utilized in the colony. While noting in January
1935 that the aeromedical service “operates normally” with “numerous” transports being
carried out, Captain Puypéroux nevertheless opined that this service “is not requested as
much as it should and, more often than not, [is sought] too late.”370 As this comment
implies, the timely use of air ambulances—and, more simply, the frequency with which
medical aircraft were employed—was still an area of concern even after the colony’s
squadrons were outfitted with better aircraft. In addition, the continued availability of the
Potez 29 was becoming an issue in the late 1930s. An interdepartmental note from May
1938 stated that due to the low number of available Potez 29 aircraft in France, colonial
squadrons soon would no longer receive with this type of airplane; consequently, a
comparable substitute was needed.371 The unfavorable climate in Indochina only
exacerbated the problem of a dwindling supply of aeronautics resources in the metropole
and, eventually, the impossibility of sending new aviation materials to Southeast Asia.372
For instance, on February 13, 1940, the two-person crew of a Potez 29 fatally crashed in
rough weather as they flew from the Tong airfield to Mon Cay to retrieve a patient who
required surgery.373

370

SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Missions aériennes, politiques et économiques, liaisons postales et
évacuations sanitaires en Indochine,” January 31, 1935. Perhaps seeking to remedy this situation,
he proposed equipping the Potez 29 with a reserve fuel tank so that the plane could more easily
reach the remotest areas of the colony.
371
SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Note pour le 3ème Bureau de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air,”
May 6, 1938.
372
See chapter seven of this dissertation for a more detailed analysis of the challenges of
furnishing Indochina with aeronautics materials.
373
Cony and Ledet, 305.
162

Conclusion
Beginning in the early 1920s, the aeromedical service in Indochina was utilized
not only for a variety of medical purposes but also as a symbol of French power and
civilizing benevolence. Proponents of medical aviation declared that aircraft possessed
certain attributes—speed, comfort, and safety—that were particularly advantageous for
improving medical care and asserting French authority within and across vast expanses of
inhospitable colonial terrain. However, as was the case with other types of aviation in
Indochina during this period, the hopes and the realities of medical aviation diverged. In
addition to the shortcomings of the aerial infrastructure and the lack of suitable aircraft,
Indochina’s unpredictable and uncooperative weather kept air ambulances on the ground
in a manner that noticeably frustrated its advocates. Two other issues that were more
unique to medical aviation also impeded its use in the colony. First, requesting an air
ambulance at times appeared as an extremely cumbersome process, which was especially
troubling when saving time meant saving lives. Second, most areas of the colony simply
did not need an aeromedical service. This fact alone surely limited the extent to which
aerial evacuations could become a regular option for medical transport.
To a large extent, the trajectory of Indochina’s aeromedical service mirrored the
path of medical aviation elsewhere in the French empire. Manchon argues that on the
cusp of the Second World War, medical aviation was firmly established in the empire and
had shown itself to be a service that was both useful and an “essential” component of
French colonial propaganda. But, he adds, the hopes of the early 1930s about the degree
to which this service would be utilized in the colonies were disappointed. Apart from
Madagascar, medical missions “never represented more than a very small part” of the
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activity of a given territory’s air force. In the second half of the 1930s, the number of
aerial evacuations did increase in the empire, but this type of work remained ancillary for
aircrews. “To a great extent,” Manchon concludes, medical aviation “remained dependent
on local demands,” which varied greatly from one region to the next and from year to
year. He stresses, though, that maintaining an aeromedical service was important for the
French because it helped to convey an “image of security and civilization in the eyes of
the [local] populations.”374
The first part of this dissertation has analyzed how aircraft were utilized to deliver
passengers, mail, medical supplies, and patients to, within, and through French
Indochina. Simultaneously, these different aerial missions were intended to function as an
instrument of French colonial propaganda and a representation of French colonial
authority. As the second part of this dissertation will show, the purposes for which the
French envisioned using flight technology—and, indeed, the ways that planes were
actually employed—went beyond transportation and communication. Part two thus
examines the use of aviation—as well as the impediments to this use—as a tool of
colonial development, internal policing and control, and external defense.
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CHAPTER FIVE: PHOTOGRAPHING AND RECONNOITERING THE COLONIAL
LANDSCAPE
In a speech given in 1920, Alfred Guyomar touted the benefits of colonial
aviation within Indochina. His remarks included a discussion of how aerial photography
and reconnaissance could assist with a variety of tasks in the service of colonial
development. Aerial photos would not only act as “a valued and devoted colleague of
Indochinese surveyors” conducting cadastral work but also aid in the drawing up of more
precise maps for the public, the military, and geographers. Moreover, aerial photography
and reconnaissance would provide an efficient means of scouting future sites for
highways and railroads.375
Guyomar’s statement highlights some of the ways that the French conceived of
using aviation—military aviation in particular—for economic purposes in the interwar
period. His comments also suggest that airplanes and seaplanes provided the viewer with
a unique perspective of an object or place of interest below. During the two decades that
followed his speech, aircraft were used in Indochina for creating cadastral registers,
completing public works projects, drawing up maps, assisting scientific research, aiding
local businesses, and helping to package the colony for public consumption.376 The
specifics of these assignments may have differed, but the common goal of these missions
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was to “capture” the colonial landscape both in terms of control and imaging. In doing so,
the French sought to develop, understand, and promote the parts of Indochina that were
photographed or reconnoitered from the air.
By the later 1930s, proponents of aviation could indeed boast that aerial
photography and reconnaissance had rendered “inestimable services” for colonial efforts
in science, industry, and commerce.377 Yet, as was the case with air transport and medical
aviation, the French encountered various obstacles as they sought to deploy aerial
photography and reconnaissance in Indochina. Unsurprisingly, many of these
impediments were familiar to military and colonial authorities: organizational difficulties;
a lack of funding; the challenges of the physical environment; and the limitations of the
era’s technology. Another issue was that, for certain aviation enthusiasts, government
officials were not providing enough support for aerial photography and reconnaissance
work in the empire. Overall, these hindrances both handicapped the effective utilization
of the aerial perspective and stripped aeronautics technology of some of its luster as an
all-purpose tool to be utilized in the service of developing, studying, and promoting
Indochina.

The Aerial Perspective and Aviation
The successful employment of aerial photography and reconnaissance during the
First World War was crucial for the postwar application of aviation in urban planning and
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the social sciences.378 Jeanne Haffner discusses the wide-ranging influence of these
wartime uses in the decades that followed the conflict:
Considering the contribution—both real and perceived—of aerial photography to
military triumph in World War I, it is no wonder that the airplane became central
to so many developments in art, science, and social sciences in the 1920s and
1930s. The literal ability of the airplane to provide a distant, holistic outsider’s
perspective—not only a new visual angle but also a novel outlook on the world—
inspired a wider variety of intellectual and political movements throughout
Europe.379
Furthermore, the aerial perspective seemed to offer an objective, scientific tool for
studying populations—within the French empire at first but eventually within France
too—and how they related to the surroundings in which they lived. According to Haffner,
aerial photographs of colonial peoples were a means of obtaining “unparalleled access
into the inner workings of these societies, overcoming numerous linguistic and cultural
boundaries.”380 French anthropologist and pilot Marcel Griaule provides an instructive
explanation of how the aerial perspective allowed the observer to overcome the
limitations of ground-based reconnaissance. In a text on his fieldwork in Chad in 1943,
Griaule recounted the way in which this vantage point clarified the obscurities and
unmasked the secrets of the landscape below:
Seen high in the air, a district holds few secrets. Property is delineated as if in
India ink; paths converge in critical points; interior courtyards yield themselves
378
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up; the inhabited jumble comes clear. With an aerial photograph the components
of institutions fall into place as a series of things disassembled, and yielding. Man
is silly: he suspects his neighbor, never the sky; inside the four walls, palisades,
fences, or hedges of an enclosed space he thinks all is permitted. But all his great
and small intentions, his sanctuaries, his garbage, his careless repairs, his
ambitions for growth appear on an aerial photograph.381
Griaule also emphasized the practical utility of aerial photographs. Planes could
photograph larger areas in less time than traditional, ground-based methods of
documentation. In addition, aerial images provided scientists and researchers with an
effective means of tracking changes over time in the societies and environment below.382
Martin Thomas concisely summarizes how aeronautics and photographic
technology worked together in the interwar years to furnish imperial powers with new
ways of viewing and governing colonial spaces. Aerial photography and reconnaissance
influenced the development of policy in the British and French empires partly because
these techniques “intersected the ongoing work of colonial mapmakers, geologists, and
archaeologists.” By the 1920s, Thomas explains, aerial surveys and photographs “had
revolutionized the working practices of military staffs and civilian specialists whose
decisions demanded accurate information about topography and climate, agriculture and
water distribution, or sites of archaeological interest.”383
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Aviation and Cadastres in Indochina
Jean-Baptiste Manchon states that proponents of colonial aviation emphasized
how aircraft would provide extremely valuable assistance in the task of drawing up
cadastres, official registers of real estate created for tax purposes. By utilizing aviation in
this manner, aeronautics technology would contribute to a mapping effort that not only
was fiscally advantageous for France but also helped consolidate French colonial
control.384 Yet in the mid-1920s the idea of using aircraft for cadastral work remained “an
entirely new subject” that was “still far from being up and running” in France. Within
Indochina though, the flatness of certain parts of the landscape—especially along the
coast, in Cambodia, and around the delta regions of the Mekong and Red Rivers—offered
a particularly promising setting for undertaking these aerial surveys.385 Thus it is perhaps
unsurprising that the colonial administration employed aviation for this purpose from a
comparatively early date in the interwar years. Indeed, Indochina, along with Algeria and
Tunisia, was one of the areas of overseas France in which planes assisted early and
frequently with creating cadastres. The colony, moreover, long remained the primary
testing ground for developing and refining the techniques for using aviation to prepare
these real-estate registers.386
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As early as the spring of 1920, officials in Indochina were examining the
possibility of employing aircraft to assist in drawing up cadastres.387 Requests for this
type of support often emphasized how aerial reconnaissance yielded precise data. On
June 4, 1920, for instance, the Resident Superior of Cambodia proposed having aircraft
deployed to aid the territory’s cadastral work. Citing a group of villages near the airfield
at Phnom Penh, the Resident suggested that aviation be utilized to “inspect [both] the
exact surface area of a defined region under cultivation and the nature of the crops.” With
this information, the local government could calculate property taxes in order to provide
“an indisputable base” for both the administration and the taxpayer.388 Importantly, the
use of aviation to help resolve property disputes was envisioned as applying to all
landowners and not just the French. As one French Deputy wrote, aerial photographs
“can in many cases serve as extremely precise documentary evidence for resolving
disputes, and property owners, indigenous or European, have not taken long to realize
this and appreciate them.”389
As the previous examples suggest, French officials were aware that the clarity of
the aerial perspective helped sort out confusion on the ground below. Other requests for
cadastral assistance followed this line of thinking. For instance, the local administrator of
Hai Duong sought to have aircraft assist with drafting a map of the provincial capital,
387
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asserting that “this work is absolutely essential if we want to get out of the anarchy in
which we are stuck.” In a letter from late November 1923, he noted that aviation would
allow for the required tasks of inspecting claims made by various parties and conducting
on-site surveys of land plots and rice fields to be carried out with ease and efficiency.
With this information collected, this official reasoned, the local administration would be
in a position to precisely calculate the taxes to be levied.390
Into the 1930s, colonial officials requested that aerial photography be used for
cadastral purposes. The French thus continued to prize the aerial perspective for its
perceived ability to provide accurate information swiftly and efficiently. As the head of
the cadastre service wrote in June 1930, aerial photographs supplied colonial authorities
with “more exact maps than those resulting from communal surveying.” Likewise,
French engineer A. Michel commented in November 1936 that aircraft would offer a
quick remedy for a lingering fiscal problem in Tonkin. Pointing to a pair of immense
valleys that remained un-surveyed—and whose populations had, consequently, remained
un-taxed—Michel remarked that “the topographic study of these sites would be carried
out quite rapidly and in favorable terms by the use of aerial photography.”391

Aerial Photography and Reconnaissance for Development Projects
In addition to assisting with real-estate surveys, aviation was charged with various
other tasks in the service of modernizing and exploiting the landscape of Indochina.
Public works officials, for instance, aimed to utilize airplanes and seaplanes as a cost390
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efficient, safe, and swift means of gaining an unimpeded perspective of an area of interest
below. According to a contemporary publication, these officials “frequently request
aircraft collaboration for survey of a route or study of an area in which they have decided,
for example, to carry out irrigation work or put in a railroad line.”392 In a specific
example from May 1920, the Governor of Cochinchina inquired about having military
planes conduct reconnaissance and photography flights as a means of researching an
alternative route between the coast of Annam and Cochinchina. The existing path ran
along the coast while the proposed road would cross the Central Highlands; this route
project was the type of infrastructural program for which Minister of the Colonies Albert
Sarraut and his ilk campaigned as part of the empire-wide mise en valeur of the 1920s.393
Several years later, Deputy Archimbaud reported on the success of an aircraft
mission that was deployed to reconnoiter a direct route from Hue to Saigon. While
serving as a preferable alternative to the coastal route, the envisioned road would also
make Kontum—“an important center of colonialism”—more accessible and allow for the
“peaceful penetration” of a region that remained “difficult and rebellious.” Archimbaud
stated that the three aircraft deployed for the operation, which took place intermittently
between late January and early April 1925, logged 135 hours of flight time and returned
with over 500 pictures.394 Elsewhere in Indochina, the Resident Superior of Laos wrote to
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the Governor General in 1929, outlining a project for employing aircraft to survey a
region through which the extension of Colonial Route 8 was planned to pass.395
Into the mid-1930s, aviation continued to aid the work of expanding the road
network. For instance, air force officer Captain Marcel Puypéroux recalled being asked
by a Monsieur Pierrot, the French Resident in Dong-Hoi, to reconnoiter an expanse of
mountains in the area in order to determine a suitable terrestrial route for penetrating this
“especially inaccessible” location. In March 1935 an aerial survey and photography
mission revealed “the existence of an entry valley until then unknown.” With future tasks
in mind, Puypéroux asserted that aircraft would be particularly useful for helping with
road-building efforts in certain areas of Annam.396
Aerial photography and reconnaissance were also utilized in railroad construction
projects. From late December 1921 until early February 1922, for instance, aircraft were
deployed to take photos of a sixty-kilometer stretch of land that was part of a planned rail
link between Saigon and Phnom Penh. Similarly, from March 10 to the beginning of May
1922, aerial photography was used in Cambodia for studying a rail line connecting Pursat
to Sisophan.397 Lastly, planes were charged with surveying a portion of the
Transinochinese Railroad’s itinerary in the mid-1930s; this Hanoi-to-Saigon link was a
aforementioned request from May 1920. In any case, the key point remains that aviation was
charged with a variety of tasks—sometimes during the same mission—that involved the
economic development of Indochina as well as the maintenance and extension of French colonial
authority.
395
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massive public works project that was launched in 1898 and not completed until late
September 1936.398
In some cases, colonial officials sought to employ aviation to help preserve the
landscape and its resources for the benefit of the local populations. Of course, the purpose
and manner of these efforts was primarily dictated by French concerns. In one specific
instance, Yves Henry, the Inspector General of Agriculture, Farms, and Forests, wrote to
the Governor General about a protected region of mangrove forests in southern
Cochinchina. Henry’s letter indicated that tanneries in Cholon as well as charcoal
manufacturers looking to sell their product internationally were removing large numbers
of the area’s trees in a way that wasted much of the wood. Unregulated and occurring
throughout the mangrove forests, this harvesting was leading to “the complete ruin of the
populations” due to the loss of a source of fuel. The solution, as proposed by the
Inspector of the Forestry Service, included using aerial photography—a “rapid and
economical method”—to draw up a precise map of the forests so that a concentrated,
regulated system of timber harvesting could be implemented.399
The use of aviation for public works projects was not limited to land-based tasks.
Indeed, aircraft served as a useful tool for studying and resolving issues involving water
as well. In November 1922 a French engineer working as part of a hydrography project
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sought to utilize aerial photography for a topographic survey of two ports in the Ha Long
Bay region of Tonkin. Previous surveys in the area, he explained, had required work that
was “extremely long and often presented real dangers.” The engineer reasoned that the
study could be completed faster and with fewer missions if seaplanes were employed to
take photographs of several islets in the region. This writer added that the aerial photos
thus obtained could be useful for identifying certain as-yet undiscerned shoals. Engineers
from the hydrography project requested aviation assistance for similar tasks at least two
more times during the first half of the 1920s.400 Aircraft also helped with tasks involving
urban water management. In the first months of 1924, public works officials aimed to
deploy photography and reconnaissance flights in the area surrounding the Bé River. This
information would be utilized for a canal-building project intended to alleviate the water
shortages that Saigon and neighboring Cholon had been struggling with for several years.
Once again, aviation was presented as a more efficient and economical means of
completing the work than ground-based methods alone.401
The view that aviation could assist in “taming” the colony’s waterscape applied to
situations in which the problem was too much water as opposed to a shortage. Given the
geography and weather of certain parts of Indochina, it is perhaps unsurprising that the
400
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colony was the area of the French empire in which aircraft played the most significant
role in surveying and photographing during periods of flooding. In January 1935,
Puypéroux discussed some of the benefits of employing planes to survey flood zones. He
stated that aerial reconnaissance of the colony’s flood-prone rivers during critical periods
could help spot not only the inflow of floodwaters but also threats of embankment rupture
or the actual breach of a dike. With these observations in hand, authorities could then
warn any threatened populations in advance.402 In addition, aerial observation and
photography of inundated areas provided engineers with key data regarding flooding
patterns. For instance, following a period of heavy floods along the Red River in August
and September 1923, the public works department requested that aircraft be dispatched to
Hanoi to determine precisely which parts of a tract of low-lying, embanked land—known
as a polder or casier—were submerged. The air force, a French official noted, was the
“only service capable of furnishing this information before the waters receded.” When
the Red River flooded anew in 1925 and 1926, aircraft again were used to survey the
inundated areas.403

Mapping the Landscape in Indochina
Sources also attested to the valuable contribution that aviation could bring to the
cartographic project across the French empire. Deputy Archimbaud, for example,
underscored the benefit of aerial photography, remarking that this technology “finds in
the colonies a particularly successful application in the execution of topographic surveys
402
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undertaken by different services.” This aerial support was particularly important during
the interwar years because, in general, there remained a lack of accurate maps for large
swaths of the French empire. Manchon points out that by the time that aviation was being
installed across the empire, sufficiently detailed maps of the colonies had been created
only for Algeria and Tunisia.404
Moreover, colonial organizations such as the Service Géographique complained
of having to rely on undependable data when undertaking the study of a poorly known
area. As a publication from 1931 explained, this organization often had to deal with errorriddled maps or questionable plans based on information collected from local inhabitants.
The authors contended that aviation offered a remedy to this problem: the airplane
“makes it possible to determine with exactitude the distances from different points [and]
their positions, and provides a view of the region that is sufficiently accurate for creating
a map.” Likewise, another source asserted that aircraft allowed for easier, more rapid
penetration of otherwise inaccessible areas, and aerial photography permitted “the
resolution of difficulties that hold back or stop the reconnaissance made on the ground.”
Additionally, with the broad, unobstructed view from an airplane, an observer could work
economically and efficiently in the task of correcting errors on existing maps.405
Within Indochina, the Service Géographique sought to have aerial photography
and reconnaissance help with various jobs throughout the colony. These calls included a
1921 request involving northern Cochinchina and another for work in the South Central
Coast region of Annam during the summer of 1924. Elsewhere in Annam, two aircraft
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completed an aerial photography mission in the Pleiku-Kontum area of the Central
Highlands in February 1926. As a final example, planes were deployed during the course
of 1929 in the North Central Coast region of Annam and the northeast of Tonkin. The
purpose, Manchon indicates, was to take photographs that were to be used for drafting a
series of maps.406
Into the late 1930s, aviation continued to assist with filling in the empire’s
cartographic gaps.407 For Indochina, this mapping effort remained unfinished by the
middle of the decade. As Puypéroux reported in January 1935, the colony “still has
numerous regions that are poorly known or unexplored.” In particular, he identified
certain areas within Cambodia and northern Laos that could be “usefully explored” with
aircraft. Indeed, officials requested aerial photography and reconnaissance help until the
end of the 1930s. Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet cite several aerial photography
assignments that were carried out between March and May 1939 and included work in
Annam, Laos, and Tonkin.408

Aerial Photography and Reconnaissance for Scientific Research
Scientific organizations and social scientists throughout the French empire also
took advantage of aeronautics technology. While a handful of Europeans employed
planes for scientific study abroad prior to the end of the First World War, this usage
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significantly increased during the two decades that followed the conflict.409 In 1939,
pilot-archaeologist J.Y. Claeys stated that for Indochina as well as the Levant, military
aviation “provides efficient and valuable assistance to scientific research.” He remarked
that this aid was especially important in regions like Indochina that contained areas of
undulating terrain that were difficult to access. In addition, Claeys described how aircraft
not only furnished researchers with an unimpeded perspective of the landscape but also
revealed the layout of ancient ruins. The configuration of such sites, concealed by time
and the growth of vegetation, was not evident when investigating the areas on foot.
However, the aerial perspective penetrated this obscurity with ease. As Claeys explained,
“lost citadels, razed and invisible on the ground…, appear clearly to the aerial
observer.”410
Among the notable social-science patrons of aviation in Indochina was the Ecole
française d’Extrême-Orient. Beginning in the early 1920s, members of this organization
sought this assistance for tasks throughout the colony. In 1921, for instance, the group
submitted a request for aerial photographs of several ancient monuments located in the
insalubrious marshes of the Plaine des Joncs in Cochinchina.411 Similarly, in 1923 the
organization’s director approached a military official about having aircraft deployed to
take pictures of five royal tombs situated in the Thanh Hoa province of northern Annam;
these images were to be used to draw up a map of the burial site. “These tombs are
scattered around a dense forest, which makes the work very difficult,” the director
observed. Yet the project supervisor was confident that aviation offered a means of
409
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completing the required work in an efficient manner. He wrote, “we would save a lot of
time if we were able to rely on photographs taken from an airplane.”412 French
researchers were subsequently able to identify other ancient monuments and sites in
Tonkin and Annam by utilizing aerial photography. In Cambodia as well, Claeys argued,
aerial photography and reconnaissance had proven “especially fruitful” tools for social
scientists. In addition to providing images of the well-known temple complex at Angkor
Wat, aviation had aided in the “rediscovery”—from the French perspective at least—of
myriad other features of the ancient Khmer civilization. With the help of aircraft, Claeys
proclaimed, researchers had drastically improved their knowledge of the former
civilization. He pointed out that aerial reconnaissance had revealed connections among a
given site’s scattered monuments and buildings.413
Social scientists utilized aeronautics technology to capture and categorize the
colonial landscape not only in terms of natural and built environments but also in terms
of contemporary indigenous societies. For Pierre Gourou, whose study of the rural
peoples of the Tonkin Delta was published in 1936, aerial photography was an important
tool for analyzing the socio-spatial relations of the Tonkinese populations. In the
abstracted forms of the villages and surrounding landscape captured in aerial
photographs, he saw a type of unity between local groups and the natural environment.
Gourou concluded that this seamless blending of the two fostered politico-economic
balance and social happiness among the peoples he studied. For Gourou, then, aerial
photographs showed a perspective of the Tonkin Delta that revealed a unity and structure
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that was otherwise unapparent in the seeming disorder of daily life in these rural
communities.414
In addition, Gourou combined aerial photography with scientific study in the
Mekong River Delta during the 1930s, a decade that witnessed a socio-political crisis
compounded by economic and ecological problems in the region. Gourou was among a
growing cadre of French and Vietnamese social scientists who, equipped with new
theories for understanding socio-spatial relationships, put forth schemes for land reform
and redevelopment in the Delta. In this manner, researchers hoped to utilize aviation to
help resolve present-day challenges involving the colonial landscape. According to David
Biggs, “new technologies available in this period, especially aerial photography, became
key to this shifting colonial discourse on development and the rural landscape.” Images
snapped from above, he explains, “shifted the colonial gaze from horizontal views, where
interior spaces of villages and homes were hidden to surveyors..., to vertical views
‘peering over the village hedge’ to show vibrant mosaics of fields, dikes, and villages.”
Based on this information, Gourou and thinkers of his ilk presented new schemes for
reordering the space of the Delta.415

Aerial Photographs of Indochina for the Public
Aside from being applied to colonial development projects and scientific studies,
aerial photographs were placed in public exhibitions and printed material on Indochina
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during the interwar years.416 These images provided the average European viewer with
unique vistas of what likely would have been an unfamiliar place. The use of aerial
photographs for this purpose not only demonstrated the progress of photographic and
flight technologies but also served to publicize and promote Indochina—and the positive
results that the colonial project had produced therein—during a period in which the
French invested heavily in the production of such propaganda. For the empire as a whole,
the basic intent was to more closely link the colonies to French national identity.417
Beginning in the early 1920s, aerial photographs were used in a variety of public
venues and printed material to uniquely display and promote Indochina. For instance,
with the December 1922 opening of the eighth Salon de l’Aéronautique—a popular
aerospace exposition that France had hosted since 1909—rapidly approaching, the
Minister of the Colonies solicited the loan of a variety of Indochina-related objects from
the 1922 Exposition Nationale Coloniale de Marseille. In addition to twenty photo plates
of sites from around the colony, the Minister’s request included eight aerial photographs
and maps showing broad perspectives of Saigon-Cholon, Hanoi, Vinh, and several
provinces in the northern part of Annam. Several years later, more aerial photographs
were sought for Indochina’s exhibit at the Paris Exposition Coloniale of 1931. In
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December 1929 a Monsieur Eckert, an official for the fair, presented to LieutenantColonel de Prémorel, the chief of the colony’s air force, an extensive list of aerial images;
these photos, collected from the five constituent parts of Indochina, were intended to
function as an overview of life throughout the colony. Additionally, a publication for the
1931 event contained aerial photographs of the residence of the Governor of Cochinchina
as well as an aerial image of Hanoi.418
Moreover, journals and guidebooks incorporated aerial photographs in an effort to
increase viewers’ knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of French Indochina. For
example, the well-circulated L’Illustration—this journal published an issue dedicated to
aviation on a biennial basis from 1924 through the 1930s—printed aerial images such as
“Terrestrial Mosaic.” According to the caption, this photograph of a rice field in Vinh
Province “provides, in the decorative form of a geometric ‘cloisonné,’ an accurate idea of
the Indochinese lowlands.”419 Aerial photographs also appeared in the Bulletin de
l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine. Articles from early 1930 contained an aerial
photograph for a cadastral map as well as aerial images of Saigon’s port, Angkor Wat,
Nha Trang, and a Tonkin airfield.420
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Similarly, Indochina’s Bureau of Tourism utilized aerial photographs to promote
airplane tours between Saigon and Angkor Wat. In May 1929 this organization printed a
guide that included photographs snapped by the Compagnie Aérienne Française. Among
this material were images of Saigon, Phnom Penh, and the Angkor Wat complex.421
While implying that the round-trip flight was a simple and delightful journey, these
photographs—along with the publication’s commentary—aimed to persuade the reader
that “there is perhaps nothing more splendid than being able, from above, to embrace the
whole of this ensemble [of Angkor Wat] at a glance.”422 Viewers could also consult aerial
photographs in French-authored guidebooks for Indochina. One such guidebook from
1931 contained images of the Royal Palace of Phnom Penh and Angkor Wat while
another, also printed in 1931, incorporated a larger variety of aerial images.423

Aerial Photography and Reconnaissance for Companies and Individuals in Indochina
This chapter has thus far analyzed how aerial reconnaissance and photography
aided the work of the colonial administration, scientists and scientific organizations, and
promoters of the empire. Aviation was also called on to assist small businesses,
industries, and individuals throughout Indochina. It should be pointed out that nonFrench individuals and businesses could and did submit requests for aerial photography
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and reconnaissance. While noteworthy in terms of revealing a glimpse of the day-to-day
interactions between colonizer and colonized, requests from the native populations can be
understood as falling within the bounds of a colonial system to which the French
regulated access.
A publication from the colonial exposition of 1931 observed that “private
individuals, service managers, concessionaires, or even manufacturers often request the
assistance of military aviation.” The writer stated that aerial photographs allowed persons
to know their property “down to the very last detail.” Armed with this data, individuals
would be better informed about any improvements, modifications, or repairs that their
businesses or land required.424 For example, military planes undertook numerous
photography missions involving distilleries and tobacco factories in Cochinchina and the
Red River Delta between September 1921 and March 1922.425 In another instance, pilots
completed a photographic survey of several stretches of land in Cochinchina.426
Elsewhere in the colony, a mission order from mid-March 1924 authorized a proposal
submitted by the Compagnie Minière et Métallurgique de l’Indochine; the firm had
inquired about aerial photographs of a mining site in the mountains of Tonkin.427
Vietnamese business owners also sought the aid of aerial photography and
reconnaissance. The archival record suggests that colonial and military officials treated
424
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requests made by members of the indigenous populations no differently than if the
requester was French. For example, a mission order from February 1925 approved a
request made by M. Bach-Thai-Buoi, a Haiphong-based shipowner, for an aerial
photography survey. Likewise, in August of the following year, authorities authorized a
request submitted by M. Nguyen-Viet-Vang, a shopkeeper in Hanoi; in this case, the task
consisted of deploying aircraft to photograph a section of rice fields.428

Limitations and Impediments to Aerial Photography and Reconnaissance in Indochina
Explaining why planes were viewed as a valuable tool for public works projects
in Indochina, Manchon notes that “from the moment one moved away from large cities
this means of reconnaissance appeared incomparably more rapid, precise and economical
than any ground survey.”429 Similarly, in the mid-1920s, air force commandant Francois
Glaize highlighted the benefits of employing aviation for different economic tasks in the
colony. In addition to the “good quality of work” provided by aerial reconnaissance and
photography, aircraft offered the advantages of speed and low cost.430
Ideally—and at times actually—statements such as Manchon’s and Glaize’s were
accurate. Yet French officials did voice concerns about the use of aviation for
reconnaissance and photography purposes. These concerns typically related to the
following issues: mission organization and costs; the amount of preparatory work; and
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the limitations imposed by weather and the existing technology.431 Moreover, certain
observers even lamented the lack of progress made in utilizing aviation for colonial
development projects. In this case, the complaints tended to focus on how metropolitan
and colonial authorities not only provided the air force with inadequate resources but also
remained hesitant to deploy aircraft as a tool of economic improvement and scientific
understanding in the empire.
From the start of the 1920s, officials grappled with the basic issue of how to
organize and pay for aerial photography and reconnaissance assignments. In the summer
of 1920, the head of Indochina’s air force presented the Governor General with
information regarding reimbursements for aviation missions in general and aerial
photography tasks in particular. This clarification was needed, this officer explained,
because there was no standard process for repaying mission costs. The creation of some
type of reimbursement strategy was further warranted due to both the increase in the
number of requests for aviation and the inability of the air force budget to support
repayment on its own. In an effort to sort out this problem, the air force chief suggested
that the requester be presented with a precise estimate of the costs of the desired work.432
431

These hindrances at times worked in tandem. For example, weather problems could
lead to delays in the deployment of a mission, which in turn increased the cost of the aviation
assignment. Similarly, financial and infrastructural obstacles tended to foster a situation in which
aviation technology was available but not able to be used because the ground facilities lagged
behind.
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When aircraft assisted with real-estate surveys, the operation’s costs were split between
the general and local budgets in Indochina.433 Aside from establishing rules related to
funding, officials drew up regulations pertaining to aircrew safety and mission execution
during aerial photography operations.434
While signaling that progress was being made toward establishing a
comprehensible system for launching aviation missions for economic tasks, these
measures do not seem to have immediately clarified this process. As late as the fall of
1924, French officials still sought a more coherent approach to deploying aircraft for
cadastral work. As noted in a report from October, the problem appears to have stemmed
from a lack of organization on the part of the colonial administration. “Even today,” this
document stated, “the administration has still not formulated a very clear program of
what it requires concerning cadastre.” An additional difficulty resulted from that fact that
administrative needs varied across the different jurisdictions in Indochina.435 In other
words, at this point there was not yet a consensus among the different cadastre services in
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the colony with regard to the way in which aviation should be utilized for drawing up
these surveys.436
A workable approach to ordering and carrying out aerial photography and
reconnaissance missions had been developed by 1930. According to this arrangement,
colonial administrators would submit requests to the head of the air force. Each request
needed to include a detailed list about the areas to be photographed, the scale of the
photos, the optimal period of time to carry out the task, and the urgency of the job. Upon
reception of an appropriately detailed submission, this air force official would draft a
mission order that the original requester would then forward to the Governor General for
authorization.437 Yet despite the progress implied by the creation and functioning of this
system, problems appear to have lingered into the late 1930s. In June 1938 air force
commandant Devèze complained to Governor General Jules Brévié about the difficulties
that his service was encountering in undertaking photography missions on behalf on the
government general. Devèze identified those seeking aviation assistance as the source of
the trouble, stating that requests tended to either lack any indication of the work’s
urgency or were submitted at the last minute.438
More generally, the costs of installing and maintaining an aviation presence in
Indochina hindered the deployment of aircraft. As this dissertation has emphasized,
436
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French officials were aware of the expenses and construction required to make an air
service function as expected. Already in the early 1920s, the French were cognizant of
how these financial issues were handicapping the utilization of aerial photography and
reconnaissance. In June 1920 the Chief Engineer of Public Works determined that aircraft
would have no more than an auxiliary role in the task of drawing up real-estate registers
in the colony and recommended that planes be used for this work only in specific
instances. This official, a Monsieur Lefèvre, explained his reasoning primarily in terms of
the costs and infrastructure involved with aviation. As he bluntly stated, “airplanes cost
much, by themselves, by their personnel, by the installations that they require…,which,
for cadastre, will be numerous.”439
Lefèvre also pointed out that an extensive ground-based effort was still needed
when aircraft helped with cadastral tasks. In his opinion, the assistance provided by
aviation did not greatly reduce the overall workload that creating a cadastre normally
involved. Lefèvre even went so far as to assert that employing aircraft for these surveys
would actually be a hindrance to the regular cadastre service. He judged that this service
would be saddled with additional tasks that related to arranging any required aviation
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infrastructure. As a result, the cadastre service “will be unable to work regularly, as it
would do if it was on its own.”440
Several days after Lefèvre drafted this correspondence, the Resident Superior of
Annam wrote to the Governor General with regard to how this assessment applied to the
Resident’s own outlook for conducting real-estate surveys within his jurisdiction. He
remarked, “cadastre by aircraft will require numerous preparatory works on the ground,
[which are] expensive installations [on their own], and will then be able to yield useful
results only after a series of difficult operations involving the use of specialized
personnel.” Elaborating, the Resident highlighted the different actions needed in terms of
both infrastructure and human expertise. “The preparatory works on ground require, by
their importance and their special nature, the existence of a cadastre service that Annam
does not have,” he explained. He further indicated that “the utilization of components
furnished by photography will necessitate the employment of specific officials,
draftsmen, photographers.”441
Administrators and public works officials were not alone in noting the financial
and technical drawbacks of putting aerial photography and reconnaissance to use for
colonial development projects.442 Pilot and journalist Henri Bouché described the burden
440

1920.

ANOM, GGI 66492, “Note pour Monsieur le Résident Supérieur en Annam,” June 4,

441

ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Résident Supérieur en Annam à Monsieur le Gouverneur
Général de l’Indochine,” June 12, 1920. When aircraft did assist with cadastral work, drawing up
these surveys still was a multi-step process. This process included measuring and demarcating of
the area to be appraised, taking the aerial photographs, resizing and developing the photos,
interpreting and editing the images to highlight certain terrestrial features, and issuing blueprints
to then be used for cadastral purposes. ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize,
Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine, à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,”
May 3, 1920.
442
Other local administrators worried about the costs of aerial photography and
reconnaissance tasks, approaching the government general for aid. For instance, in October 1929
Jules Bosc, the Resident Superior of Laos, expressed his hope that Indochina’s general budget
191

of constructing auxiliary airfields and aeronautics facilities for a given mission. “The
installation of these auxiliary terrains is itself extremely expensive,” he observed, adding
that “very often…they [the future sites] are occupied by extensive rice fields that must be
expropriated at a high price.” Of course, the acquired land still needed assorted
construction and upkeep, which only increased the total cost. Even with the investment
already made in readying and maintaining these auxiliary terrains, Bouché found that
such sites were “only rarely usable.” To further complicate matters, he reported, repairs
and development work were required after each rainy season.443
Indochina’s weather and climate also restricted the use of aircraft for economic
and scientific work. The success of these missions often hinged on having favorable
flying conditions and visibility, neither of which could be guaranteed for lengthy periods
in the colony. As Lieutenant Colonel Henri Leblanc stated, the start and end of a given
aviation operation were “strictly dependent on more or less capricious atmospheric
conditions [that are] impossible to predict with certainty.” Bouché attested to this reality
while visiting an airfield outside Saigon in March 1925, noting that “the days where
photography work is possible are, indeed, very rare.” He estimated that in Cochinchina—
and perhaps in the entirety of Indochina as well—only one out of every ten days had
weather that was favorable for aerial photography.444 Leblanc’s and Bouché’s remarks
demonstrate how the clarity of the aerial perspective—so prized by proponents of aerial
would cover the expenses of two aerial photography assignments within the protectorate.
According to Bosc, the local budget lacked the six thousand piasters that the operations would
likely cost. ANOM, GGI 66545, “Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur
Général de l’Indochine,” October 23, 1929. A mission order subsequently authorized the
Resident’s request. ANOM, GGI 66545, “Ordre de Mission,” February 17, 1930.
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photography and reconnaissance—could be negated rather easily by clouds, rain, and
other atmospheric disruptions.
In an attempt to deal with challenges of the local weather and climate, officials
aimed to be pragmatic about the amount of time needed to complete photography and
reconnaissance missions. In February 1924, for example, Glaize indicated that an
assignment requested by a mining company in Tonkin would require three days of work
in good weather. However, he pointed out that it was unlikely that this timeframe could
be adhered to because, in northern Tonkin, “the bad days, where we cannot take
photographs, are unfortunately much more frequent than the favorable days.”445 In
another instance, unfavorable weather combined with mechanical problems to severely
limit the number of days on which aircraft were able to carry out photography work for a
proposed railroad in Cambodia.446 Likewise, Monsieur Le Fol, the Resident Superior of
Cambodia, wrote to the Governor General in December 1927 with regard to completing
an unfinished aerial photography operation in Prey-Veng Province. In the initial attempt,
the pilots undertook only two flights in the region—one in February 1927, the other in
March—due to atmospheric conditions.447
Despite officials’ efforts, the fact remained that the exact costs of an aerial
assignment could not be determined until the job was finished. This situation could
potentially complicate the general process of organizing, planning, and financing aviation
missions in Indochina. Additionally, lengthy delays between the submission of a request
445
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and the deployment of aircraft affected the cost of the work. This was especially true if
the area of interest was distant from a primary airfield; in this case, the personnel and
aircraft needed sufficient materials and supplies to be stationed at an auxiliary landing
site for an extended period.448
Furthermore, even with advances in photography and aeronautics during the
1930s, these technologies were still vulnerable to the tropical climate of Southeast Asia.
In his 1939 article, Claeys discussed the value that certain technological developments
would have for the future of aerial observation, but he cautioned his readers about the
adverse effects that the climate could have on photographic equipment. Claeys noted that
Indochina’s heat and humidity necessitated that certain measures be taken to protect these
materials. Problematically though, such precautions often were not possible for
assignments that required rather lengthy amounts of time.449
Consideration of the colony’s unfavorable climate aside, aeronautics technology
could not singlehandedly complete the work of photographing, surveying, and
reconnoitering Indochina. Put otherwise, despite the various capabilities of aircraft and
the public perception of flight, there were limits to the usage of aviation as a tool for
developing, studying, and promoting the colonial landscape. French officials were keenly
aware of these technological limitations. During the 1937 Exposition Internationale de
Paris, Monsieur F. Blondel, the Chief Engineer for Mines, assessed the practical
applications of aviation for mining and geological research in the empire. Discussing the
utilization of planes for preparing topographical maps, Blondel commented that aerial
448
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exploration “must be accompanied by an effort on the ground.” He further judged that the
costs of employing aircraft for this purpose remained “rather high.” Moreover, Blondel
reported that the current state of aeronautics and photographic technology allowed, for
the most part, only large-scale maps to be drawn up from the data collected from the
air.450 As a final point, he stressed that aerial reconnaissance should never be seen as a
substitute for work on the ground: “it is essential...to thoroughly underscore that no one
has ever claimed that aerial exploration will entirely replace conventional exploration on
the ground.”451
The fact that Blondel felt it necessary to emphasize this point suggests that
exactly such a belief existed in some capacity, likely among a public for whom aviation
was still a spectacular and marvelous technology. Indeed, French officials noted the
prevalence of this perception. For instance, in a summary article from 1932, Lieutenant
Colonel Edouard de Martonne identified what he felt was a misguided and widely held
view: “aerial photography is considered today as a universal panacea.” He also contended
that many people mistakenly believed that the development of this technology made the
task of mapping the entirety of the French empire “no more than child’s play.” Similarly,
“ill-informed public opinion” was inclined to think that improvements in aerial
photography allowed for small-scale maps to be created with a minimal amount of effort.
Yet as de Martonne explained, an assemblage of photographs snapped from above was
not tantamount to a map, especially as these aerial images had distortions and errors that
required correction via more precise means of analysis. Like Blondel, he emphasized that
450
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while aviation was valuable for aiding the work occurring on the ground, aircraft should
not be expected to replace this terrestrial effort.452
Finally, even though aviation was being utilized for a variety of colonial
development projects, certain observers maintained that flight technology should be used
more extensively in the empire. In seeking to account for why aviation was not fully
being taken advantage of, contemporaries typically cited either government hesitation to
employ aircraft for economic purposes or officials’ reluctance to provide adequate
materials to the colonial squadrons. For example, the author of a 1924 report on the use
of aircraft for creating cadastres asserted that this technique was “slowly but surely
making strides.” However, aerial cadastral work was apparently being held back by a
skeptical colonial administration. Since 1920, the study pointed out, cadastre by plane
had “encountered numerous obstacles, various objections—justified or not—the principal
of which was general and arose from the Administration’s fear of embarking on an
adventure whose outcome, in the current state, appeared dubious.” This writer was
optimistic about the future though, foreseeing a closer and more regular collaboration
between aviation and government and scientific organizations. According to the report,
“the day does not seem far when Aeronautics will be asked to work regularly with
cadastre and not in fits and starts.”453
Glaize described a different way in which government was hindering the usage of
aircraft for economic missions in Indochina. In a memorandum from February 1924, he
noted that military aviation received only a meager allotment of resources from France.
Additionally, Glaize outlined several measures for improving the colony’s air force; this
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list included a point about bolstering this service’s materials and personnel. He reasoned
that these reinforcements were critical to ensuring that military aviation was capable of
“execut[ing] the more and more economic missions that are entrusted to it.” Without
additional resources, Glaize remarked, the air force soon would be unable to carry out
these assignments.454
In 1926 Glaize pleaded anew for more materials, again contending that “the
demand increases, and military aviation remains the same.” In his view, the problem was
that the metropolitan government was providing the air force with resources that were
both inadequate and unsuited to assisting with colonial development projects. Glaize
elaborated on this situation and how it was negatively impacting this service’s operation.
First, the current financial crisis had caused “certain restrictions...to the application of the
decree of January 19, 1920”455; according to a military official quoted by Glaize, these
restrictions were “doubtless going to require aviation to limit the missions of an
economic nature that ordinarily are entrusted to it by the local Governments.” Second,
aeronautics materials designed for military use were poorly adapted to the various
economic tasks that were increasingly being requested in Indochina. Stating that the
squadrons needed new types of specialized aircraft, Glaize pointed out that the model of
airplane in use—the Breguet 14—was “suitable for many civil missions, but in no way
adapted to any one in particular.” An upgrade to the colony’s flight technology was
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warranted because, simply put, “the possibilities of aviation in 1926 are no longer what
they were in 1919.”456
Into the later 1930s, certain observers echoed the previous decade’s complaints
about a lack of aeronautics materials for the colonies. For instance, in April 1937 Marcel
Griaule described with frustration how researchers in the empire were utilizing aerial
photography only haphazardly: “until now...aerial photography is scarcely used but in
case of immediate necessity and depending on the chance circumstance of the work or the
state of mind of those concerned.” He added that the scientists who employed aerial
photography tended be those who had worked with this technology while serving in some
capacity with the air force. Most other researchers were not familiar, or even aware, of
the advantages of aerial images.457
Reflecting on the problem in its entirety, Griaule noted a disconnect between the
public authorities who had “powerful aeronautics resources” at their disposal and the
scientific community. As the former were not always well informed about the work of the
latter, the public powers tended to view scientific research—and presumably the usage of
aerial photography therein—in terms of “speculations with distant returns.” To rectify
this situation, he called both for improved coherence and coordination of aerial
photography services and for authorities to provide scientists with easier access to this
technology. Griaule concluded by arguing for a better understanding of the importance of
aerial photography on the part of researchers and the public powers: while scientists
needed to request this technology more frequently, government organs needed to readily
provide the means for using this valuable tool of study. With this renewed effort, aviation
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would contribute more significantly to “the inventory of our colonial riches in land,
plants, and human institutions.”458

Conclusion
During the interwar years, aviation was charged with a variety of photography
and reconnaissance missions throughout Indochina. While differing in their specifics, the
common purpose of these missions was to gain control over the colonial landscape—
whether natural, constructed, or human. In doing so, the French hoped to develop,
understand, and promote Indochina. From a broader perspective, the utilization of aircraft
for economic and scientific tasks demonstrates how aviation technology enabled the
French to imagine that they could exercise full control throughout the colony despite the
small number of settlers and administrators on the ground.
The employment of aviation for this work did furnish tangible results for the
colonial project, as evidenced by the assorted cadastres, land surveys, scientific articles,
and photography collections that were produced with the help of aircraft. In the longer
term, Biggs, in his analysis of “nation-building” in the Mekong River Delta in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, states that aerial photography and remote sensing
“changed the way that most nation builders and those who read their studies understood
and represented the delta.”459
As this chapter has shown though, aerial photography and reconnaissance
encountered various impediments that literally and metaphorically grounded these
services. Once again, the hopes and the realities of aviation diverged. The program of
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employing photography and reconnaissance to develop and understand the colonial
landscape—as well as rejuvenate the colonial economy and public interest in
Indochina—remained incomplete as France entered the Second World War. Moreover,
even as he notes the aforementioned changes in perception and representation, Biggs is
careful to point out that the aerial vista and aerial photographs tended to obscure the
complexities of the natural and human landscape below, thus limiting the effectiveness of
schemes for increased control and better management therein.460
The French imagined that aviation, as a multi-purpose tool of empire, was capable
of controlling the colonial landscape in Indochina in ways that went beyond
reconnaissance and photography. As the following chapter demonstrates, officials viewed
aircraft as a powerful and efficient means of asserting French colonial authority.

460

Biggs, 109, 124. He describes how this situation unfolded in the Mekong River Delta.
“By flattening the landscape into a two-dimensional plane,” Biggs explains, the aerial perspective
“may have overemphasized the fractal-like repetition of human life in [Tonkin’s] ‘infinity of
casiers,’ leading officials...to believe that such designs should be propagated across the Mekong
region.” Biggs concludes that “such artificial landscapes failed to halt the delta’s ecological and
social unravelings” in this area of the colony.
200

CHAPTER SIX: DEFENDING INDOCHINA AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS
In 1911 France’s General Henri-Nicolas Frey summarized the potential
advantages of airpower for European nations seeking to suppress rebellions and control
dissent within their empires. Aviation, Frey declared, would provide colonial
administrations with “easy, rapid, and continuous police surveillance on barbarian
nomadic tribes and on numerous and civilized populations that are, by nature, suspicious,
hostile, and quick to revolt.” Planes also would permit authorities to intervene “with the
speed of a bird of prey” in “threatened or troubled places.” If necessary, aircraft—
“formidable engines of destruction”—would handily overcome the “imperfect weapons,
the cunning, and the ingenious tricks” of the “the so-called ‘inferior’ races.”461 Regarding
Indochina specifically, in 1920 Alfred Guyomar explained how aircraft could function as
an effective tool for both quickly putting down revolts and deterring the indigenous
populations from carrying out further rebellions in the future. He confidently stated, “the
airplane’s speed and ease of travel over regions lacking communication, the...moral effect
it will have on the indigenous populations, make it an especially powerful weapon in this
country.”462
Frey’s prediction and Guyomar’s assertion demonstrate how proponents of
empire viewed aviation as a potent and efficient means of quelling anti-colonial activity
and bringing about submission. Indeed, throughout the French empire, airpower was used
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to bomb and strafe dissident groups, to astonish and coerce the native peoples, and even
to reaffirm to the colonized that the French were their benevolent guardians. In this
capacity, aviation was intended to function as a symbol of power and an efficient means
of asserting colonial authority.463
When utilized in this manner—in other words, to protect Indochina against what
this chapter refers to as “internal threats” to colonial rule and stability—airpower was
most often sent to rural areas, Laos and the Central Highlands of Annam in particular.
This focus on rural areas is perhaps unsurprising, as these regions were judged to be the
most troublesome parts of the colony. Of course, colonial authorities also had a larger
presence—and thus more resources immediately available—in urban areas.464
Furthermore, missions against internal threats involved symbolic displays of power more
often than actual deployments of violence. These aerial demonstrations, the majority of
which took place in Laos, could include other objectives as well, but the importance that
officials placed on the symbolic role of the flights is clear.
Despite the seeming omnipotence and omniscience of aviation—and despite
French confidence in the potential of airpower—many of the same problems that
encumbered other uses of aircraft also hindered plans for utilizing planes against internal
threats. Prominent among these recurrent problems were the challenges of the local
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weather and geography, the limits of the era’s technology, and a lack of infrastructure.
Another concern was competition with Thailand and this country’s air service; Thailand
also emerged as a significant impediment for the French in matters of civil aviation and,
as the next chapter shows, colonial air defense. A final problem—and one that was very
troubling for the French if they wanted to appear as powerful colonizers whose position
demanded obedience—was that planes did not always seem to have the coercive effect
that the French imagined they would. Taken together, these different issues effectively
limited the extent to which aviation could take flight as a tool of colonial control.

Airpower as a Means of Colonial Control
In the late nineteenth century, new technologies in the fields of medicine,
transportation, and armaments provided European imperialists with a safer and cheaper
means of establishing profitable colonial holdings.465 However, as the century came to a
close, indigenous populations began to gain access to certain of these technologies,
especially weapons, and utilized them to resist colonial authority. Accordingly,
colonizers sought to develop new technologies in order to remain in a dominant position.
While colonial territories had served as laboratories for testing and refining new methods
of organized violence even before the First World War, this practice only intensified in
the interwar years as wartime advances in weapons technology were put to lethal use
overseas. In addition, European nations employed new weaponry to police their empires
partly because the colonial landscape—distant from Europe and subject to fewer national
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and international regulations—was considered to be a more acceptable setting than the
European continent for experimentation.466
Daniel R. Headrick contends that the “most striking” of the technological
innovations for maintaining control within European empires was the airplane, which
“promised to give [colonizers] back the advantage they were losing on the ground.”
Aviation allowed colonial powers to maintain authority at minimal cost, the “maximum
projection of and minimum actual use of force,” according to historian Priya Satia.467
Martin Thomas likewise argues that aircraft—the arch example of colonial powers
seeking to effectively and cheaply maintain their authority—radically altered the
political, military, and cultural significance of the colonial airspace.468
Regarding France and its colonies, Jean-Baptiste Manchon observes that the
French expected that aircraft would greatly benefit the empire in terms of “prestige,
force, and development.” Initially, colonial aviation often was linked to local military
operations, but, by the mid-1930s, the “political usage” of aviation had both intensified
466
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and diversified across the empire.469 This progression was evident in Indochina as well,
although the use of aircraft for multipurpose missions was already occurring in the early
1920s. For the next two decades, the belief persisted that aviation could serve as a
“multipurpose tool” within Indochina in “all conceivable eventualities,” able to intervene
swiftly and across vast distances to provide aid to French forces.470

Deploying Airpower in Bombing and Strafing Missions in Indochina
By the mid-1920s, French officials were requesting that military planes be put to
use in policing operations to stamp out anti-colonial activity in Indochina. There does not
appear to be a scholarly consensus regarding exactly when aircraft were first charged
with these missions, but the earliest instance likely occurred in the Central Highlands of
Annam in the spring of 1924. This region had been causing the French difficulties earlier
in the year, but the use of violent force was not authorized until the spring.471 By this
point in the year, a group of “Mois” people in and around the village of Konkroi had
made it known to the local administration that they vehemently opposed the planned
construction of a road through their territory.472 After ground troops proved unable to
469
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quell the protests, the Resident Superior requested that two aircraft be sent to bomb
Konkroi as a demonstration of French power and colonial authority. In an attempt to limit
the loss of life, the colonial administration warned the local population that Konkroi was
to be bombed on April 11. The bombardment that followed destroyed between seventy
and eighty huts but failed to stop the rebellion. After a group of Mois subsequently
invaded a neighboring village that was supposedly under French protection, another air
strike was ordered on Konkroi for April 18. This second bombing, which came without
advanced notice, succeeded where the prior operation had failed. The following day,
troops entered the village unimpeded.473
For the rest of the decade, the Central Highlands remained an area of concern for
authorities. Most notably, in March 1929 an air strike that targeted several villages was
ordered in response to the local population’s ongoing hostility to French efforts to
develop transportation networks and profitable coffee, tea, and rubber plantations in the
region.474 This particular mission was one of the few instances during the interwar years
in which French military and colonial officials were candid about deploying aircraft
specifically to attack Indochina’s native populations. Between March 19 and March 26,
aircraft dropped thirty-two bombs on villages in the regions of Ankhé and Dak To as part
of a joint operation with French forces on the ground. During these raids, the aircrews
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supposedly were careful to avoid hitting those peoples who were considered to not be
associated with the rebellious elements of the population.475
From the French perspective, this mission was judged to have been a complete
success. An undated, unsigned report confidently stated that “without a doubt the moral
effect was considerable, especially because of the speed with which the repression took
place.”476 Other reports echoed this conclusion. In a letter composed in April 1929, the
Resident Superior of Annam wrote that the airplanes provided “very effective assistance”
to the local colonial militia. “These [flying] machines,” he noted, “have shown
themselves to be the most powerful auxiliary of a vigorous repression.” The Resident
emphasized how quickly the dissidents submitted when faced with a combination of air
and land forces. He observed that various groups that in the past had staunchly opposed
the French presence in the region capitulated “almost immediately” in the wake of the
March 1929 mission.477
Into the next decade, the French continued to rely on bombing and strafing
operations as a purportedly efficient and swift method of dealing with anti-colonial
activity within Indochina. According to one scholar, aircraft “played a very important
role in the repression of the numerous rebellions of the 1930s.”478 Perhaps most notably,
the air force launched reprisals following the Yen Bay uprising of 1930. The military was
able to rapidly suppress a mutiny by Vietnamese infantrymen stationed at the Yen Bay
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garrison on February 10, 1930. However, this initial effort failed to stop the insurgent
activity, and the colonial administration faced additional anti-colonial manifestations. On
February 16, French aircraft attacked the Tonkinese village of Co Am, considered to be a
rebel refuge, dropping fifty-seven bombs and strafing the villagers; the 420 kilograms of
explosives that peppered this site completely destroyed the village.479 Then, during the
spring, bombers and army patrols were dispatched to deliver reprisals on other villages
suspected of supporting insurgent activities. A cycle of indigenous protests and police
retribution continued into the fall of 1930. By September the colonial administration
determined that the provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh were ungovernable. This
judgment was followed by the implementation of a program of focused, systematic
reprisals that included bombing villages in these neighboring provinces and strafing
peasant demonstrators and rebel units in the region.480
In a more specific instance that autumn, a column of between four thousand and
six thousand villagers marched to Vinh to protest excessive taxes. On September 1 the
Resident Superior of Annam requested that military planes be deployed to the city to
assist with handling the demonstration. Sent to Vinh on September 12, these aircraft
subsequently bombed the protestors; though unsure if the group was armed, local
administrators were certain that the crowd was not responding to officials’ orders to halt
the march. To warn the demonstrators, the airplanes first dropped projectiles in front of
the column. Having failed to dissuade the protestors from further activity, the aircraft
then launched a bombardment that killed 157 people and caused the remaining
479
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demonstrators to scatter. When villagers returned to the site in the evening to bury the
dead, the French mistook the action for another demonstration and ordered a second
bombing mission that killed approximately fifteen people.481
Airpower was utilized in a similar capacity outside of Annam and Tonkin, but
such operations were much less frequent. On June 6, 1931, for instance, three planes were
dispatched to Cambodia to bomb several Mois villages and strafe a local trail leading
toward Annam. This action was intended as a reprisal for the late-May murder of a local
French official by an armed group of tribesmen.482
The examples from this section illustrate how aviation was put to use in Indochina
as a tool of suppressing what the French interpreted as insurgent activity. Aircraft were
utilized for this purpose to a greater extent elsewhere in the French empire, namely,
Morocco and the French mandate in Syria.483 Ultimately though, French officials
determined that a strategy of colonial policing that involved the systematic usage of
aircraft, such as that of Great Britain in Iraq,484 was impractical and unnecessary, with the
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possible exception of the Levant. Manchon identifies several reasons for why French
colonial authorities never implemented such a strategy on a large scale: an inadequate
supply of aeronautics materials; the immense size and purported impenetrability of the
regions that would require aerial surveillance; and the perceived docility of the local
peoples. Thus aircraft primarily played a supporting role for ground forces during
colonial policing missions. Moreover, David E. Omissi notes that this reliance on ground
forces for regular policing duties was partly a result of the fact that France lacked an
independent air force in name until April 1933 and in actuality—proper organization and
a defined role—until the following July.485

Deploying Airpower as a Symbol of Colonial Authority in Indochina
Emmanuel Chadeau points out that between 1919 and the early 1930s, military
aviation was most often employed in the French empire as a tool of propaganda and as a
symbol of the power and the reach of colonial authority.486 As the French believed that
aviation represented their control and technological prowess in Indochina, officials
utilized aircraft to coerce and astonish the indigenous peoples.487 Aviation was frequently
bases and patrolled the desert terrain, bombarding local villages and tribes as needed in order to
quell unrest and subversive actions. Satia, 16.
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used for this purpose in Laos or in the Central Highlands of Annam, regions where the
French acutely felt the need to remind dissident groups that colonial power radiated far
beyond the colony’s political and commercial centers.
It is worth noting that airplane sightings had an effect on the Europeans in the
colony as well. This point serves as a reminder that in the 1920s and 1930s, aviation was
still a technology with which most people did not regularly have direct contact. Thus it
was not uncommon for the appearance of an aircraft to spark public interest and even to
amaze onlookers. For example, the French Resident in the Cambodian city of
Battambang described a mid-June 1920 landing at the local airfield. This official, a
Monsieur Lambert, observed that the city’s European and indigenous populations
gathered en masse around the airfield to welcome the two-person crew. The following
day, a crowd of several thousand people convened to watch the plane’s departure. “Soon
the aircraft disappeared in the clouds,” Lambert recounted, “leaving each person with the
memory of an unforgettable and unprecedented spectacle.”488
From the early 1920s, French officials attested to the value of aviation as a potent
source of French prestige and colonial authority. For instance, Battalion Chief Roux
remarked in January 1923 that airplanes were an “excellent and productive manifestation
of our superiority.” Three years later Jules Bosc, the Resident Superior of Laos, referred
to aircraft as an “admirable instrument of propaganda” that produced both awe and
submission among Indochina’s native populations. He wrote of “the considerable and
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occasionally prodigious effect” of aviation on the “mind of the various races of the
country, those who live in the valleys as well as the semi-independent—and at times
dissident and rebellious—groups who remain in the upper mountainous region.” Bosc
subsequently reiterated this opinion, praising flight technology for making a significant
contribution to the “growth of our authority and our prestige among the indigenous
populations that inhabit the most remote parts of French Asia.” He went so far as to
describe aviation as the embodiment of the colonizers’ self-appointed position of
civilizing protector: aircraft brought to the native populations “a concrete vision of the
powerful guardianship that assures their security and protects them from the dangers that
once threatened their lives and their homes.” Finally, at the end of January 1935, Captain
Marcel Puypéroux stated that the act of traveling by air was itself a tool of colonial
propaganda. As Puypéroux explained, air transport of influential French and indigenous
passengers had “a considerable effect on the Annamite as well as Laotian or Montagnard
populations.”489
Aviation was employed for these symbolic purposes as early as the spring of
1920.490 In general, the colonial administration judged these operations to be an effective
means of asserting their authority. For instance, on December 22, 1923, Resident
Superior Bosc wrote that the French needed to “once again to display our flag” in a
region of Upper Laos that bordered Burma. With an interest in “show[ing] our air force to
489
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the populations who still are ignorant of it,” Bosc cited the symbolic power of aviation:
“these peaceful demonstrations of the genius and strength of France grab the attention of
the indigenous populations and have a lasting impact on their state of mind and on the
political situation of the country.”491 Carried out in early 1924, this mission had
purportedly left “a profound impression” throughout Laos and had demonstrated the
“excellent qualities and mastery of...military aviation.”492 In December 1924 the French
Resident in Kontum described the native peoples’ response to the sight of an aircraft in a
similar manner. He noted that the appearance of airplanes in the southern region of
Kontum had made “a substantial impression on the rebellious villages.” The Resident
added that no further action was needed “to overcome the last hesitations of some of
them and bring about their submission.”493
Into the 1930s, the French continued to praise aviation as a valuable tool of
colonial propaganda and coercion. For example, Louis Ménès declared that his January
1930 seaplane voyage to Laos had amazed the indigenous populations situated along the
entirety of his route. Recounting this round-trip journey from Saigon to Luang Prabang,
he claimed that local peoples were both stupefied and dazzled by the sight of his aircraft
and the machine’s ability to land on water. Furthermore, local officials professed that
French prestige among the Laotians would be “considerably enhanced if similar
491
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demonstrations occurred more frequently.”494 In another instance, Ménès described a
June 1930 aerial mission in which he dropped ten thousand leaflets on a sizeable group
that was protesting against the colonial administration in Cochinchina. The circular—
which apparently was effective in intimidating the demonstrators—contained the
following message: “Today I throw paper, tomorrow I will drop bombs if you are not
well-behaved!”495 Elsewhere in the colony, Captain Puypéroux, while in Vinh in 1933 as
part of a joint operation between air and ground forces, spoke with the province’s
Resident about how low-flying aircraft could be used to deter insurgents from further
disrupting the work of the local administration. Later, Puypéroux dispatched three
airplanes to fly over the region. “The result was, so to speak, immediate,” he stated.
“Certain excited minds calmed down and…taxes came in more easily.”496

Multi-Purpose Aviation Missions in Indochina
Finally, aviation missions did at times have more than one goal and, therefore,
were not solely about coercing, intimidating, or dumfounding the native populations.
Such multi-purpose flights typically included either photography work for colonial
development programs or policing-related surveillance and reconnaissance of the
colonized peoples.497 Aside from Laos, the area in which this type of mission occurred
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most frequently was the Central Highlands. Between 1923 and 1927, aircraft were
deployed to this region of Annam to assist with mapping and photographing for colonial
road projects. In addition to providing Public Works engineers with key information,
these missions included low-altitude flyovers that were intended to astonish the people
below.498 In May 1925, for instance, Governor General Monguillot informed the Minister
of the Colonies of the success of a recent aerial operation in the Kontum region of
Annam. Initially tasked with reconnaissance of the planned layout of Colonial Route 14,
the aircrews were also instructed to conduct a flyover above several dissident Mois
villages. While local administrators had made progress in civilizing the area’s indigenous
populations, certain groups persisted in demonstrating a “fierce independence” that
colonial authorities found unacceptable. The Governor General wrote that aircraft were
ordered to this area to “inspire a salutary fear and bring about their submission.”499 This
comment reflects how the French tended to see the modern technology of flight as being
able to accomplish in the empire certain goals that otherwise and hitherto remained
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unachievable; in this particular case, the goal was bringing a particular group of insurgent
villagers to heel.
Multi-purpose missions were carried out in this section of Indochina into the mid1930s. In June and August of 1934, for example, Puypéroux took part in what he later
referred to as “economic and political missions” along the border between the Central
Highlands and South Central Coast regions of Annam. At the request of Quang-Ngai
province’s Resident, three airplanes were sent to a forward post that had recently been
attacked by a group of Mois peoples. This aerial mission and an ensuing air-and-land
operation—each of which the French proclaimed to be a resounding success—furnished
officials with information regarding the most practical path for a future route between
this post and a neighboring position. In addition, the aircraft “made an immeasurable
impact among the hostile Moïs populations,” as local villages subsequently appeared
much less antagonistic to colonial authorities.500
Aside from their utilization in the Central Highlands, military aircraft were
deployed for multi-purpose assignments throughout Laos during the 1920s and early
1930s. In fact, Laos appears to have been the area of Indochina in which aviation was
called on most frequently for these missions. This observation is perhaps unsurprising
when considering the geographical and administrative challenges that the French faced in
establishing and maintaining a protectorate in this part of Indochina. Indeed, this
expansive territory consisted of large portions of heavily forested, mountainous terrain.
Moreover, the region’s historical capital of Luang Prabang was distant from both Hanoi
and Saigon, and the number of French in Laos was miniscule compared to their presence
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elsewhere in Indochina.501 The reality of this situation hints at why officials saw in
aviation an efficient tool of colonial control that could be frequently used for, and
extremely beneficial to, French efforts in Laos.
Not long after a viable aviation presence had been established in Indochina,
officials were requesting that aircraft be deployed to Laos for multi-purpose missions.
The first such operation was ordered in the fall of 1920 and took place in January 1921;
this mission was scheduled to coincide with the Hanoi-to-Saigon aerial tour analyzed in
chapter two of this dissertation. According to a mission order of November 6, 1920, this
operation involved reconnoitering several airfields in Upper Laos and “exercis[ing]…a
moral action on the [local] méos populations.”502 Following the mission’s completion in
January, various officials remarked that the aircraft had both astonished and dazzled the
native peoples. A telegram stated that the airplanes’ mid-January landing on the Plain of
Jars outside Xieng Khouang had caused an “admiring and fearful stupor” to spread
among the crowd of indigenous onlookers. Over the next few days, interim Governor
General Maurice Le Gallen observed, Méo delegations flocked to Xieng Khouang to
affirm their loyalty and declare their absolute submission.503 Similarly, Commissioner
Barthélémy, the French administrator in Xieng Khouang, reported to Resident Superior
Bosc that the arrival of the planes had had “a profound impression and moral impact of
501
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considerable significance” on the area’s inhabitants. Barthélémy also judged that, in
terms of French influence in the region, this mission had been able to achieve in several
days what the local administration had needed twenty years to accomplish.504
Considering the political unrest in this part of Indochina, this assessment may not have
been much of an exaggeration.505
Along the Laos-Tonkin border as well, aircraft were utilized for multi-purpose
missions in the early 1920s. In particular, François Glaize, the head of the air force,
sought to have aircraft deployed to this region in December 1922 to inspect the airfields
at Sonla and Dien Bien Phu. While stating that the primary goal related to developing air
travel to this part of Indochina, Glaize pointed out that sending planes to the Laos-Tonkin
border would also be beneficial for the colonial administration in their efforts to deal with
local dissident groups.506
The French would indeed take advantage of this opportunity to use aviation as a
vehicle for demonstrating the superiority of the colonizers and their technology.
Recounting this operation, Battalion Chief Roux reported that a trio of planes had arrived
at the Dien Bien Phu airfield on December 26, and the aircrews spent the next few days
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carrying out several tasks.507 These jobs included giving airplane rides on request—
Europeans first, then indigenes—and conducting an aerial survey for a future landing
field. Roux described how the native inhabitants were stupefied by the aircraft, by the
speed and apparent omnipotence of a device that they did not understand. The local
peoples, he explained, were convinced that the airplane could travel wherever it chose in
an “unimaginably short amount of time” and that “nothing would be able to escape its
watchful eye and its blows.” Roux added that the propaganda effect of this operation was
“even better than anything it had been possible to imagine.” He explained that “the ease,
the sureness with which the takeoffs and the landings took place, the steadiness with
which the airplanes came to align...one near the other a few meters from the spectators,
gave the natives the impression that these enormous machines were completely
subservient to us in every situation.”508 Of course, Roux’s appraisal was the opinion of an
enthusiastic French observer. Accordingly, this commentary reveals more about what the
French imagined that aviation was doing as a tool of colonial authority than what planes
were actually achieving in this role.
As a final point of praise, Roux indicated that this operation was able to coerce
the Méo peoples into respecting and accepting the authority of the French. On the request
of an administrative official in Luang Prabang, one of the airplanes carried out a lowaltitude flyover above three dissident villages on December 29, 1922. According to Roux,
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this action succeeded in getting the attention of the Méo villagers; the flight was followed
by a display of submission on the part of these previously disobedient groups.509
Multi-purpose aviation missions continued to be deployed in Laos as the 1920s
progressed. The tasks of one such operation from late January 1925 included aerial
demonstrations “of a political interest” above an area whose population was being
harassed by groups of malefactors who had entered the protectorate from China.510 “The
more or less complete absence of any effective authority,” Resident Superior Bosc
explained, “offers these opium smugglers and brush pirates a place of refuge of which
they never fail to take full advantage.”511 Bosc believed that a symbolic display of French
airpower would reassure the native peoples in the area that the colonial administration
was fully capable of keeping them safe from foreign threats.512 The Resident was thus
pleased to report the mission’s success in this regard, writing that the aircraft had “a
profound impact” everywhere that the aircrews traveled. He avowed that every
population encountered was “joyful, eager to gaze at the great birds in the sky or on the
ground...that materialized for our distant protégés, in a form that was all the more striking
because its existence was shown to them for the first time.” As a manifestation of “the
force, the power, and the genius of the grand protector Nation,” aviation had yet again
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provided “the most favorable results for the influence and prestige of the French
authority.”513
Resident Bosc requested another mission in October of the following year.
Specifically, he aimed to have military planes provide assistance in the Bolovens Plateau
area of southern Laos. According to Bosc, aircraft were needed to examine—and possibly
to deal with—an ongoing situation in which a rebel named Komadam was attempting to
stir up further anti-colonial sentiment among several dissident tribes.514 For the sake of
efficiency, Governor General Varenne planned for two aircraft that were scheduled to
photograph of the region’s rapids between January and February 1927 to survey the
disturbances in the Bolovens Plateau after completing this photography work.515
This whole operation came to be postponed, though. With the administration still
concerned about the political troubles in this area, in September 1927 Bosc again sought
authorization for what was envisioned as a similar type of dual-purpose mission.
According to telegrams exchanged in February 1928, this operation, too, was temporarily
shelved. While it was realized that equipment problems would make the aerial
photography work impossible, weather reports indicated that local conditions would
restrict visibility in the area inhabited by the dissident groups.516
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The Limitations of Airpower as a Tool of Colonial Control in Indochina
The problems encountered in organizing the mission to the Bolovens Plateau
serve as a reminder that the actualities of aviation at times failed to match the theoretical
omnipotence of airpower. In addition, because the colonial administration occasionally
found itself repeatedly requesting that aircraft be sent to certain areas, it is clear that
aviation failed to achieve in a single blow what the French believed it would, whether in
a symbolic manner or in an actual deployment of airpower.
Furthermore, officials were aware that mission delays, cancellations, and failures
had the potential to damage French prestige and authority in the eyes of the native
peoples. Speaking to this matter, Commandant Superior Richard Puypéroux offered
comments that underscore not only the contrast between the supposed power of aviation
and the reality of aeronautics technology but also the colonizers’ reluctant
acknowledgement of the tenuousness of their control in the empire. “At the risk of
compromising the moral benefit that we...expect from this new instrument of
domination,” Puypéroux asserted in January 1921, “every demonstration must be assured
of success in advance.” He explained that due to the publicity that was often given to
aerial operations, peoples harboring anti-colonial sentiments would take advantage of any
mission setbacks. Puypéroux’s assessment suggests that the French believed that the
cancellation or postponement of an announced flight revealed the limits and weakness of
their colonial authority, particularly when the flight was scheduled to be carried out in a
region in which insurgency was a problem. Battalion Chief Roux made a similar
argument. While declaring that aircraft were for the French a tool of prestige that “for a
long time will remain unmatched,” he emphasized the need to take “all the necessary
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precautions in order to avoid a failure.” Roux contended that nonsuccess would have the
immediate effect of “markedly diminish[ing] the very great fear of aircraft that...all the
natives have who have seen them and those who have heard of them.”517
Of course, despite the care taken in organizing aviation missions, certain issues—
namely, unfavorable weather, equipment problems, and infrastructural deficiencies—
impeded the deployment of aircraft. As noted at the end of the previous section, poor
visibility disrupted the plans for sending airplanes to the Bolovens Plateau in February
1928. Likewise, the January 1921 operation to Upper Laos was originally scheduled to
begin at the end of November 1920, but “exceptionally unfavorable atmospheric
conditions” and problems with the aircraft delayed the departure.518 At the start of the
next decade, Resident Bosc remarked that a multi-purpose mission to this region of the
protectorate required great piloting skill due to the inadequacies of the aviation
infrastructure throughout the area’s mountainous terrain. As a final example, even the
widely praised Central Highlands bombing raid of 1929 encountered difficulties because
of flight conditions and airfield issues.519
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Another significant limitation to the use of aviation as a tool of colonial control
was that airpower was not as coercive and astonishing as French authorities imagined it
to be. In short, aircraft were not always able to stupefy colonized peoples or to swiftly
alter the mindset of recalcitrant natives, which was a fact that officials acknowledged. For
example, Roux held that utilizing airpower against dissident groups—or threatening to do
so—was doubtless an effective method of control, but only when flights were deployed
regularly to areas of concern.520 Roux’s point was indeed valid; as this chapter has
shown, aircraft were ordered to the Kontum region of the Central Highlands on several
occasions during the 1920s. Yet even after the bombing raid of 1929, officials were not
convinced that this problematic area would remain pacified and, consequently, did not
rule out the possibility of additional aerial operations.521
Furthermore, as previous chapters have indicated, French aviation did not have
exclusive possession of the skies above Indochina. Indeed, the French at times felt that
they were locked in an aerial propaganda battle with Thailand. This battle was especially
intense in Laos, where the French found themselves fighting off Thai attempts to gain
influence over the local peoples through symbolic displays of airpower. As one official
remarked, “it is important to show the Laotian population that France in Indochina also
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possesses an aerial force that is every bit as good as that of Siam.”522 This struggle
between Thailand and French Indochina in the realm of aviation fits into a longer history
of a difficult relationship between these neighboring territories. In general, the Thai and
the French had had a rather strained relationship from the moment that France became
involved in Southeast Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century. Additionally, it is
worth reemphasizing that the Thai had been forced to cede to France a large portion of
territory—from which was established the French protectorate in Laos—in 1893.
Colonial officials were aware of the presence of Thai aircraft over Indochina from
the early 1920s and sought to respond accordingly. In the spring of 1921, three seaplanes
were deployed up the Mekong River on a round-trip journey from Saigon to Luang
Prabang as a means of “affirming our prestige on our frontier.”523 For the rest of the
decade, officials remained anxious that Thailand, with its burgeoning air service and
distinctly non-European aircrews, would win influence over the native populations and,
as a result, damage French colonial authority. For instance, when Resident Bosc
originally requested an aerial mission to Upper Laos in the fall of 1924, he described the
goal of the operation as “counterbalance[ing] the effect on the populations residing along
the Mekong that frequent Siamese airplane flights produce.” Previous aviation missions
in the region were of a similar nature, with one such flight having been carried out in
February 1924.524

522

ANOM, GGI 66492, “[Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à] Monsieur le Gouverneur
Général de l’Indochine,” December 22, 1923. This quote is from a comment, dated December 27,
1923, that is typed on a cover sheet for this letter from the Resident Superior.
523
ANOM, GGI 66492, “[Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à] Monsieur le Gouverneur
Général de l’Indochine,” December 22, 1923; Cony and Ledet, 55.
524
ANOM, GGI 66501, “Du Cabinet Militaire,” November 7, 1924; ANOM, GGI 66502,
“Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” September
21, 1924. Bosc reported that just eight days after the February mission was completed,
225

Several years later, the French were still grappling with the issue of Thai aircraft
in the vicinity of the Laos-Thailand border. Thus Bosc’s October 1926 request to travel
by air from Vientiane across Laos and on to Hanoi was in part a propaganda move
intended as a response to Thai aerial activity in the area.525 In September of the following
year, Bosc used similar reasoning when he requested an aerial tour along the Mekong
River.526 Perhaps unsurprisingly, he later argued in October 1929 that the French needed
to continue launching aircraft to the parts of Laos to which Thailand was still sending
their own airplanes with some regularity. For France, Resident Bosc explained, such
flights were “essential for the safeguard of our prestige and our influence in the eyes of
our populations bordering the Mekong.”527
Officials elsewhere in Indochina also expressed concerns about Thai aerial
activity. For instance, Resident Lambert of Battambang asserted that the arrival of a
French plane in June 1920 had boosted the prestige of the colonial authority among
Cambodia’s natives. Indicating that this landing was especially important because the
local peoples had watched a Thai airplane touch down in the region several months prior,
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Lambert pointed out that the French flight was “indispensible” for counteracting the
“enormous effect produced on them by the Siamese airplane.”528
In any case, by the mid-1930s, officials were submitting fewer requests for
symbolic displays of airpower.529 In his report from January 1935, Captain Puypéroux
wrote of a recent decrease in the number of military flyovers above dissident regions. He
identified two primary reasons for this decline: the continued use of aircraft that were
outdated and unreliable; and budgetary constraints that had forced reductions both in fuel
allowances and the number of joint missions with the other armed services.530 While
these very straightforward causes were certainly evident—the economic crisis that
plagued France during the 1930s hindered aviation efforts in the empire—the drop in the
number of these missions could also have related to a pair of other, more indirect causes.
First, it is possible that the French simply realized by this point that aircraft were
becoming less effective as a way to coerce and astonish the colonized populations.
Second, as they were faced with foreign competition in the skies above Indochina, the
colonial administrators could not hope to utilize aviation as a marker of prestige and
power to which only the French themselves had—or provided—access.
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Conclusion
From the first decade of the twentieth century, the French had envisioned using
airplanes and seaplanes in the empire as a powerful instrument of authority, technological
prowess, and coercion. Like the colonial officials of other European nations, the French
aimed to utilize airpower “to lay the most solid foundation for their domination of
[native] tribes and races,” in the words of General Frey.531 Within Indochina from the
1920s to the mid-1930s, aircraft deployed for this purpose conducted policing operations
as well as flights—some of which included additional aviation work—in which the use of
airpower was symbolic. While the specific tasks of these missions differed—and whether
or not these operations involved the use of weapons—the common goal was to assert the
power of the colonial authority and bring about the submission of the native peoples
below.
Despite officials’ confidence that aviation would function as the preeminent
means of defeating supposed internal threats, this use of aircraft was hindered by a host
of issues. Chief among these were unfavorable weather, unreliable flight technology, and
an inadequate aerial infrastructure. Additional problems were caused by aeronautics
competition from Thailand and a fundamental misconception of how colonized peoples
would react to the sight of aircraft—not to mention a lack of consideration of how these
reactions could change over time. Yet as the following chapter demonstrates, the skyhigh expectations that the colonizers had for utilizing aviation to maintain control and
assert authority within Indochina carried over into the realm of colonial defense. Indeed,
the French sought to integrate airpower into schemes for protecting the colony against
external threats as well.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DEFENDING INDOCHINA AGAINST EXERNAL THREATS
“The situation in the Far East indeed demands all of our vigilance because of the
conflicts that may arise and expand in the Pacific,” Minister of the Colonies Louis Rollin
observed in late November 1934, adding that turbulence within the nations that bordered
Indochina could have repercussions for the colony itself. With these concerns in mind,
Rollin declared that “aviation, [a] versatile arm, would be singularly invaluable...to the
capacity for rapid and extensive intervention.” More than three years later—a time by
which the possibility of another European war loomed large and a conflict had already
erupted between China and Japan—Governor General Jules Brévié found himself
pleading yet again for critically needed reinforcements for Indochina’s air force: “the
defense of the countries of the Union forms a whole, and we would not be able to
consider it effective while lacunae as serious as those that currently exist in the aerial
realm remain.”532
Rollin’s comment highlights how aviation in Indochina was viewed as a means of
protecting the colony against external threats, with this air defense typically taking the
form of coordinated action with land or naval forces; the potential enemy was understood
to be China, Thailand, or Japan, with these latter two taking precedence in the minds of
French authorities as the 1930s progressed. Beginning in the middle of this decade,
French anxiety about these external threats amplified along with corresponding calls for
improvements—both quantitatively and qualitatively—to Indochina’s air force. Much
more often than not though, France was unable to provide the desired aviation
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reinforcements, a situation whose gravity is encapsulated in Brévié’s appeal from midMarch 1938.
There were multiple, interconnected reasons for why the metropole was incapable
of furnishing Indochina with the aeronautics materials that local authorities desperately
sought. Chronic political instability, economic problems, inter-service rivalries within the
armed forces, and an increasingly foreboding international climate in Europe combined
with an aeronautics industry that, for most of the 1930s, was ill suited for the efficient
production of modern aircraft. This chapter thus shows the extensive reach of the
problems that plagued metropolitan France in the 1930s and how the lack of an adequate
resolution of these issues directly handicapped not only the air force but also French
military capabilities throughout the empire.
It is important to note that the specifics of the political shifts that occurred in the
metropole during the 1930s appear to have had little direct effect on aviation in
Indochina. Social, economic, and political turmoil in the metropole during this decade533
of course had an effect on the French empire, and the political instability and lack of
coherent leadership that was a characteristic of France in this period did actively frustrate
the efforts to bolster the empire’s air forces. Yet, in the case of Indochina, it remains
difficult to pinpoint if and how the policy shifts that accompanied the changing
governments in France specifically altered the colonial and military administrations’
approach to aviation. It seems, though, that the meaningful impact was limited. Even
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major political changes—such as that which came with the election of the left-wing
Popular Front in 1936—do not seem to have directly modified the longer-term
development, or lack thereof, of Indochina’s air force.534 This is not to say that metropole
and colony operated in isolation of one another or that political developments in France
had few repercussions in the empire.535
This chapter seeks to avoid an overly complicated account of the minutiae and
shifts in the designations of squadrons and in the command structure of the air force in
Indochina—indeed, a thorough understanding of the organization of the armed forces
themselves requires a grasp of rather esoteric details.536 The focal points, therefore, are
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observation, though, mostly deals with the use of airpower during the French military operations
in the Maghreb and the Levant. Jean-Baptiste Manchon, L’aéronautique militaire française
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For instance, the general structure of Indochina’s air force remained unchanged for
years, but, starting in 1938, officials began crafting plans for reorganizing and re-designating the
squadrons; these proposals were developed even though new aircraft and personnel for these
squadrons—or for future units—were not arriving in the colony as quickly as hoped. Christophe
Cony and Michel Ledet acknowledge the confusing nature of these organizational diagrams,
wittily observing that “from time immemorial our bureaucrats have often drawn up plans and
other charts [that have led], in many cases, the best linguist to be confused.” Manchon provides a
broader example of one of these structural shifts in his discussion of a decree of February 16,
1929, which dealt with transferring administrative authority for aviation from the War Ministry
and the Ministry of the Colonies to the newly created Air Ministry. This directive “definitively
connected” colonial aviation to the aviation service in the metropole and, as a result, left open the
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the general framework for military aviation in the colony, how officials worked to make
this air force capable of defending Indochina against external threats, and why many of
these attempts ultimately fell short. The most realistic option for bolstering Indochina’s
air force was to have the metropole outfit the colony with a capable fleet of aircraft. Two
alternatives were also examined in the mid-to-late 1930s, although neither proposal was
ultimately deemed practical: planes could be sent from France as a means of directly
assisting Indochina in the event of an attack; and local resources could be gathered to
strengthen the colony’s air force. Overall, the failure to establish the type of modern,
powerful air force that was envisioned for Indochina illustrates another way in which the
realities of colonial aviation fell short of the hopes. In fact, the gap between hopes and
realities perhaps yawned widest in the case of aircraft functioning as a key component of
colonial defense strategies.

French Views of External Threats to Indochina and the French Air Response
The diplomatic climate in Southeast Asia at the beginning of the 1920s presented
a reality in which, Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet observe, “it [was] inconceivable
that a neighboring nation [would] attack a French colony.”537 The atmosphere was
relatively calm in East Asia as well, which was at least partly due to three agreements
concluded among six Western European nations, the United States, China, and Japan
between late 1921 and the end of 1922.538
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Drawn up during the Washington Naval Conference from November 1921 to
December 1922, these accords appeared to have laid the groundwork for more stability in East
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Circumstances both within East Asia and on a broader scale caused this relatively
firm foundation to begin to deteriorate as the 1920s came to a close. John F. Laffey
pinpoints the contributing factors and describes how the overall situation proved
increasingly troubling for French Indochina:
The nominal unification of China, as well as the onset of the Depression, began to
pose new problems. Shortly thereafter, Japanese aggression, [starting in the fall of
1931 with the invasion of Manchuria], not only overturned any semblance of an
East Asian status quo, but began to interact with developments in Europe in a
fashion which threatened the entire treaty structure upon which French security
rested..... [T]he French position in the Far East steadily eroded during the
1930s.539
With the danger that Japan posed to French Indochina was apparent and the status
of China a lingering problem, Thailand represented “an even more pressing, if less
intimidating” menace. By the late 1930s the specter of an increasingly powerful Thailand
caused particular alarm. Edward M. Young points out that while the actual threat of a
Thai attack on the Indochina was essentially non-existent prior to the mid-1930s, “the
energy and effort that the Siamese devoted to expanding aviation aroused the keen
interest, and at times the concern, of the British and French authorities” in Burma and
Indochina.540
The validity of Young’s observation—as well as French officials’ awareness of
the reality of the Thai threat—is shown in an April 1938 report written by Lieutenant
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Colonel F. Pichon. Following a recent visit to Bangkok to view a series of aerial
demonstrations, Pichon remarked that he was particularly caught off guard by the
unveiling of at least fifty-one locally built aircraft. The reason for his surprise was that
this spectacle indicated that Thailand possessed more sophisticated facilities for
assembling aircraft than the French had previously envisioned. “On the whole,” Pichon
stated, “Siam is already in a situation clearly more favorable than that of...Indochina.” He
explained that the colony was at present “incapable of building aviation equipment of any
kind on site” and, consequently, would have to rely on the metropole for all aeronautics
resources in the event of a conflict. Taking account of Thai military aviation in its
entirety—including production capabilities, infrastructure, and resources—Pichon
asserted that the potential of Thailand’s air force placed it in a position that was
“dangerously superior” to the air force in Indochina. He added that Indochina presently
could not close the quantitative and qualitative gap between its air force and the Thai air
force.541
Not only was the growth of Thai military aviation rather unexpected, but it also
made more likely a scenario in which the French armed forces would be placed in the
unenviable position of having to simultaneously defend a terrestrial western front against
Thailand and two thousand kilometers of coastline against Japan.542 Air force officials in
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Indochina thus foresaw a situation in which Thailand, emboldened by a successful
Japanese penetration via the colonial coast, would then aggressively push into
Cambodia.543
In his November 1936 report to Indochina’s Council of Defense, Colonel Raoul
Augereau captured the totality of the threats that faced the colony during this time.
Specifically, he described two emerging developments in Southeast Asia that merited the
careful attention of colonial military officials. First, he cited the Chinese army’s
“methodical and continuous reorganization” as well as the modernization of its military
materials and aircraft. Second, Augereau noted that recent years had witnessed the
“increasing influence of Japan on Siam[,] with all the political, economic, and military
consequences that may result.”544
In the event of an attack on Indochina, the air force would be charged with a
variety of duties. Moreover, due to the limited capabilities of the colony’s naval forces,
the role of military aviation would be even more important. Augereau listed the wartime
obligations of the local air arm: determine the adversary’s strategic plans; cooperate with
army and navy forces in colonial defense operations; attack weak points in the enemy’s
1938, the colony’s anti-aircraft defenses only assured meager security against enemy airplanes for
a few “sensitive” areas of the territory, leaving the majority of Indochina vulnerable to an air
attack. SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général d’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des
Colonies,” March 11, 1938.
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position; resupply isolated posts; and provide transport for military personnel and sick or
wounded patients. Overall, then, the daunting situation that the air force could potentially
confront was having to grapple with the challenges of defending an immense territory
against China, Japan, and Thailand, each of which were determined to possess, in
Verdier’s estimation, “far from negligible” aviation capabilities.545
The French faced this forbidding scenario even though metropolitan and colonial
officials had for years toiled to transform the air service into a robust defensive force that
could assist in launching a response to attacks from without. In fact, as the following
sections demonstrate, the effort to provide Indochina with a strong air force began during
the First World War.

Indochina’s Air Force (1917 to 1929)
Jean-Baptiste Manchon notes that officials in the metropole decided on the
establishment of a military aviation service for Indochina at the start of 1917. This
decision had been motivated by recent concerns about the stability of the Chinese
provinces that bordered Indochina as well as worries about Chinese pirates making raids
into parts of Tonkin and Laos.546 Cony and Ledet state that the first unit was created as a
“trial squadron” (escadrille d’études) on July 13, 1917; this group became Squadron One
on April 6, 1918, the same day that a second squadron was established.547
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By the mid-1920s, French authorities were both highlighting how aviation would
be a key contributor to the defense of the colony and expressing doubt about the
defensive capabilities of the local air force. “In the event of a conflict,” air force
commandant François Glaize argued in February 1924, “it is unquestionable that military
aviation would have a very important role to play in Indochina. Unfortunately, the quality
of its personnel [and] the value of its materials would not compensate for the inadequacy
of its size.” He stated that officials should consider if the air force could hold out for long
with its twenty pilots facing the “scores of crews that certain of our neighbors could put
into service.” Three years later, Major General Andlauer forwarded to the Governor
General a program for the development of the colonial air network and the enhancement
the air force’s defensive capabilities. While not fundamentally different from previous
plans, this project had become necessary in part due to the “the increased threat of a
conflict with Chinese units in possession of modern matériel.” The third squadron was
subsequently formed on October 1, 1927, and the fourth was established exactly one year
later. The fifth unit—a seaplane squadron—was created three years later on October 1,
1930.548

Indochina’s Air Force (1930 to 1934)
In terms of qualitative and quantitative improvements for Indochina’s air force,
the 1930s proved to be a frustrating decade. As will be shown, requests for aviation
reinforcements and replacements often encountered critical delays, inadequate
548
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substitutes, and flat-out refusals from the metropole during this period. Yet the responses
from France were not a result of stubbornness, stinginess, or ignorance. Rather,
metropolitan officials—consistently and for most of the 1930s—were grappling with
various industrial, economic, and diplomatic problems of greater immediate significance.
By mid-1933, government and military authorities were considering establishing a
sixth squadron in the colony. By this time, a five-year project for the gradual
improvement of the colonial air forces had been drafted with goals that included the
renovation of the existing materials throughout the empire and the formation of a sixth
squadron in Indochina. While agreeing to this plan in principle, the Air Minister advised
that due to program’s high cost, the creation of new air force units in the colonies could
be carried out only after the work required for the existing squadrons was completed.549
Discussions over the creation of a sixth unit continued the following year. On
January 13, 1934, the head military official in Indochina judged that the growth of
aviation in Southeast Asia, especially in China, should be countered by an increase in the
colony’s air force. To address this need, this official suggested that a sixth squadron be
established in Tonkin between 1935 and 1936. Yet the Ministry of the Colonies doubted
the feasibility of this plan in the format that it was presented due to this department’s
concerns about location and costs.550 In the fall of 1934, the creation of the sixth
squadron was again considered and again stalled due to budget limitations as well as the
need to first upgrade the existing aviation units and facilities.551 The lack of financial
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support for the renovation of the Indochina squadrons remained an issue the following
autumn, but metropolitan aviation requirements proved a more urgent matter. By this
point in the 1930s though, the available funds were meager even for the aeronautics
demands of the metropole.552
By the spring of 1934, Cony and Ledet remark, more than three years had passed
since Indochina’s air force had received newer models of aircraft. In late October, the
Governor General made clear that with the political environment in Southeast Asia
becoming increasingly unstable, Indochina was in danger of being left to appear as the
neglected relative of a distant France. The Governor General thus pressed for the
expedited delivery of a number of tri-motor planes, advocating for the shipment to be
sent at the beginning of 1935 instead of the end. The recipient of the Governor General’s
plea was Minister of the Colonies Rollin, who himself hoped that these aircraft would be
transported to Indochina with enough time for the planes to be put into service toward
March or April 1935. A decision on the expedited delivery of the aircraft was reached by
mid-December, as Air Minister Victor Denain informed the Minister of the Colonies that
he had resolved to submit an order for a number of Bloch 120 planes to be shipped to
Indochina. Ultimately though, this plan was discarded by the end of 1935 due to both the
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priority of stationing these aircraft elsewhere and the eventual decision to provide
Indochina with a different type of multi-engine plane.553

Indochina’s Air Force (1935 to 1940)
Cony and Ledet note the rather stagnant state of the colony’s air force between
1935 to 1938, describing how the status of this service would “but for minor details
remain unchanged” for nearly three years despite the efforts of military and government
authorities. The sluggish—or even non-existent—pace of improvements witnessed in
Indochina was reflected elsewhere in the empire during this time. Concerning
metropolitan plans for reinforcing the colonial squadrons in the period lasting from 1935
to 1939, Cony and Ledet observe that “multiple projects [were] drawn up, all [were]
doomed to fail because of a chronic shortage of money.” Moreover, these authors
indicate that Indochina would receive almost no modern aircraft during between 1935
and 1939. Until 1939, the colony received from around fifty “so-called modern aircraft”
from the metropole; these planes served as reinforcements—but not replacements—for an
existing fleet composed of flying machines that were mostly outmoded.554
As the previous statement implies, officials in Indochina were forced to deal with
the problem of the quality of the aircraft currently in use. Concern about the existing
planes had been voiced throughout the 1930s, but this worry grew more pronounced as

553

Cony and Ledet, 234-235; SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général à Monsieur le
Ministre des Colonies,” October 29, 1934; SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Ministre des Colonies à
Monsieur le Ministre de l’Air,” November 27, 1934; SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à
Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” December 11, 1934. The sixth and seventh squadrons were
set up on October 1, 1939, and February 15, 1939, respectively. The final two, which brought the
total number of air force units in the colony to nine, were both created on October 10, 1940. Cony
and Ledet, 631.
554
Cony and Ledet, 233, 230.
240

the 1930s progressed. In short, newer models were needed to replace the colony’s
airplanes and seaplanes, many of which were either outdated or poorly suited for the local
climate and terrain. For instance, air force commandant Augereau highlighted the
military’s concerns about the quality of the aircraft in his report from November 1936.555
“From the viewpoint of aviation,” Augereau asserted, “Indochina is practically disarmed
if we consider the progress and achievements of modern technology.” He concluded that
both the renovation of existing units and the establishment of supplementary squadrons
were “an absolute necessity.”556
The problem of needing more and better aircraft would not be immediately
remedied despite the continued efforts of colonial officials. At the end of December
1937—over a year after Augereau drafted his report—Governor General Brévié
discussed the minimum program to undertake so that the colony’s air force could mount
an effective defense against an aerial attack. The features of this project—which was a
summary of a plan authored by air force commandant Devèze that the Governor General
had dispatched to the Minister of the Colonies on October 4, 1937—included, broadly:
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equipping the colony with newer, more powerful aircraft; reworking parts of how the air
force was organized; and establishing an additional squadron.557
In this same correspondence from December, Brévié implored Minister of the
Colonies Marius Moutet—he was repeating an entreaty from mid-November—to press
the Air Minister to address the fact that Indochina’s air force possessed no fighter planes.
Brévié pointed out that gathered intelligence indicated that Japanese forces would launch
an attack into the southern provinces of China in the near future, thus extending the SinoJapanese conflict to the doorstep of Indochina. “Therefore,” he reasoned, “it would be
advisable to no longer postpone the sending of these aircraft.”558 That Indochina lacked
fighter aircraft at this point, Cony and Ledet remark, was in part a result of the way in
which French officials anticipated utilizing the nation’s colonial squadrons in a military
capacity. From the moment that air units were first established in the empire, the
squadrons’ military tasks were generally understood to be policing missions focused on
maintaining order within a given territory. For Indochina specifically, there had been
little interest in having fighter squadrons prior to 1935 because of the nature of the air
force’s coordinated land-and-air policing tasks. After mid-decade though, the colonial
administration watched with alarm as Thailand boosted its military capabilities and
relations between China and Japan further deteriorated; calls for fighter aircraft
consequently grew louder.559 Stated otherwise, fighter planes were not needed as long as
the air force was considered a means of controlling the native populations. Only when the
557
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French contemplated that they would be on the receiving end of an air attack did they
think about the need for this type of combat aircraft.
Notwithstanding Brévié’s plea for fighter planes, metropolitan officials had been
working to provide aviation assistance to Indochina. According to a December 1937
letter from Air Minister Pierre Cot, the renovation of the aircraft in the colonies “has been
undertaken inasmuch as possible.” With regard to Indochina, Cot reported not only that
four bi-motor Potez 542 planes were in the process of being shipped to Southeast Asia
but also that the most significant components of the sixth squadron had just been set up in
the colony. The Air Minister explained that several tasks still needed to be finished before
the five-year plan’s goals were fully realized.560 “With an eye to the full execution of this
program in 1938,” Cot asserted, “every measure is being taken by my Department.” He
specified that Indochina’s sixth unit would have all its required materials from the
beginning of 1938 (dès le début de l’année prochaine).561
The improvement of Indochina’s air force did not progress as swiftly as planned
though. On January 25, 1938, Brévié was informed that the Air Minister was not able to
fill the Governor General’s late-December request for fighter aircraft. Indeed, on January
4, 1938, a note for the air force Chief of Staff estimated that the modern light aircraft that
the colonial administration was hoping for during the current year would likely remain in
France due to metropolitan needs.562 In a letter of March 11, 1938, Brévié admitted that
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he was surprised to have learned that there was as yet no commitment from France that
could lead him to anticipate additional materials. He expressed his astonishment as he
referred to several pieces of correspondence exchanged between metropole and colony in
the second half of 1937 that seemed to indicate that the process of reinforcing
Indochina’s air force had been initiated. “Although I had never received formal
assurances,” Brévié contended, “I had a right to expect supplementary air resources, light
defensive aircraft included. This way of seeing things, perhaps a little optimistic, found
itself justified.”563
Brévié forecasted that the issue of sufficiently bolstering Indochina’s air force
would remain unresolved in the immediate future. Furthermore, the Governor General
judged that it was advisable to move away from the current method of augmenting
Indochina’s air force, which consisted of having France send small shipments (par petits
paquets) of planes that were poorly suited to conditions in the colony. In fact, the
Governor General theorized that the utilization of dated equipment in the sweltering
humidity of Indochina was not even beneficial from a financial standpoint. Operating in
this climate, an older model of aircraft—likely to have already been in service for an
atypically long duration due to the lack of a replacement—required repairs and expensive
new parts more frequently than its newer metropolitan counterpart. As he succinctly
stated, “an outdated aviation is...a costly aviation as well.” Brévié judged that the
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colony’s air force remained both “ill suited to wartime missions” and expensive to
maintain.564
Additionally, Brévié called attention to how delays in the delivery of new aircraft
put the air force in the predicament of receiving planes that were already outmoded by
the time they arrived in Southeast Asia. In frustration, he professed that the failure to
provide Indochina with new aircraft in a reasonable amount of time left the colony with
“material that, perfectly adequate to the period envisioned for its usage, becomes obsolete
at the date of its delivery.”565 Brévié wrote about this particular dilemma because, by
mid-March 1938, an announcement had been made for a delivery of four Potez 542
airplanes and several Loire 130 seaplanes would be transported to Indochina; these
reinforcements, the Governor General remarked, had actually been anticipated two years
earlier. Brévié worried that the aforementioned situation regarding extended delays and
the resulting problems could be repeated with the Potez 542 delivery if these planes were
slow to reach the colony.566 He also lamented that even with the fulfillment of this pledge
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of additional aircraft, Indochina would still have an aviation fleet “whose efficacy will
remain quite problematic.”567
Apparently, only three days after Brévié drafted his lengthy letter of March 11,
Air Minister Guy La Chambre had submitted a plan for military aviation in the empire for
1938; La Chambre noted that the main components of this program had been provided in
prior communications from October, December, and January. Among the project’s aims
for Indochina were the creation of the long-anticipated sixth unit and the upgrading and
restructuring of the colony’s other squadrons. In the second half of April, air force
Deputy Chief of Staff Tarnier stated that the process of improving Indochina’s aircraft
fleet was being followed “as fast as resources allow.” These renovations included the
delivery of two Farman 221 airplanes, four Potez 542s and five Loire 130s. As of April
21, the Potez planes “currently reach” the colony while the Farman planes were
designated as having been “recently assigned.” The Loire seaplanes were scheduled to be
transported beginning in June.568 The effort to move forward with the measures outlined
by La Chambre continued over the following months and until the end of the year.569

information is incorrect. In any case, what remains clear is that colonial officials were obviously
dissatisfied with the sluggish pace of what were perceived to be desperately needed
reinforcements for the air force.
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SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général d’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des
Colonies,” March 11, 1938.
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SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” March
14, 1938; SHAA, 2B31/D3, “Plan de Défense de l’Indochine. Note concernant les moyens
nécessaires à la défense de l’Indochine,” [n.d.]. This document is attached to SHAA, 2B31/D3,
“Le Colonel Tarnier, Sous-Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air à Monsieur le Général de
Division Bührer, Inspecteur Général des Troupes Coloniales, Président du Comité Consultatif de
Défense des Colonies,” April 21, 1938.
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On September 6 the Air Minister wrote that he had authorized the creation of the sixth
unit via a letter dated July 22. The two Farman 221 airplanes were to be sent to Indochina by the
end of the year. Moreover, five Loire 130 seaplanes were soon to depart for Indochina, and seven
more Loire 130 aircraft were slated for delivery in July 1939 or even earlier in the year.
According to Cony and Ledet, two of this initial batch of seaplanes were sent by ship from France
in late September 1938 and probably reached the colony in November for reassembly; the
246

In another attempt to equip the colony with modern fighter aircraft, a midNovember letter to the Minister of the Colonies stated that the empire’s fighter-plane
squadrons would be provided with two models of Dewoitine aircraft between July 1,
1939, and the end of the year; this objective was to be accomplished by deducting planes
from the metropolitan units, which is a solution that appears quite unrealistic considering
that the squadrons in France were chronically in need of materials in the second half of
the decade.570 Unsurprisingly, Indochina never received this particular shipment of
planes. In at least three other instances between the fall of 1938 and the following
summer, officials labored with little success to find a way to allocate a sufficient number
of fighter aircraft to the colony without diverting critically needed resources from
France.571
remaining three aircraft left the metropole on October 15. They also note that the other seven
Loire planes did in fact arrive in Saigon in July 1939 to be reassembled. As 1938 came to a close,
metropolitan air force officials sought to outfit Indochina with further reinforcements. On
December 12 the Chief of Staff wrote that additional Potez 542 planes were currently in the
process of being delivered to Southeast Asia. Several days later the Air Ministry indicated that
only three of these aircraft would be dispatched to the colony in January 1939; Cony and Ledet
deduce that these airplanes likely arrived between April and May. SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Le Ministre
de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” September 6, 1938; Cony and Ledet, 291-293,
295; SHAA, 2B31/D3, “Le Général Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air à Monsieur le
Ministre de l’Air,” December 12, 1938. SHAA, 2B33/D3, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le
Commandant de l’Air en Indochine,” December 21, 1938.
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SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Note pour l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air,” December 12, 1938.
Earlier in 1938, a decision had been made to send, as and when metropolitan aeronautics needs
allowed, a total of fifty-two Dewoitine 510 airplanes to Indochina. Cony and Ledet, 244.
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In the first attempt, in mid-October 1938, La Chambre referenced a request from the
Minister of the Colonies for the delivery to Indochina of enough weapons and munitions to outfit
eleven Dewoitine 510 planes, which the Governor General had planned to incorporate into the air
force; these aircraft, currently stripped of their armaments and had originally been destined for
sale to China, were presently in transit in Indochina. The affair was resolved the following month,
as the Air Minister wrote on November 21 that the planes were to be moved to China as
originally planned. SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,”
October 14, 1938; SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,”
November 21, 1938. Then, in January or February of 1939, France requested about fifty Dutchmade Koolhoven fighter planes, earmarking these aircraft for Indochina. In the end though, these
airplanes remained in the metropole, as production delays were followed by the outbreak of war
in Europe. Cony and Ledet, 251; Manchon, 638. The third effort occurred several months after
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In December 1938, metropolitan officials also delineated long-term plans for
reorganizing and repurposing the empire’s air forces. Writing to the Air Minister on
December 12, the air force Chief of Staff provided a detailed note concerning a two-year
project for the air defense of the colonies. Following the recommendations put forth
during a key meeting of the Superior Air Council that took place on July 26, 1938, this
program was adopted on September 14 and included refurbishing and expanding the air
forces throughout overseas France.572 More specifically, the plan entailed the following
measures, which were to be achieved by 1941: renovating the aircraft that were in
currently in service; establishing an air unit “specially prepared for the defense of the
overseas territories”—Manchon refers to this as the “Imperial Division” (Division
impériale)573; and, in total, twelve more squadrons to the colonies.574 According to this

the Dutch order was placed. At this time, officials in Indochina again tried to secure several
fighter aircraft that were originally intended for China; a total of three of these planes,
disassembled and missing certain parts, had arrived in Haiphong in the summer of 1939 for
eventual delivery to China. As a result of Devèze’s insistence, the colony’s air force would
eventually gain a single, fully equipped Potez 63 after a back-and-forth discussion that extended
to the summer of 1940. For further details, see Cony and Ledet, 302.
572
SHAA, 2B31/D3, “Le Général Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air à Monsieur
le Ministre de l’Air,” December 12, 1938; Manchon 635. Manchon explains the significance of
the late-July meeting, asserting that this gathering was critical for defining the imperial policy
that the Air Ministry would pursue until the outbreak of war the following year. More generally,
he argues that by this point there was evidence of the definitive transition toward an “imperial
concept of aviation in the colonies.” Instead of creating squadrons focused on policing within a
given territory, it was determined that the colonial air forces needed to be transformed from “a
simple aviation of domination” into a multi-purpose strike force; these squadrons thus needed to
be able to provide assistance elsewhere in the empire. In other words, officials henceforth viewed
colonial airpower as more of a unified force, the constituent parts of which could be shifted as
required. Manchon, 634-635.
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The Imperial Division was to be based in North Africa and equipped with long-range
multi-motor aircraft. Manchon notes that this unit represented an attempt to shift the
responsibility for protecting the empire from metropolitan squadrons to what he describes as “a
reserve air force capable of acting exclusively for the benefit of the Empire”; if required, the
Imperial Division could be utilized to assist with the defense of the metropole. Manchon adds that
this imperial strike force was “the archetype of what would have been imperial aviation.” SHAA,
2B31/D3, “Le Général Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre de
l’Air,” December 12, 1938; Manchon, 649-650, 645-646.
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plan, Indochina’s own air force was to be augmented from five to twelve squadrons: three
fighter units, three observation units, two seaplane units, and four bomber units.
It was calculated that the colony would possess this projected number by the end of
1940.575
An Air Ministry letter of February 10, 1939, elaborated on the establishment of
Indochina’s fighter squadrons. This document indicated that these units would be created
on October 1, with one each to be stationed at the Bach Mai, Tourane, and Bien Hoa
airfields. The Chief of Staff anticipated that these squadrons would be progressively built
up so that they would be fully in place at the beginning of 1940.576 However, a
fundamental problem was that when this letter was composed—and, indeed, until a
fortuitous but accidental delivery of Morane-Saulnier aircraft in the fall of that year—
Indochina possessed no fighter planes.577
More generally, even officials like Joseph Vuillemin—then serving as air force
Chief of Staff—believed that the two-year plan for the empire’s air forces would still
leave Indochina in a position that would “definitely be insufficient against a powerful
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In this instance, the category of “Colonies” referred to Indochina, French West
Africa, French Equatorial Africa, Madagascar, and French Somaliland.
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SHAA, 2B31/D3, “Le Général Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air à Monsieur
le Ministre de l’Air,” December 12, 1938.
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SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à MM. le Commandant de l’Air en Indochine,
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Cony and Ledet, 297. Explaining this windfall, a letter of from early May 1940
recounted, “as a result of an error in the shipment of Morane 406 aircraft, 20 of these planes
arrived in Indochina, and the 1st fighter squadron was established.” SHAA, 2B33/D2, “Note pour
le Cabinet Militaire,” May 3, 1940. Another issue, which was perhaps less obvious, was that
Indochina’s air force lacked personnel who were capable of flying these modern aircraft. To
address this lacuna and allow the fighter squadron to be in place by the October 1 deadline, three
planes earmarked to serve as training aircraft were shipped to Indochina in the spring of 1939.
Then, at the beginning of August, the fighter-plane training section was created at Bach Mai.
Cony and Ledet, 299.
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enemy.”578 The colony’s squadrons were not alone in suffering from a lack of adequate
defensive means; indeed, Indochina’s armed forces as a whole as well as the air forces
elsewhere in the empire were plagued by this issue.579 This point underscores how
scarcity of material and monetary resources was a widespread problem that the
metropolitan government was simply unable to address without taking away from
France’s ability to defend itself as war threatened in the later 1930s.
While the outbreak of war in Europe at the beginning of September 1939 did not
significantly alter life within Indochina, this event extinguished the hopes that the
colony’s air force would receive major material assistance from France. Moreover, in
Cony and Ledet’s estimation, even the Potez 542 and Farman 221 planes—these were
certainly some of the “newer” types of military aircraft in Indochina at the time—
“already seem[ed] out of another age” in the fall of 1939.580 By the spring of 1940—and
with war underway in Europe—the colony’s air force amounted to sixty-one total
airplanes and seaplanes in service and fifty-four additional aircraft of varying quality and
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November 8, 1938.
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type in reserve.581 Even at this point, Minister of the Colonies Mandel continued to
request renovations to the content and structure of Indochina’s air force.582
While France was clearly incapable of furnishing Indochina’s air force with
adequate aeronautics reinforcements, two other options were examined for improving the
colony’s air defenses. Yet these alternatives—arranging for metropolitan aircraft to
directly assist with protecting Indochina and marshaling local aviation resources within
the colony—each proved as unrealistic as Mandel’s hopes that the French government
would send reinforcements to help in Southeast Asia in the spring of 1940.

Direct Metropolitan Assistance for Indochina
In an account submitted to the Governor General on December 17, 1937, air force
commandant Devèze recounted that several Farman 221 and Farman 222 aircraft had
arrived in the colony in late November.583 This delivery was part of a more extensive
military exercise that had commenced earlier in the fall. Regarding the background of this
air force maneuver, on December 22, 1936, Air Minister Pierre Cot and the air force
581

SHAA, 2B33/D2, “Note pour le Cabinet Militaire,” May 3, 1940.
Air force Chief of Staff Picard determined that Mandel’s requests—these were put
forth in a letter of letter of April 22, 1940—were impractical. Picard explained that these various
renovations, should they be put in place, would be detrimental to the existing air force units,
especially those in the France. SHAA, 2B33/D2, “Note pour le Cabinet Militaire,” May 3, 1940.
The Minister of the Colonies and the Air Ministry also continued to push for major renovations to
Indochina’s air infrastructure in the first months of 1940. In late March 1940, these two
departments provided the Governor General with information regarding the construction of a
large aero-naval base on the coast of Annam at Cam Ranh Bay; the air force Chief of Staff urged
that that the required funding be provided so that the facility could be completed as soon as
possible, ideally in October 1940. SHAA, 2B33/D4, “Note pour la Direction des Travaux et
Installations,” March 23, 1940.
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A total of four aircraft—two Farman 222s and two Farman 221s—completed the
journey to Indochina, arriving in Hanoi on November 22 before proceeding to Saigon on
November 26. The pair of Farman 221 planes remained in the colony and was transferred to the
Tong airbase on December 4, three days after the other aircraft had departed for the return trip to
France. Cony and Ledet, 240.
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Chief of Staff had signed an act for the establishment of an air formation—the “Air
Guard Division” (Division de la Garde aérienne)—on the first day of the upcoming year.
The goal of this unit was to enhance the capacity of the air force to respond swiftly to a
sudden attack, whether within the empire or against France. The overseas maneuvers in
the fall of 1937 included the initial trial use of the Air Guard Division beyond the
metropole.584 The formation of this unit—and the undertaking of the air convoy to
Southeast Asia—indicates that French officials were investigating possibilities for
defending Indochina that did not rely solely on an air force contingent that was
permanently stationed in the colony.
Like other French observers, Governor General Brévié praised this voyage and
the efforts of the aircrews; Brévié noted with satisfaction how the operation, which was
directed by a General Pastier, had left a “profound impression” on the European and
indigenous populations. The Governor General explained that this mission had
demonstrated “France’s interest in its far-off possession in Asia…[at a time when] the
Sino-Japanese conflict leaves a shadow hanging over the destiny of this region.” Yet
Brévié cautioned against becoming overly optimistic about the ability of metropolitan
forces to come to the defense of Indochina in a timely manner. He estimated that with the
probable scenario of the hoped-for material assistance arriving too late, Indochina would
be required to face an initial hostile incursion with only the colony’s own resources.
However dazzling were the possibilities that Pastier’s mission had appeared to open up,
the Governor General concluded, “the air defense of Indochina can and must rest only on
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a complete organization [that is] installed on its soil and that allows it, while waiting for
assistance from the metropole, to face outside air attacks forthwith.”585
Similarly, Devèze wondered if, in the event of a generalized conflict, the colony
could actually count on aviation reinforcements from France. He pondered this question
while taking into account not only the possibility that aircraft resources could be
considered more crucial to the European theater but also the prospect that difficulties
would arise in the lengthy journey from France to Southeast Asia. Devèze wrote that with
the present capabilities of aeronautics technology, this metropolitan aid would probably
consist of only heavy, long-range aircraft. With this point in mind, he made three
observations. First, the successful utilization of such planes would be determined by the
conditions of the local infrastructure.586 Second, Indochina would not be able to expect a
contribution from lighter aircraft beyond those with which the colony’s air force should
have already been provided; dispatching faster fighter planes from France did not appear
as a viable option, Manchon notes, because these planes lacked the required long-range
capabilities. Third, barring a preemptive declaration of war, metropolitan reinforcements
would be unable to provide immediate aid to Indochina in the event of a sudden attack.587
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SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des
Colonies,” December 31, 1937. Brévié added that, because the first objectives of an enemy
operation would likely involve targeting Indochina’s air force facilities, the capacity for action of
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colony.
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The infrastructure did not appear to Devèze to be particularly well suited to receiving
long-range planes such as the Farman aircraft. “Currently and in dry periods,” he remarked, only
four of the local airstrips were able to accommodate these heavy airplanes without risk of
incident; to this list of four airfields—Gia Lâm, Tong, Vientiane, and Tan Son Nhut—he
cautiously added the runways at Tourane and Hué. Later in his report, Devèze indicated his
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SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Compte rendu sur le passage en Indochine des avions Farman 221
et 222 ayant effectué les manœuvres aériennes d’Outre-Mer,” [December 17, 1937]; Manchon,
625. The date of Devèze’s report is found in Cony and Ledet, 241.
253

Air force Deputy Chief of Staff Tarnier confirmed Brévié and Devèze’s verdict
two months later. For the metropole to intervene in the defense of the empire, Tarnier
explained, there needed to be not only a suitable local air network but also military planes
available to assist. The fundamental problem of a lack of sufficient resources remained
though, which was an issue that French officials both reluctantly acknowledged and
desperately attempted to address. Tarnier himself observed, “in the event of even a
localized colonial conflict, it does not seem that the European situation, in the present
state of our air forces, makes it possible to divert units to reinforce the defense of our
overseas possessions [italics original].”588
While the overseas maneuvers were successful in both meeting the stated
objectives without major incident and positioning the French empire’s air defense at the
center of strategic debates. Even so, these exercises had also revealed the Air Guard
Division’s ineffectiveness as an option for defending the empire. In analyzing the
shortcomings of this group, Manchon contends that it was situated too far away, would
take too long to put into operation, and had too few “means of action” (moyens
d’actions). Consequently, shortly after he was named air force Chief of Staff on March 8,
1938, General Vuillemin determined that this aviation unit would be discarded, effective
April 1.589

588

SHAA, 2B31/D4, “Le Colonel Tarnier, 1er S/Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de
l’Air à Monsieur le Général Billotte, Membre du Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, Gouverneur
Militaire de Paris, Président du Comité Consultatif de Défense des Colonies,” February 14, 1938.
589
Manchon, 625-626.
254

Local Aeronautics Production in Indochina
Along with considering options that involved having the metropole either provide
planes to colonial squadrons or directly assist in the defense of overseas France, officials
examined the prospect of having individual colonies produce some of their own war
equipment. Yet a key problem was that, from the 1920s, little effort had been made to
develop raw material industries within the empire. For Indochina in particular though, it
was recognized that the colony faced the realistic possibility of being cut off from the
metropole for an extended period; this eventuality led the Advisory Committee for the
Defense of the Colonies (Comité consultatif de défense des colonies) to determine in late
December 1936 that Indochina was the only area of the empire in which the
establishment of a local war industry was an option worth investigating. The
Committee’s judgment was reflected in the attempts in the second half of the 1930s to
utilize local materials and personnel for building up the colony’s air force.590
By the fall of 1938, metropolitan officials were studying the possibility of
developing an aeronautics production center in Indochina. In late October, Minister of the
Colonies Mandel requested that the Air Ministry provide feedback on a recent study
concerning the local construction of wooden aircraft frames; such a facility would make
the colony less dependent on France for aviation materials. On November 15 and without
waiting for the Air Ministry’s response, Mandel approved a plan for building an
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Thomas, “At the Heart of Things,” 345-346. Even as military aviation was being
organized in the early 1920s, officials aimed to incorporate locally sourced materials into the
processes of assembling and repairing aircraft in Indochina. Yet this interest was, in general, not
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aeronautics factory in Indochina—at a cost of 100 million francs—that would be able to
produce 150 airframes and 400 motors in a year or less.591
Several months later, Air Minister La Chambre expressed his dissatisfaction with
this project, highlighting that the plan was premature and failed to properly take account
of certain regulations concerning the role of the Air Ministry. Furthermore, he believed
that this proposal was, in fact, beneficial neither to France nor Indochina. Elaborating, La
Chambre explained that the project would only allow for the production of a single type
of airplane and that Indochina would still need to rely on the metropole for aircraft
materials, which would ultimately divert precious resources away from France. The Air
Minister concluded that the project would neither “provide the colony with the soughtafter autonomy” nor “lead to any savings.” La Chambre, Thomas frankly states, felt that
“it was nonsense to believe that a solitary assembly plant could produce enough fighters
to alter the strategic planning of the Japanese military.”592
In any case, the plan developed by the Minister of the Colonies would not have
been able to immediately enhance the colony’s air force. At a meeting held at the Air
Ministry on May 10, 1939, it was noted that the proposed facilities would begin
producing airframes—and these would still require engines from France—toward the
start of 1941. The gathered commission, whose purpose was to determine which aircraft
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model was best for Indochina, preferred that any manufacturing center should initially
focus on the assembly of planes using only materials sent from France.. For his part, La
Chambre preferred to maintain the status quo while also endorsing the idea of providing
the colony with enough aeronautics supplies to sustain the air force for several months of
war.593
The commission’s report seems to indicate that the Ministry of the Colonies’
proposition was still being considered in the late spring of 1939 despite La Chambre’s
objection several months prior. By the date of this meeting, the plan had progressed to the
point of a contract for the facilities and equipment being concluded with the Breguet
aeronautics firm. Furthermore, this account noted that the “production surplus” of the
locally re-assembled planes could be exported toward French territories around the Indian
Ocean as well as “neighboring countries,” which were presumably not hostile to the
French. Manchon notes that the effort to establish a local site for building planes and
munitions continued even with the outbreak of war in September 1939. What remained
appealing about this type of facility, he explains, was that it not only allowed Indochina
to address part of its aviation needs but also reduced the empire’s dependence on
metropolitan aeronautics materials. Manchon adds that the availability of local resources
could prove crucial if the communication lines with the metropole were severed. The
manufacturing center was being erected at the Tong base by the end of the year, but this
still-disputed project was ultimately abandoned the following summer. After his
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appointment as Governor General in July 1940, Admiral Jean Decoux ended the program
due to rising costs and interminable delays.594
Aside from establishing an aeronautics facility in the colony, other locally based
solutions were offered to address the issue of improving Indochina’s air force. Most of
these proposals involved utilizing the colony’s existing manpower and machines. For
example, in 1935 a General Armengaud conducted a two-week tour of Indochina’s
airfields and aero clubs, taking time to encourage local Frenchmen to train as pilots.
Armengaud envisioned the formation of a reserve air force consisting of aero-club
members from around the empire. Despite enthusiastic responses from the settler
populations, this idea was unrealistic given that France already was failing to meet
metropolitan demands for military aircraft and thus could not be expected to supply the
empire with additional materials. As further evidence of this plan’s impracticality,
Thomas’ cleverly observes that “a host of trained settler pilots was no more feasible than
divisions of Mois tribesmen halting a Japanese advance.” As a more reasonable option
for employing aero-club resources, Devèze proposed using the groups’ equipment and
personnel for transporting military orders and General Staff officers.595
Separately, Devèze suggested that the air force could requisition the
crewmembers and aircraft that Air France was using on its recently opened route between
Hanoi and Saigon. By early 1938, air force commandants throughout the empire were
granted the power to requisition civilian aircraft, crew, and any infrastructural materials
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in the event of mobilization for war. Responding to an inquiry about the application of
this statute to Air France’s line to Indochina, Minister of the Colonies Théodore Steeg
wrote that the personnel and materials used on the route east of Karachi would be
withdrawn to Saigon; the six aircraft that traversed this section would then be repurposed
as a section of cargo planes. As a means of further compensating for the air force’s
shortages, Steeg also pointed out that the Air Minister had determined that private
tourism aircraft could be requisitioned.596
Reflecting on options for putting civilian aviation resources at the disposal of the
air force, certain officials were unconvinced about the military value of Indochina’s nonmilitary personnel and aircraft. Augereau, for instance, voiced skepticism regarding the
advantage of employing commercial and tourism planes. In late November 1936, he
expressed serious doubts about the extent to which such additions would improve the
capabilities of the military squadrons. Even prior to the mid-1930s, officials had appeared
unwilling to entrust parts of the civilian workforce with the task of making a productive
contribution to the air force. Glaize opined in February 1924 that the only way to
overcome the weak position of the colony’s air service was to mobilize reserve personnel
and use local facilities to meet some of the requirements for aeronautics supplies.
“Without mentioning it for now,” Glaize added, “we can also avoid the assistance of
personnel and material from civil aviation companies that could come to be set up in
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Indochina.”597 Yet the fact that French officials had to seriously consider pressing civilian
resources into the service of the air force underscores the increasingly desperate situation
that French Indochina faced by the later 1930s.

The French Air Force, the Aeronautics Industry, and the Economy
By the mid-1930s the external threats to Indochina were evident, as were different
options for how to deal with these menaces. Yet the efforts to quantitatively and
qualitatively improve the colony’s air force were mired in a morass of economic, interservice, and industrial challenges that originated in a France that was scrambling to
address the looming danger of a second European conflict. As the effects of these
problems radiated from metropole to colony, they essentially stymied the development of
a military aviation presence that was capable of providing an air defense for Indochina.
John E. Dreifort observes that military officials in France firmly believed that the
majority of the nation’s defensive capabilities would be needed to stave off Germany in
the event of war. Consequently and even without considering the additional blows that
the economic crisis dealt to Indochina, France’s military forces in Southeast Asia would
be “woefully inadequate” to take the lead in containing Japanese expansion efforts.598 As
Dreifort’s comment implies in referencing the need to focus on the defense of France,
Indochina’s military deficiencies were not singular. Simply put, the French government
prioritized the defense of the metropole over protecting the empire. “Reduced to
essence,” Thomas states, “empire defense was an unaffordable luxury to a France
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struggling to meet the threat of German invasion.”599 Additionally, France lacked a
coherent program for defending the entire empire. The expectation was that imperial
resources would be used in some capacity to support the French war effort in Europe. By
the mid-1930s the defense plan was, in Thomas’ estimation, a “confusing and ad hoc
system” that failed to reconcile the fact the colonial forces would not only have to ensure
security in the empire but would also likely have to serve in France. In fact, Thomas
argues that Indochina’s situation in the 1930s highlighted, more than anyway else in the
empire, the contradiction between the expectations for colonial assistance and the reality
of local external threats.600 Dreifort summarizes the dilemma that France faced in
attempting to deal with rising tensions both in Europe and in Southeast Asia:
If the resources of the empire were concentrated for the defense of French
interests in China, Indochina, and the Pacific, Germany might seize the
opportunity to attack in Europe. On the other hand, by focusing its attention and
resources in Europe, France ran the risk of providing Japan with an opportunity to
expand in the Far East at French expense.601
Like the majority of Western nations, France faced the challenges of the Great
Depression. The French economy began to feel the effects of the crisis in early 1931.
France reached an economic nadir by mid-1935 and only began to recover at the end of
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the decade.602 Of course, the problems experienced in the metropole certainly had
repercussions throughout the empire. Thomas points out that the negative consequences
of the difficult period from 1931 to 1935 were worse in the colonial setting than in
France, and, as a result, the imperial economies required more time to stabilize than did
their metropolitan counterpart.603 In fact, even when supposedly at its pinnacle in the
1920s, French Indochina was already beginning to suffer from “symptoms of
dysfunction,” as economic and political problems started to arise.604 The economies
throughout the empire showed signs of recovery between 1936 and 1939. However, as
the political situation in Europe concurrently began to deteriorate, France began pressing
the colonies for wartime resources, and these demands threatened to sink the empire back
into a depression.605
The challenges that the air force General Staff and the Air Ministry faced in trying
to establish a viable metropolitan air force also contributed to the struggles encountered
by the aviation service in Indochina. Robert J. Young writes that by 1936 the air force
was both “tactically and strategically deficient.” This situation was the consequence of
not only the economic crisis but also a “clash of theories, neither of which was
characterized by a broad vision” and an “inter-service credit distribution which gave
aviation a low priority.” While military expenses began increasing after 1934, Eugen
Weber adds, the combination of “military conservatism and financial orthodoxy” resulted
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in the air force receiving a meager portion of funds. Aviation historian Patrick Facon
explains that the army and navy had vehemently opposed the development of an
independent air force because those who endorsed an autonomous air arm sought to
overturn traditional war strategies that favored sea power and land forces.606
The impediments to rearmament in mid-to-late 1930s France were not limited to
disagreements about military doctrine or rivalries among the armed services. In fact, for
most of the interwar years, the structure of France’s aeronautics industry was itself an
impediment to the mass production of aircraft. “The aeronautical industry was a
shambles,” Weber contends, describing this sector as “a congeries of small firms
incapable of facing the world of modern productivity and unwilling to test its waters.”
This situation appeared as somewhat of a reversal of the position that the country’s
aeronautics firms had occupied prior to the 1920s.607 Herrick Chapman indicates that as
early as 1928, “nearly everyone connected with French aviation recognized that French
manufacturers were slipping behind.”608
Thus in the early 1930s, France was faced with the daunting task of reviving its
aeronautics industry in the face of both advances in aviation technology and the
impending threat of German rearmament. In short, a comprehensive restructuring,
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expansion, and modernization of the French aircraft industry sector was needed.
However, as Chapman points out, “change of this sort did not come easily in France,
where mass production and industrial concentration were much less advanced than in
Germany…. Most of the major aircraft manufacturers evaded rationalization in the early
1930s.” He concludes that by 1932 the aeronautics industry remained “as fragmented, as
ill equipped for mass production, and as poorly prepared to compete with foreign rivals
as it had been in in the late 1920s.”609 Of course, the dizzying variety of aircraft models
considered for Indochina’s air force during the mid-to-late 1930s highlights this
industry’s disarray.
By the later 1930s the qualitative and quantitative deficiencies that resulted from
France’s floundering effort to mass-produce aircraft were evident.610 Alarmed by the
aggressive actions of Nazi Germany in 1938 and 1939, the French government began a
feverish rearmament plan in an attempt to deliver the modern aircraft that the air force
had needed since the middle of the decade.611 Yet, even prior to Hitler’s annexation of
Austria in March 1938, the French government was aware of how severely unprepared
the nation’s air force was for war in Europe. Chapman observes that a “sense of urgency
actually became pervasive at the highest levels of government” in mid-January 1938
following Vuillemin’s report that in the event of a conflict, the German air force would
handily defeat its French counterpart in only a few days. In the wake of this admission,
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La Chambre, who had recently replaced Cot as Air Minister, was able to gain approval
for a revised plan for aircraft production.612 The actualization of a new program proved
difficult though. “Making aircraft production a priority of the government was only a
beginning,” Chapman explains, “the real challenge was to find a way to apply the
financial resources of the state to enable the industry to do what it had not done since the
First World War—mass-produce airplanes.”613
A major three-year rearmament scheme—Plan V—was approved by the Superior
Air Council on March 15, 1938, and this year itself marked a turning point for the
aviation industry.614 For the first time since the 1920s, the annual aircraft output saw a
substantial increase. While manufacturers produced 833 aircraft in 1937, the number for
1938 was 1477 airplanes of varying quality.615 With the guidance of the Air Ministry, the
French aeronautics industry was able to improve the monthly output of aircraft in the two
years leading up to the Nazi invasion of France.616 Between September 1939 and May
1940, manufacturers were able to drastically increase production. In fact, France
produced more airplanes during this period than either Great Britain or Germany.617
Overall, the rearmament effort occurred too late though, as a wide gap—in terms
of both quantity and quality—still separated French airpower from the superior German
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air service when France and Germany faced each other in the spring of 1940. When Nazi
forces invaded France in May, the German air service counted more than three times as
many aircraft as the French air force. Furthermore, the aircraft that France deployed were,
on the whole, of an inferior quality compared to the German machines: many of the
French planes were “unfit for combat,” lacking cockpit instruments, certain equipment, or
armaments.618

Conclusion
While Indochina’s military aviation service was called on to play a role in
defending the colony against external threats—Japan and Thailand were identified as the
most likely adversaries—government and military officials recognized that the air force
would be unfit for this task without major renovations to the local fleet. This issue of
equipping the colony with sufficient aerial reinforcements became more pressing as the
1930s progressed. However, during this same period, the work of providing Indochina
with aircraft that were more powerful and of a newer design than the outdated and
overworked planes currently in use also became more difficult. Moreover, officials came
to realize that Indochina could neither realistically expect timely air assistance from
France in the event of an external attack nor employ local resources to bolster its air
force.
The consequences of numerous problems within France radiated toward Southeast
Asia, leaving Indochina’s air force plainly incapable of carrying out the defensive tasks
that were optimistically expected of it. Within France, inter-service rivalries among the
armed forces, an economic crisis, and socio-political strife combined with an aeronautics
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industry that remained ill suited for the mass production of aircraft for most of the
interwar years and a worsening international climate. As war threatened Europe in the
later 1930s, the already limited aviation resources needed to be funneled toward the
defense of the metropole instead of being spread toward the outer reaches of the empire.
As Manchon points out, military aviation in the empire “did not exist in a vacuum.”
Decisions made in France about the structure and financing of the air force, the
capabilities of the metropolitan aeronautics industry, the requirements of the metropolitan
squadrons, and, above all, the need to protect France itself, dictated how—and with
what—the empire’s air services would be equipped.619 This situation proved especially
true for Indochina, both the most remote and most threatened part of overseas France.
“Like the other European countries that had an empire in the Pacific, [namely,] Great
Britain and the Netherlands,” Cony and Ledet observe, “the forces in the Colony were
feebly armed and too few in number to withstand the armed forces of a nation like Japan.
Unfortunately, the air force units were the clearest reflection of the deficiencies in
personnel and material.”620
When France found itself facing another global conflict less than two decades
after the prolonged slaughter of the First World War, neither the French air force, nor
Indochina—or the French empire as a whole—appeared as assets to be defended at all
costs. In short, France lacked the resources to defend its extensive empire, a fact that the
French were never willing to openly face. In theory, the empire was supposed to furnish
the resources that justified France’s claim to be a major world power, but, in practice, the

619
620

Manchon, 654.
Cony and Ledet, 425.
267

empire did not figure into serious French thinking about a major war, which centered on
protecting the metropole from a German invasion.
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CONCLUSION: AVIATION AND INDOCHINA AFTER THE INTERWAR YEARS
While traveling on a French plane during his pedagogic tour of Indochina, Jean
Marquet’s young Annamese protégé declared, “I thought I was dreaming: I had just
traveled almost two thousand kilometers, crossed ten rivers, and a thousand
mountains...thanks to a flying machine that passed over all of Indochina in a few hours.”
Elsewhere in this fictional travelogue from 1928, Marquet’s narrator proclaimed, “You
can tell everyone that the French have conquered, by their science and their audacity,
even the sprits of the air.” Elsewhere, in the middle of the following decade, French Air
Minister Victor Denain praised aviation in the French empire as a “perfect tool of
authority and leadership.”621
Whether discussed in works of fiction or as part of the everyday activity of
government, aircraft were for many interwar observers the embodiment of power, speed,
technological prowess, and—in the empire—colonial authority. My dissertation has
argued that the French, armed with this belief in aviation, employed aircraft as a vehicle
for extending, consolidating, developing, and protecting French interests both within
Indochina and throughout Southeast and East Asia. Indeed, an assortment of people and
entities—government and military officials, scientists, commercial airlines, and local
businesses—sought to put airplanes and seaplanes to use for a variety of tasks. The
diverse work with which aviation was charged in Indochina included the following: mail
and passenger deliveries; medical transports; photography and reconnaissance; coercion,
621

Jean Marquet, Les cinq fleurs: L’Indochine expliquée (Hanoi: Direction de
l’instruction publique en Indochine, 1928), 155, 153; ANOM, FM, 3 ECOL/22, d.2/année
1935/1936, “André (élève administrateur), Mémoire sur l’aviation”; quoted in Jean-Baptiste
Manchon, L’aéronautique militaire française outre-mer, 1911-1939 (Paris: Presses de
l’université Paris-Sorbonne, 2013), 652. For more detail on Marquet’s text, see David W. Del
Testa, “Paint the Trains Red: Labor, Nationalism, and the Railroads in French Colonial
Indochina, 1898-1945 (PhD Diss., University of California, Davis, 2001), 133-138.
269

for those natives who refused colonial authority, and astonishment, as a more general
reminder of French control; and protecting the colony against external attacks. In short,
aviation was viewed and utilized in Indochina as a multi-purpose tool of empire.
However, the hopes for aircraft were not matched by the realities of flight in the
1920s and 1930s. Aviation failed to get off the ground to the extent that its proponents
imagined for several interconnected reasons. Problems with ensuring adequate financial
and material resources—these shortages became much more dire as the 1930s
progressed—combined with challenges of weather and geography that the French never
fully overcame. These supply problems and the difficulties of the local environment in
this part of the world—not to mention the distance between Europe and Southeast Asia—
only further burdened the era’s relatively fragile flying machines. In turn, the limitations
of contemporary aircraft were concerning to military and government officials laboring to
install an infrastructure that would allow planes to safely travel in the colony. French
military aviation and civil aviation were also challenged, both implicitly and explicitly,
by nations in Europe, East and Southeast Asia, and the United States. These challenges to
French aerial supremacy were present within the colony itself, although in a more indirect
manner, through the ways that the colonized responded, or failed to respond, to French
aviation.
This stark contrast between hopes and realities extended across the entire
spectrum of how aircraft were utilized in the context of Indochina. Even in cases that the
French could cite as aerial achievements, the realities of aviation tended to fall short of
the hopes according to some metric—whether cost, usage, practicality, effectiveness, or
speed of development. Moreover, this contrast between what the French believed aircraft
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could achieve and what planes actually achieved—and the reasons for this gap as well—
reveal much about the experience of French colonialism in Indochina. Thus my study
encapsulates not only the highest hopes of the French imperialists but also the
weaknesses and the limits of French control and technological prowess in the empire.
Ultimately, in disappointment of the lofty expectations that the French had for powered
flight and their faith in the seemingly unlimited potential of this technology, aviation
failed to maintain, rejuvenate, and strengthen French colonial rule in Indochina. French
power and colonial authority—even in the form of a modern, multi-purpose device like
the airplane—were not omnipotent.
For all intents and purposes, the end of the interwar period marked the end of
aviation as a multi-purpose tool of empire in Indochina. Yet the history of French
aviation in Indochina extends into the mid-1950s. The question arises, then, of the links
between the utilization of aircraft in French Indochina during the heyday of colonial
aviation and the usage of planes during the difficult years that stretched from the Second
World War until the end of the First Indochina War in 1954. The extent of the turmoil
during this period marked a distinct break with the prior decades of colonial history.
While aviation was used in the 1940s and 1950s, the context mainly related to wartime
necessities involving transportation and military operations. Stated otherwise, airplanes
and seaplanes were not employed in exactly the same way in these two periods; indeed,
the scope of how aircraft were employed in Indochina was sharply narrowed in the years
that followed the French defeat in June 1940. While the previous point may seem
obvious, what is less evident is that aviation, both military and civil, did play a key role in
the victories and the defeats of these wartime years.
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Moreover, many of the same problems that impeded aviation in the 1920s and
1930s also hindered the deployment of aircraft in France’s short conflict with Thailand
that started in late 1940 and, more consequentially, during the protracted war with the
Vietminh that broke out in 1946. Mirroring what was plainly evident during the interwar
era, French aviation was never able to fully overcome the hurdles of Indochina’s
geography and weather. In addition, the lack of modern aircraft and an inadequate
number of personnel again proved problematic, as did the inability to find suitable
aeronautics resources either locally or via the metropole. Furthermore, Indochina did not
have an aviation infrastructure suited to the needs of the moment; while these needs
related to wartime requirements in a way that was obviously not present during the
interwar years, the fact remains that aircraft could not operate effectively without certain
basic elements in place on the ground.
A final, major concern—and one that certainly was not apparent in the 1920s and
1930s—was a local population that was vehemently opposed to returning to colonial rule
as it had existed prior to the Second World War. Of course, as my dissertation has shown,
there was insurgent activity and growing anti-colonial sentiment in Indochina during the
interwar period, but the specific circumstances in which these manifestations occurred
were quite different than what emerged after the Second World War. Yet in both
environments, the French wholeheartedly believed in the efficacy of airpower as a means
of putting down rebellion and asserting—or reestablishing—control. In fact, the use of
airpower against insurgency in Southeast Asia only increased after the bombing and
strafing missions of the early 1930s. In the decades that followed, historian Alexander B.
Woodside states, the French military—and later the American forces—relied upon
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“increasingly destructive doses of air power…in a desperate attempt to stop
revolution.”622 For France as well as the United States, Daniel R. Headrick contends, the
firm conviction that possessing superior airpower would guarantee victory proved to be a
“disastrous illusion.”623
For the French, the experiences in Indochina during the 1940s and 1950s magnify
not only many of the challenges they had encountered in getting aviation off the ground
in the interwar years but also the disastrous results of not adequately dealing with these
issues. A measure of longer-term success did occur for civil aviation in Indochina during
these years, though this success was not primarily about the French. Specifically, the
period of the First Indochina War led to the eventual establishment of locally operated,
non-French airlines. As French colonialism made its exit from Southeast Asia in the
1950s, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia each were able to launch their own air services.

The Franco-Thai Conflict and the Second World War
The fall of France to Nazi Germany in June 1940 initiated a sequence of events
that ultimately led Indochina into a relatively short conflict with Thailand.624 Around the
time France surrendered, the colony was defended, Bernard F. Fall estimates, by a force
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composed of “about 70,000 French troops equipped with completely obsolete material—
there were 15 modern fighter planes and one operational tank company in the whole
country.” Furthermore, Indochina was facing “the territorial appetites of both Japan and
her sole ally and satellite in Asia, Thailand.”625
The scenario that unfolded to bring Thailand and Indochina to war appeared to
confirm French military thinking regarding this nation’s irredentist intentions.
Emboldened both by the French defeat in Europe and by the appearance of an Indochina
whose leaders were essentially powerless against Japanese demands, Thailand moved to
reacquire its lost territories. The conflict that broke out, which lasted from late November
1940 until late January 1941, included various encounters between the opposing air
forces. According to the peace treaty—a settlement that Japan mediated—Thailand
regained most of its ceded territories, and the French in Indochina received six million
piasters in reparations. While not a decisive victory for Thailand, the Franco-Thai War
was nonetheless tremendously important for the nation; the conflict represented the first
time that Thailand had won concessions from a European power.626
Assessing the job of the French air force during this war, Edward M. Young
comments that this service “fought commendably with the material it had available.”
Likewise, Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet judge that French military aviation
performed respectably in a conflict that pitted it against an air force that was numerically
superior and outfitted with more modern flying machines. The French air force had
sustained significant damage though: about thirty percent of the local contingent was
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unserviceable by the time the fighting ceased.627 Of course, considering the decrepit
status of the air force at the end of the interwar period, these losses—or any losses for
that matter—would be all the more significant in later years.
Meanwhile, Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery observe that “the war in Europe,
France’s surrender to Germany in June 1940, and the refusal of the British and
Americans to commit to eventual cooperation with the French colonial enterprise made
Indochina an easy target for the Japanese.” The Vichy government signed an accord with
Japan, which gave the French the “illusion of a durable sovereignty” in Indochina. This
illusion was shattered on March 9, 1945, when Japan initiated a complete administrative
takeover of Indochina.628 Despite the damage sustained to its fleet since 1940 and a
shortage of spare parts, until 1945 the air force remained “militarily operational.” In this
capacity, the majority of the air force’s duties involved flying support missions to assist
the land army. Cony and Ledet add that these assignments were carried out even though,
in the event of war, the effectiveness of the service’s completely obsolete Potez 25 planes
was doubtful.629
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Military Aviation and the First Indochina War
Predictably, and as the previous paragraph suggests, the air force still suffered
from material deficiencies by the time France became embroiled in the First Indochina
War near the end of 1946.630 As my dissertation has demonstrated, France clearly lacked
a modern, powerful air force to challenge Nazi Germany both leading up to and during
the Second World War. Modernizing the French air force was obviously an unrealistic
option during the subsequent years of Nazi occupation and collaboration; as Cony and
Ledet note, the French defeat in June 1940 “plunge[d] Indochina into an isolation that
became total in the fall of 1941.”631
François Le Roy describes the “tragic state of disrepair” of French aviation at the
end of the Second World War. He observes the damaging consequences of various issues
stretching from the 1930s until the liberation of France in the summer of 1944: “the
adversities of war, combined with the errors of France’s air policy in the 1930s, had
caused its ruin. The Vichy regime’s misguided actions, the occupiers’ exactions, the
Allies’ raids, and the Resistance’s sabotages had left the aircraft industry in shambles.”
The air force itself, Le Roy points out, at this time consisted of a “disparate and
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restored empire” in Southeast Asia. Brocheux and Hémery, 355, 337.
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unimpressive collection of French, American, British, Soviet, and Japanese battle-worn
aircraft.”632
French military aviation thus entered the First Indochina War as a depleted
service arm. Philippe Gras frankly concludes that the French air force was nonexistent in
Indochina in 1945. For France to expect to deploy airpower effectively against a resilient
enemy, the air force would have to be laboriously rebuilt. In fact, the air fore truly started
being reinforced only in 1949, nearly three years after the conflict had commenced. “In
the end,” Gras writes, “only the transport planes, and, beginning in 1951, [certain]
bomber aircraft, will really be suited for the war. The others, particularly the fighter
planes, [were] designed for air combat or for theaters of operation less subject to climatic
contingencies.” Yet there was no other option for what could be sent from France to
bolster the air service. While the Second World War had of course left France with few
spare aircraft, the French aeronautics industry was handicapped by misguided leadership
as the nation emerged from the conflict.633
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François Le Roy, “The Elusive Pursuit of Grandeur and Independence: Mirage
Diplomacy, French Foreign Policy, and International Affairs, 1958-1970,” (PhD Diss., University
of Kentucky, 1997), 7-8.
633
Le Roy writes that in the years immediately after the Second World War, the French
government’s overly ambitious plans for the aviation industry simply promoted a “wasteful
policy of prototypes” and “counterproductive competition.” The government was not the only
reason for the postwar industry’s disorganization and inefficiency, though. France possessed
neither the human nor the economic resources to manage the “strategic obligations” of the Cold
War and decolonization eras. The French aeronautics industry as a whole, and French military
aviation in particular, did finally rebound. Detailing how the 1950s unfolded for French aviation,
Le Roy writes that the French government finally “pulled itself together,” providing the nation’s
aeronautics industry with the guidance that this foundering sector sorely needed. The air force
was also able to recover, benefiting from both increased direction from the state and integration
into NATO’s defense structure. Yet despite the progress that had been made, “not all was well”
with the nation’s aeronautics industry from the mid-1950s. Budgetary limitations—long a major
problem for French aviation—consistently posed a hurdle to recovery and growth for both the
industry and the air force; these fiscal constraints were only worsened by the wars of
decolonization in Indochina and Algeria. Le Roy judges that by 1958 “the French aeronautics
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The material situation that the French squadrons faced—being outfitted with
flying machines that generally were worn out, required constant maintenance in the
humidity and heat of Southeast Asia, and were a poor fit for guerrilla warfare—proved to
be a major problem that was never fully solved despite the arrival of newer American
aircraft in 1950.634 Indeed, these deficiencies in suitable planes, spare parts, and
munitions plagued the air force for the duration of the First Indochina War.635 In addition
to quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in aircraft and aeronautics materials, the air
force had to deal with a personnel shortage, which of course placed enormous strain on
those who were serving.636
The entirety of these material problems was compounded by the fact that pilots
were operating in a hostile country that lacked a suitable highway network. Aircraft
offered the only rapid means for delivering supplies to military posts and for rescuing
those in need. Deficiencies in other means of transport only increased what was already
to be a heavy reliance on aviation. “Within Indochina itself,” Dominique Legarde
observes, “the transportation routes—roads, rail lines, waterways—were blocked, and the

industry could proudly celebrate its achievements.” He concludes, “the position of France among
air powers had dramatically improved between 1950 and 1958.” Le Roy, 9-10, 14-15, 22-23, 27.
634
The United States started providing aid to the French and Bao Dai’s French-backed
government in the State of Vietnam in an effort to stop the spread of Communism in Southeast
Asia. North Vietnam began receiving military assistance from Communist China in the same year
as American help arrived. The French had also received aircraft from Great Britain, but these
fighter planes were better suited for air combat against an opposing air force than for a war
carried out in dense jungles and mountainous highlands. Mark Philip Bradley, “Making Sense of
the French War: The Postcolonial Moment and the First Vietnam War, 1945-1954,” in The First
Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2007), 18-19; Gras, 19-20.
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Peoples, 335-336.
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As there were no reserve flight teams in Indochina, aircrews carried out missions on
what was essentially a non-stop schedule. Gras, 17.
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maritime links with France were lacking.”637 Regarding the damage that anti-colonial
forces had caused to the railroad network in particular, David W. Del Testa writes that
between 1944 and 1954, “large sections of the railroads...became unusable due to Viet
Minh sabotage.” In doing so, the Viet Minh “deprived the French of a major mode of
heavy transport in areas under French control.” However, to address the military’s
burgeoning transportation needs, the French could not simply lean more heavily on a
functioning local air network that had been installed during the interwar years because no
such network existed. Indeed, Legarde states that the current aerial infrastructure was
composed of airstrips that were “all in a pitiful state” (en piteux état) in 1946 and needed
to be adapted to a traffic that would ceaselessly intensify as the conflict evolved.638
Headrick offers the reminder that “environments can help or hinder conquerors,”
and this latter scenario certainly was evident for the French air force as it struggled with
problems of weather and geography during the First Indochina War.639 While the
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The expectations that were heaped upon the air force were due in no small part to the
fact only 150,000 troops—composed entirely of volunteers and Legionnaires—could be sent to
Indochina; the relatively small size of this ground force was a result of it being “politically
impossible to send draftees to reconquer a distant colony.” Headrick, Power over Peoples, 335.
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the Trains Red,” 308.
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Headrick, Power over Peoples, 370. Gras emphasizes that the region’s heat and
humidity caused malfunctions in aeronautics equipment and made working conditions for pilots
and ground personnel very challenging, even dangerous. Moreover, the rainy season turned
certain airfields into what were essentially “huge swamps.” Some of the larger bases remained
fully operational throughout the year. Other airfields, however, had to limit the types of aircraft
that could land at specific times of the year, and certain sites were simply unusable during the
wettest months. More generally, few of the French airstrips were concreted. The French also
grappled with foggy and hazy conditions, particularly in the more mountainous areas of
Indochina—my dissertation has of course emphasized the problems that these climatic and
geographical conditions caused for French aircraft in the 1920s and 1930s. The environment
proved an at-times insurmountable challenge to the French land forces as well. “One of the
reasons the French had lost their war was because the environment of Indochina was so hostile to
conventional forces,” Headrick states. “There were few roads or open ground for tanks and
trucks. Wetlands, rice paddies, and steep mountains impeded the movement of soldiers. And the
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environment greatly handicapped the French, the Vietminh utilized local conditions to
their advantage. Their ground forces not only “readily melted into the rural population”
but also exploited a familiar landscape that was “the ideal terrain for ambushes and
guerrilla tactics.” Moreover, Gras points out that aerial photography often was unable to
spot the Vietminh’s mobile and well-camouflaged workshops and depots.640 This point
provides a striking example of how the all-seeing, omniscient capabilities of the aerial
perspective touted by the French in the interwar years could be enfeebled by a
purportedly inferior enemy.

Commercial Aviation and the First Indochina War
Though increasingly restricted by a dwindling supply of materials and the damage
inflicted by Allied bombings, civil air transport continued within Indochina during most
of the Second World War; conversely, flights between France and the colony had
ceased.641 Yet in the First Indochina War, civil aviation played a major role in
transporting people within Indochina and between France and Southeast Asia. Of course,
the context for these non-military flights had shifted from the interwar years. As Legarde
rhetorically asks, “did anyone really have the desire to travel to Tonkin during this period
if they were not expressly obligated to do so?”642

forest cover made it impossible for aircraft to see the enemy.” Gras, 17; Headrick, Power over
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Resuming postal and commercial service to Southeast Asia in June 1946, Air
France would be one of several French airlines that provided transport during this
conflict. Indeed, a host of other aviation companies created in the late 1940s and early
1950s offered flights to, within, and through the colony during this time.643 It should be
noted that many of these airlines were relatively small firms that had rather short-lived
existences. These flights, moreover, should not suggest that there existed a flurry of
“regular” commercial traffic but rather a traffic that was primarily motivated by the
necessities of the wartime moment. Such necessities—which only increased as the
conflict wore on—entailed not only passenger and mail deliveries but also ambulance
service.644
According to Legarde, the French airlines in Indochina signed a joint declaration
on June 17, 1950, that asserted that Air Viet-Nam (or Air Vietnam) would be “one of the
first national firms created at the request of the Vietnamese Government following the
643

Legarde, 87. The airlines that participated in some capacity with air transport—either
within Indochina, within Southeast and East Asia or from Saigon to France—included the
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(London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 276-277. Davies provides certain information that
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Pau Accords.” This company was to have an “exclusive monopoly on the interior air
routes coming under the territorial jurisdiction of this State.” The Pau Accords were
concluded at the end of November.645
A progression toward the development of local, non-French aviation was soon
apparent, and this occurred even with the conflict continuing to rage in Indochina.646 At
the beginning of October 1951, Air Vietnam was formed through a collaborative effort
between French and Vietnamese interests. The Vietnamese government owned half of
this company’s shares, and the French government—represented by several French firms,
most of which were airlines—was in possession of the other half. After its creation, Air
Vietnam assumed the responsibilities for “local domestic and regional” flights while
French companies continued to provide air service between Paris and Saigon. With an
agreement concluded in 1952 for Air Vietnam to provide transports to, within, and
through Cambodia, the principal destinations to which this company offered service from
its headquarters were as follows: Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Hanoi, Dalat, and
Hong Kong.647 As 1952 came to a close, Laos also became directly involved in
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commercial aviation. Air Laos, a Franco-Laotian firm created earlier in the year,
launched service on December 20, 1952.648

Aviation at Dien Bien Phu and after
The French surrender that followed the siege of the Dien Bien Phu base signaled
the end of French colonialism in Southeast Asia. This battle also witnessed the
desperation, the weakness, and, ultimately, the failure of French aviation in Indochina.
In November 1953 General Henri Navarre determined that the French needed to
build a base in the mountains of Tonkin at Dien Bien Phu in order to cut off the route
through which the Chinese Communists were providing materials to the Vietminh. The
following March the Vietminh launched a siege on this fortification, which was supplied
entirely by air. While their artillery quickly rendered the airfield unusable, anti-aircraft
fire—combined with the drizzly and foggy conditions in this region—made flying
dangerous and airdrops ineffective or at times impossible.649 During this battle, aviation
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companies also assisted in the dangerous work of delivering men and materials to the
besieged base.650
As part of his assessment of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Fredrik Logevall
states that the French military “committed the common error of overestimating the
strategic capabilities of airpower.” General Lionel-Max Chassin, the head of the French
air force in Indochina from 1951 until 1953, described how this siege “cost aviation in
Indochina dearly.” Chassin reported that 62 planes were lost—48 were shot down, and 14
were destroyed on the ground. He noted that over 10,000 sorties were flown, of which
6700 were transport missions; certain pilots even logged nearly 150 combat flight-hours
in April 1954 alone. Chassin’s comments highlight the limits to which military
aviation—flying machines as well as personnel—were pushed during this particular
battle. Yet his remarks, and Logevall’s appraisal as well, also are representative of this
service arm’s experience throughout the First Indochina War. “For the French air force,”
James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson conclude, “it was a war with too many missions,
too much territory to cover, and far too few airplanes and personnel to carry out the
mission.”651
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The singing of the Geneva Accords on July 20, 1954, put a stop to hostilities in
the First Indochina War. With regard to aviation in Southeast Asia, the end of this
conflict was followed by the launching of local, independent airlines. “As has been the
custom since the air age began,” R.E.G. Davies observes, “the immediate adoption of a
national flag was followed by the creation of a national airline.” He asserts that “there is
no better way of displaying the national flag than on the nose, wings and fins of a modern
airliner.” The reason, Davies explains, related to the symbolic weight of aviation and air
travel: “the airline has become a status symbol. No independent country can afford to be
without one.”652
Indeed, shortly after the war, Air Laos reached an agreement with the Laotian
government for the company to be granted the status of a national airline. Also in 1954,
Air Vietnam concluded an agreement with Aigle-Azur, the terms of which allowed for
weekly air service between Paris, Saigon, and Hong Kong.653 Having gained
independence in 1953, Cambodia formed a national aviation firm at the beginning of
November 1956, according to Legarde. This company, Royal Air Cambodge (RAC),
undertook flights within Cambodian territory. Davies elaborates on the establishment of
RAC, providing certain information that differs from Legarde’s data. Davies notes that
RAC was created on June 15, 1956, with ownership shared among the Cambodian
government, Air France, and private investors. On October 20 this firm commenced
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operations with a route that connected Phnom Penh and Siem Reap to Bangkok; service
to Hong Kong was launched in early July of the following year.654

Conclusion
As Gordon Pirie contends in discussing civil aviation in the British Empire—and
as my dissertation has argued for aviation as a whole in French Indochina—“the gap
between rhetoric and reality of Empire aviation was a marked one.”655 The French—
dazzled by the myriad possibilities of aviation as a tool of empire—found their hopes for
what aircraft would accomplish in the service of empire dashed by the realities of
developing and utilizing aviation. Aviation was not, as the interwar public was inclined to
believe according to French Deputy Léon Archimbaud, “a panacea, capable of fulfilling
all the missions in the blink of an eye.”656 Stated otherwise, aviation failed to provide
metropolitan officials and colonial and military authorities with a definitive means of
managing and solving the problems that existed on the ground in Indochina.
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